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 In this thesis, I characterise the Roman republican diaspora in the western 
Mediterranean, on the basis of the various activities which prompted the migration of 
individuals from Italy. The intention of my discussion is to examine the connection 
between republican imperialism and the generally obscure individuals who were the 
actual participants in empire. This is partly a response to Brunt’s Italian Manpower, in 
so far as Brunt’s minimalist calculation of the population of the diaspora discouraged 
subsequent research on the subject. To accomplish this, I have relied principally on the 
available literary references as the foundation of a thematic analysis of the diaspora, 
considering migration of those in the military or associated with it, as well as those 
involved in various categories of commercial activity. The settlement of former soldiers 
was frequently connected with the re-organisation of overseas communities by Roman 
generals. Commercial activity was examined with reference to a general model for trade 
in the late republic, which emphasises the role of agents acting on behalf of wealthier 
individuals in Italy. I also considered more general characteristics of the diaspora. 
Firstly, I have proposed a maximum population for the diaspora at the end of the 
republic of 170,000. Secondly, I have proposed that communities of the diaspora were 
organising themselves into conventus by the 70s BC. Finally, I have suggested that the 
social and economic networks of the diaspora can be modelled in terms of a network of 
bilateral connections between communities, though with particularly strong connections 








 A thesis such as mine is a tremendous amount of work, and one that that would 
be truly impossible to achieve without the advice, encouragement, and support of an 
entire network from mentors to colleagues and family. First and foremost, I offer my 
wholehearted gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Greg Woolf, whose seemingly 
boundless knowledge has informed and guided me throughout my work. His generous 
support and infinite patience have accompanied this project from the merest hint of an 
idea to the finished, printed product. I can only hope to aspire to the example which 
Greg has set as both an academic and a mentor. My thanks are also due to Professor Jill 
Harries, whose valued suggestions at early stages of my work have unquestionably been 
woven into the fabric of the final result. 
The School of Classics boasts a community of staff and postgraduates that is at 
once stimulating and welcoming. I regret that I cannot single out all who deserve 
recognition, though I would like to offer my thanks to our secretaries, Irene Paulton and 
Margaret Goudie, who were invariably able to resolve the insoluble problems that a 
postgraduate might encounter. My fellow postgraduates made each day of labour in the 
office that much brighter, even when a finished thesis seemed a distant prospect. 
I would also like to thank the School of Classics for its generous financial 
support. In times of economic hardship, such assistance is most gratefully received. I 
have also received support for attendance at conferences from the Wiedemann 
Memorial Fund, and the Classical Association, both of which are most appreciated. 
My final thanks are for my family. To my siblings, Jason and Emily, who have 
endured my preoccupation with all things Roman these many years. Even when I was 
viii 
 
writing the proposal for this project, they were helping me gain access to library 
materials, and have continued to give me help and encouragement. My parents, Brian 
and Rosemary, inculcated in me a desire for learning from as early an age as I can 
remember. That fire for knowledge and understanding has burned ever since, even if the 
path I have taken to this stage has been a winding one. Finally, to my dearest wife, 
Kayla. You have watched every day of my labour on this thesis, and have shown an 
unwavering faith in my ability to bring it to fruition. Truly, you are my light.
ix 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction          1 
Chapter One – Military Settlers       7 
 1.1 – Introduction        7 
 1.2 – Soldiers, Settlers, and Italian Demography    8 
 1.3 – Spain         17 
 1.4 – The Mediterranean Islands      38 
 1.5 – Africa         49 
 1.6 – Transalpine Gaul       54 
 1.7 – Conclusion        58 
Chapter Two – Non-Combatants & Military Suppliers    63 
 2.1 – Introduction        63 
 2.2 – Non-Combatants       65 
 2.3 – Military Suppliers       76 
 2.4 – Conclusion        83 
Chapter Three – Grain Trade       87 
 3.1 – Introduction        87 
 3.2 – The Economic Background      89 
 3.3 – The Sicilian Grain Trade      102 
3.4 – The Spanish Grain Trade      107 
3.5 – The Sardinian Grain Trade      113 
3.6 – The African Grain Trade      117 
3.7 – The Gallic Grain Trade       121 
x 
 
3.8 – Conclusion        127 
Chapter Four – The Diversity of Traders      129 
 4.1 – Introduction        129 
 4.2 – Wine         133 
 4.3 – Oil and Fish Products       143 
 4.4 – Slaves         148 
 4.5 – Social Conditions of Trade      154 
 4.6 – Conclusion        162 
Chapter Five – Mining        165 
 5.1 – Introduction        165 
 5.2 – Administration of Mines      167 
 5.3 – Mines and Personnel       178 
 5.4 – Conclusion        181 
Chapter Six – Demography of the Diaspora     185 
 6.1 – Introduction        185 
 6.2 – Quantifying the Diaspora      186 
 6.3 – Patterns of Population Movement     196 
 6.4 – Chronology of the Diaspora      202 
 6.5 – Conclusion        210 
Chapter Seven – Social Conditions of the Diaspora at the end of the Republic 213 
 7.1 – Introduction        213 
 7.2 – Community Formation and the Roman conventus   217 
 7.3 – Social Relations with Rome and Across the Diaspora   229 
 7.4 – Conclusion        234 
xi 
 
Conclusion          237 







 Who were the people involved in Roman republican imperialism? What sort of 
societies did they help to create? A traditional, simplistic sort of history might focus on 
the role of magistrates and armies in extending Roman power over ever greater areas. A 
more realistic picture of this imperialism must incorporate a broader range of 
individuals. Post-colonial approaches have thus tended to emphasise the active 
influence of indigenous peoples in the development of Roman imperialism. Another 
group of individuals remains to be considered, however: those who travelled from Italy 
into regions of the Mediterranean which were increasingly subordinate to Rome. This 
diaspora was usually considered only incidentally in ancient sources, and has received 
relatively little attention in modern scholarship. A notable exception to this was 
Wilson’s 1966 work, Emigration from Italy in the Republican age of Rome, yet the 
intervening decades demand that the subject be revisited in light of subsequent research. 
Brunt’s Italian Manpower, published five years later, contributed to the neglect of the 
diaspora through a minimalist estimation of the population of Romans overseas. 
In many respects, the objective of this thesis will be to address the lack of a 
detailed modern account of the communities of the Roman diaspora, in a fashion 
informed by recent scholarship on pertinent subjects. Accordingly, matters as diverse as 
Italian demography, the organisation of the Roman economy, and models of cultural 
contact, all play a role in supporting my discussion. These research questions could be 
seen as elements of a much larger question of how the republican empire itself worked, 
not in merely administrative terms, but on a more personal scale. My interest lies in 
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establishing the connection between republican imperialism, and the relatively obscure 
individuals whose migration from Italy made them participants in empire. 
 I have imposed certain chronological and geographical limits on my discussion, 
in order to facilitate a detailed and thorough examination of the Roman diaspora within 
the space available. Chronologically, I am concerned with the republican diaspora, 
specifically between the end of the First Punic War in 241 BC, and the death of Caesar 
in 44 BC. Although evidence does exist for the presence of individual Italians overseas 
in the centuries prior to 241, it is relatively sporadic. The absolute number of migrants 
prior to 241 was probably quite low; as will be discussed in chapter six, the first real 
watershed in the growth of the diaspora probably occurred at the end of the third 
century, in association with the end of the Second Punic War. Since 241 marked the 
beginning of Rome’s control of territory overseas, my choice of start date also means 
that I will be considering the diaspora in the context of the increasing geographical 
scope of Roman imperialism. I chose a terminal date of 44 specifically to avoid 
addressing the altered conditions associated with the establishment of the Principate. 
The Augustan period saw the foundation of veteran settlements overseas, as well as a 
reorganisation of existing communities and the establishment of new or altered 
connections between them and Rome. Despite certain continuities between the diaspora 
of the republic and that of the Principate, these were fundamental changes. While it is 
questionable if such different periods could even be considered in adequate detail, a 
work which attempted to do so would be oddly bifurcated between republic and 
Principate. Under the circumstances, the end date of 44 is ideal for the republican 
diaspora to be considered in detail. 
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 Geographically, I have chosen to consider the diaspora in the west, i.e., Gaul, 
Iberia, North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. This is not to suggest that the 
diaspora in the west was substantially different from that in the east. A greater 
abundance of epigraphic evidence is available from the east, which could inform such 
subjects as the social relations of diaspora communities. Furthermore, the east was more 
urbanised than many regions of the west, meaning the diaspora there was more likely to 
be embedded in peregrine towns. I will occasionally use evidence drawn from the east, 
when it sheds light on specific subjects of interest. Essentially, though, the east will be 
excluded not because of any presumed differences, but because it is only practicable to 
undertake a case study on the Roman republican diaspora in a portion of the 
Mediterranean basin. It should be noted that I have also excluded Cisalpine Gaul from 
this study. Interesting though this region is, it is dissimilar in several respects from other 
areas of the west. The establishment of colonies there, the attention given to the region 
by both Senate and magistrates, and its administrative incorporation into Italy only three 
years after the death of Caesar, all suggest that it should be treated separately. 
 Given the chronological and geographical parameters of this thesis, I will be 
relying primarily on literary evidence. Only a minimal body of epigraphy is available 
and relevant to the diaspora in the republican west, while the helpfulness of 
archaeological evidence is limited to certain specific topics. Archaeology is key to a 
discussion of the wine trade or of mining, precisely because these activities have left 
archaeological traces. Conversely, it can do little to elucidate the organisation of 
diaspora communities or their relationship with Rome, and seldom if ever conclusively 
demonstrates the presence of individual Italians in settlements overseas. Archaeology 
could, however, be used as a means of tracing the effect of cultural contact between 
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Italians and indigenous people on material culture. While this is a fascinating subject, 
and undoubtedly important in describing the development of provincial societies, it is 
not a question I intend to address. This is not to downplay the importance of the pre-
existing societies over which Rome exerted its authority. Rather, my focus is on another 
group of easily overlooked individuals: those who migrated from Italy, and who must 
often have been the point of contact between indigenous peoples and Rome. 
As will be seen, one of the important conclusions of this thesis is that our 
estimates of the population of the diaspora should be modestly elevated from the figure 
proposed by Brunt, though not to the degree proposed by scholars such as Crawford. 
Following from this, I present a picture of a diaspora which was concentrated in certain 
coastal centres, as well as in a handful of locations where unique economic 
opportunities drew migrants further inland. The first five chapters of this thesis are 
organised on a thematic basis. This mode of organisation allowed me to analyse the 
diaspora according the particular activities which facilitated the migration of individuals 
from Italy. One advantage of this arrangement of material is the emphasis it places on 
the basic unity of the republican diaspora, while allowing for variation between regions 
and over time. In each instance, interesting conclusions can be drawn about particular 
segments of the diaspora. 
 The first two chapters concern overseas settlement by individuals associated 
with the military, former soldiers in the first, and camp followers in the second. 
Settlement by such individuals was ubiquitous where Roman armies campaigned. 
Moreover, there is evidence that their patterns of settlement were often influenced by 
generals, in a manner more prominently associated with a later period. The next three 
chapters deal with individuals whose migration was motivated primarily by economic 
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activities, including trade in grain, wine, fish products, and slaves, as well as mining. 
All of this is set within the context of a general model for the social organisation of the 
economy in the late republic, emphasising the role of agents acting on behalf of wealthy 
individuals in Italy. This model necessarily implies that sections of the diaspora were 
connected with members of the political elite in Rome, to a greater degree than has been 
recognised. As I shall discuss, the redirection of large amounts of public grain through 
Rome, and the elimination of competing markets, was accompanied by an increasing 
amount of private trade through the city. With respect to wine, the unique scale of the 
trade between Italy and Gaul means that traders from Italy are likely to have 
accompanied the product some distance inland. My model for mines, meanwhile, 
emphasises the role of individuals and small societates in their operation, as opposed to 
larger enterprises. This implies the presence of larger numbers of migrants than 
alternate models might suggest. 
The last two chapters set aside the thematic structure in order to focus on two 
more general issues. In chapter six, I have set forth my calculation of an approximate 
figure for the maximum population of the diaspora of 170,000 adult male citizens. 
Furthermore, I have proposed geographical and chronological distributions for the 
diaspora. The former emphasises regional variations in the composition of the diaspora, 
while the latter suggests a gradually increasing rate of migration during the republic, 
punctuated by episodes of higher rates of migration in response to unique economic 
conditions. In chapter seven, I discuss the social organisation of the diaspora, with 
particular attention to the conventus civium Romanorum. I contend that the diaspora 
communities themselves provided the impetus for the establishment of the conventus, 
and that their judicial role reflects the subsequent decision of magistrates to involve 
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them in the administration of justice. Finally, I propose that the diaspora can be 
modelled in terms of a system of particularly strong connections with Rome, alongside 




Chapter One – Military Settlers 
 
1.1 – Introduction 
 
 What was the role of military service in driving migration from Italy, and to 
what extent did former soldiers remain in the provinces in which they had served? In the 
wake of Rome’s military activities beyond the shores of Italy, literary evidence 
concerning areas throughout the Western Mediterranean indicates that some fraction of 
those who had served overseas remained there. Evidence concerning such soldier-
settlers is scattered. One frequently finds, however, that generals of the mid- and late 
republic were involved in establishing new communities, incorporating both Italian and 
indigenous populations. As will be seen, these foundations took place on a more 
informal basis than, for example, the veteran colonies of the late 1
st
 century BC. 
Furthermore, there are occasional references to individual soldiers lingering, as well as 
to the offspring of soldiers and indigenous women. This population of migrants would 
have given rise to frontier societies in a number of regions, and the goal of this chapter 
is to attempt to trace their presence. 
 Most of this chapter will be organised on a geographical basis, but it will begin 
by setting the migration of soldiers in the context of Italian demography in the second 
century. Where migration from Italy has been given scholarly attention, it has been 
subordinated to debates on demography. These in turn have implications, concerning 
both the military manpower available to Rome, and the characteristics of the society in 
Italy which these migrants left behind. Accordingly, section 1.2 will consider the 
relationship between military recruitment and Italian demography. Section 1.3 will then 
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concentrate on Spain, for which the most extensive evidence concerning the settlement 
of ex-soldiers is available. Section 1.4 will address their presence in the larger 
Mediterranean islands, specifically the Balearics, Sicily, and Sardinia, while sections 
1.5 and 1.6 will deal with Africa and Gallia Transalpina respectively. Having completed 
this geographical survey, the final section (1.7) will offer some general conclusions on 
the overall pattern of military settlement. 
 
1.2 – Soldiers, Settlers, and Italian Demography 
 
 In so far as studies of Italian demography have given consideration to the 
military, they have tended to concentrate on the relationship between changes in the 
rural population of Italy during the late Republic, consequent variation in the numbers 
of assidui available for recruitment, and the associated problems in mobilising 
manpower.
1
 Just as there has been debate over the most suitable model for changes in 
the Italian population, controversy exists over the picture just described. Thus, Rich 
argued that the generally held notion of a decline in the number of assidui in the late 
second century is not supported by the available evidence,
2
 an argument which was 
subsequently applied in support of the high population count for Italy.
3
 
 The traditional picture of the impact of military recruitment during the 2
nd
 
century was succinctly described by Smith in 1958,
4
 and this account was subsequently 
and explicitly supported by Brunt,
5
 as well as by Hopkins.
6
 Their view maintained that 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Brunt (1971), p. 75-77; Rich (1983), p. 287-288; Scheidel (2008), p. 38-41; Lo Cascio 
(2008), p. 240. 
2
 Rich (1983), p. 330-331. 
3
 Lo Cascio (2008), p. 240. See Chapter Six for further discussion of Italian demography. 
4
 Smith (1958), p. 8. 
5
 Brunt (1971), p. 61-84; Brunt (1988), p. 265. 
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conscription of small-holders, and service for years overseas, had such a deleterious 
impact on their farms that these frequently could not be returned to viability once the 
farmer returned. This was coupled with an influx of wealth that permitted members of 
the elite both to buy up these farms, and to purchase slaves to work the large estates 
thus formed. As a consequence, the now displaced farmers and their descendants ceased 
to be eligible for military service, on the grounds that they no longer met the property 
qualification required of assidui. This process has been connected with several other 
phenomena, for example, an attempt to address the shortage of potential conscripts 
through the diminution of the census property value required to be counted among the 
assidui. Furthermore, it has been closely associated with the observations on Italian 
agriculture that are said to have compelled Tiberius Gracchus to pursue his program of 
land reform.
7
 It has also been suggested that a cessation of colonisation after 177 
deprived this dispossessed population of opportunities for re-settlement, thus 
exacerbating poverty in Italy.
8
 Finally, it is against this background, in a change of 
policy often associated with Marius, that the army is supposed to have begun 




 Much of this account has been subjected to criticism. Thus, even the central 
assumption that conscription diminished the viability of small farms may not be valid. 
Rosenstein has argued that a family of average composition in possession of a relatively 
                                                                                                                                               
6
 Hopkins (1978), p. 4-8, 29-37. 
7
 Plut. Ti. Gracch. VIII.7. ... to\n Tibe/rion, kai\ th\n e)rhmi/an th~j xw~raj o(rw~nta kai\ tou\j 
gewrgou~ntaj h)\ ne/montaj oi)ke/taj e)peisa/ktouj kai\ barba/rouj... 
8
 A variety of dates are given by scholars for the cessation of colonisation. Salmon (1969), p. 112, uses 
the foundation of the citizen colony in 177, while Rosenstein (2004), p. 59, uses the year 181, 
corresponding with the foundation of the Latin colony of Aquileia. Brunt (1988), p. 265, meanwhile, 
argues that the senate ceased to take responsibility for the settlement of veterans after about 150, implying 
that some settlement did occur, though he does not elaborate further. Given the silence of Livy after 168, 
some doubts have been expressed regarding the reality of this change. 
9
 Brunt (1988), p. 257. 
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small amount of land could withstand the absence of a young adult male engaged in 
military service for several years. The primary reasons given for his potentially 
counterintuitive conclusion are, firstly, that the diminished capacity of such a family to 
produce food would have been offset by a reduction in their overall nutritional needs, 
and secondly, that a typical marriage age of around thirty for males would permit them 
to complete their military service before starting families. Rosenstein’s quantitative 
arguments inherently involve a high level of uncertainty. Nonetheless, even when his 
calculations are based on unfavourable assumptions about demography and nutritional 
need, they show that military service need not have been incompatible with agriculture. 
Additionally, the evidence for the replacement of small farms by extensive slave-run 
estates is not secure, as archaeological field-surveys have found little evidence to 
support it,
10
 although there is evidence for a range of farm types and sizes.
11
 
Furthermore, Rich has advised caution in accepting the hypothesis that the senate 
reduced the property qualification for the assidui twice during the second century, an 
idea originally invoked to explain the three different figures found in the sources, but 
one without direct support.
12
 
 These alternative positions are well entrenched and, in the absence of new data 
apart from that provided by field-surveys, are unlikely to be reconciled. There is 
consequently a persistent disagreement over the relationship between demographic 
trends in the second century and the number of assidui. Rich, for example, did not deny 
the possibility of a decline in the number of assidui, although he doubted the reality of a 
decline in the overall free population of Italy.
13
 Furthermore, he drew attention to 
                                                 
10
 Rich (1983), p. 296-297. 
11
 Rathbone (2008), p. 306-307. 
12
 Rich (1983), p. 314; see pp. 305-316 for a full discussion. 
13
 Rich (1983), p. 299. 
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difficulties encountered in recruitment in the mid-second century, and attributed them 
specifically to the perceived difficulty of wars in Spain, coupled with the limited 
opportunities for compensation through booty.
14
 This reluctance to serve has been 
picked up by De Ligt, and connected with a contemporaneous decline in census figures 
between 168-133. He argues that, in this period, individuals sought either to evade 
inclusion in the census, or to intentionally underestimate the value of their property.
15
 
Based on higher census figures after 133, he also suggests that the earlier period 
actually saw population growth, as well as an increase in the numbers of impoverished 
Italians, which explains the aforementioned observations of Tiberius Gracchus. 
Rosenstein took a similar position to De Ligt, arguing that the numbers of impoverished 
increased as a result of a birth rate beyond that required for replacement (due to both 
natural causes and military deaths), and the consequent partitioning of inheritances. 
Both scholars suggest that Tiberius Gracchus observed this phenomenon, and that he 
erroneously arrived at the conclusion that this increase signified a decline in the free 
population of Italy.
16
 That is to say, despite a perception of decline, overpopulation lay 
at the root of the crisis that Gracchus sought to address. Finally, Erdkamp, although 
concurring that there is unlikely to have been a decline in the number of smallholders, 
has argued that resistance to military service arose as a consequence of economic 
growth and a corresponding improvement in conditions among the assidui.
17
 
 Erdkamp’s position requires that a significant amount of wealth, which is to say 
enough to act as a disincentive to military service for a broad section of the Italian 
population, trickled down from the elite. While the general plausibility of this process 
                                                 
14
 Rich (1983), p. 317-318. 
15
 De Ligt (2004), p. 753-754. 
16
 Rosenstein (2004), p. 17. 
17
 Erdkamp (2006), p. 41. 
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seems questionable, there are more specific potential objections. Firstly, the reluctance 
to engage in military service was particular to individual campaigns and was not a 
serious impediment, for example, when preparations for the Third Punic War were 
underway in 149.
18
 Secondly, the proposed mechanism for wealth transfer is the 
production of cash crops for new markets, most obviously Rome. The viability of such 
an agricultural shift must, however, have been a function of accessibility to such 
markets: those growing cash crops either had to be close to Rome or another market 
town of sufficient size, or had to have access to inexpensive means of transportation. 
Combined with limitations on demand for these crops, only a subset of the Italian 
population could have benefitted from them. Finally, it stands in contradiction to 
Rosenstein’s preferred model of cyclical mobility, in which, as small-holders acquired 
resources, other factors such as partible inheritance tended to disperse this wealth, thus 
precluding upward social mobility.
19
 The most suitable model, however, may be one 
which recognises the diversity of experiences among the Italian population. While 
Erdkamp’s model may be problematic if applied to Italy in general, it is entirely 
possible that some small-holders succeeded as he describes. Likewise, although 
Rosenstein argues that an average family could have tolerated the absence of a member 
on military service, he concedes that other family configurations could have been less 
favourable. 
 The traditional demographic model exemplified by Brunt and Hopkins cannot be 
reconciled completely with the objections that have been raised. Given the present state 
of the debate, neither alternative is sufficient. While dispossession of small-holders no 
doubt occurred, it is not clear that it was correlated with a demographic crisis. Similarly, 
                                                 
18
 Rich (1983), p. 317. 
19
 Rosenstein (2004), p. 160. 
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although the observations of Erdkamp and Rosenstein show that the outlook for Italian 
small-holders in the second century was not universally negative, they must still 
concede that some were forced into poverty. The Brunt/Hopkins model is a worst case 
scenario of population decline, and the valid objections to it require that decline to have 
been more limited. Whatever the overall impact of military service on the population of 
Italy, demographic trends must have affected the prospects of obtaining land, and thus 
indirectly the decisions of individual soldiers not to return. The changes which Tiberius 
Gracchus observed in the countryside were experienced by those individuals, and the 
perception of poor prospects in Italy may explain in part the willingness of some to 
settle overseas. 
 What, then, of soldiers who chose to remain where they served? It has been 
recognised that individuals whose term of military service had expired need not have 
returned to Italy. The army was thus an institutional mechanism that, incidentally to its 
role as an agent of imperialism, brought about migration to the provinces in which the 
military was active. Although Brunt took a minimalist position regarding the population 
of migrants in general, he nonetheless recognised that some fraction of soldiers 
remained as settlers in areas where they had carried out their service.
20
 In his account, 
such overseas settlement was associated with inevitable liaisons involving soldiers and 
locals over lengthy terms of service, and involved marriages with indigenous women, 
the children of whom would not have held Roman citizenship.
21
 Though concerned with 
the population of Italy itself, Hopkins was able to speak of emigration to the army 
during the last two centuries of the republic, and he compared it qualitatively with 
                                                 
20
 Brunt (1971), p. 160. 
21
 Ibid, p. 164. From the Roman legal perspective, these relationships between citizen males and peregrine 
women lacking conubium would not have been recognised as marriages. 
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migration to Rome in terms of its impact on the rural population.
22
 More recent scholars 
have also considered the effects of military migration, again qualitatively. Rosenstein 
has described military service as a sink for surplus labour, one which may have relieved 
the pressure for families without access to land whose productivity was sufficient to 
support them.
23
 Erdkamp, meanwhile, has portrayed enlistment in the army as a form of 
temporary migration, and again, its impact on the availability of labour in rural areas is 
emphasised.
24
 Nonetheless, he also recognised the potential for temporary migrations to 
become permanent,
25
 a phenomenon which must have applied to soldiers as well as to 
other migrants. Though Erdkamp was particularly concerned with the movement of 
individuals within Italy, some fraction of soldiers who served outside Italy would also 
have been motivated not to return. 
Given that the objective of this thesis is to describe informal processes of 
migration and settlement, it may seem contradictory to commence by examining 
settlement of those who had served in the army. To be clear, this discussion is not 
concerned primarily with the establishment of veteran colonies as such, i.e., colonies 
established primarily for the provision of land for veterans, a phenomenon particularly 
associated with the last decades of the 1
st
 century BC. That said, some brief discussion 
of such colonies is appropriate. 
Prior to the Second Punic War, Rome had established colonies in Italy of both 
Latin and citizen type, partly in order to provide land for settlement, and partly to 
guarantee Roman dominance in their vicinity. Thereafter, for the first three decades of 
the 2
nd
 century, mostly citizen colonies continued to be established, primarily in 
                                                 
22
 Hopkins (1978), p. 50. Hopkins gives no figures for the number of migrants in this specific category, 
though they are included among the 150,000 he suggests emigrated from Italy prior to 49 BC (p. 68). 
23
 Rosenstein (2004), p. 79. 
24
 Erdkamp (2006), p. 435. 
25
 Ibid, p. 434. 
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Cisalpine Gaul, and for much the same reasons.
26
 These were founded formally, in 
accordance with a decision of the Senate, with a deductor and commissioners assigned 
to oversee the process. The foundation of new colonies then ceased, only to be resumed 
in the Gracchan period with Auximum in 128. Although subjects of fierce debate, these 
colonies were still founded with the agreement of the Senate, and with officers 
appointed for the purpose. Novel to this period, and a point of contention, was that 
colonies overseas were proposed, as at Junonia in 122, and Narbo Martius in 118. 
Even if, as seems likely, the numbers of assidui did not decline during the 2
nd
 
century, it is generally accepted that a shift in military recruitment, favouring those 
lacking sufficient property to be counted among the assidui, occurred at some point 
between 107 and 82.
27
 Contemporaneous with this change in recruitment was a shift in 
favour of establishing formal colonies (primarily) for veterans, one which allowed 
Velleius Paterculus to claim that it was difficult to identify any colony established after 
100 which could not be described as militaris.
28
 On Velleius’ model, the final ‘non-
veteran’ colonies were founded at Narbo Martius (Narbonne) in 118,29 and at Eporedia 
(NW Gallia Cisalpina; modern Ivria) in 100. Though he does not say explicitly, he may 
have regarded Saturninus’ legislation of 100, enabling the distribution of land to 
Marius’ veterans, as the first instance of the establishment of colonies exclusively of the 
militaris type. If, however, these are held not to have been established, he may have 
perceived Sulla’s establishments throughout Italy, and on Corsica at Aleria, as the first 
such colonies. 
                                                 
26
 Gabba (1989), p. 214-216. See also Salmon (1969), p. 95-111. 
27
 Hopkins (1978), p. 75. Hopkins problematizes the connection between Marius and changes in 
recruitment, but expresses no doubt about the reality of this shift. 
28
 Vell. Pat., I.15. ... Mario sextum Valerioque Flacco consulibus. Neque facile memoriae mandaverim 
quae, nisi militaris, post hoc tempus deducta sit. 
29




Velleius is concerned only with colonies that were formally established, 
whatever their founding populations, but even in the period after 100, informal 
settlement continued. In this regard, one may point to the settlement of some veterans of 
the Sertorian war by Pompey at Lugdunum Convenarum in 72,
30
 and of others of these 
veterans later in Italy.
31
 By 59, and the forcible passage of Caesar’s bills allowing the 
settlement of Pompey’s veterans, colonization was effectively the prerogative of 
individual magnates. The first half of the 1
st
 century thus sees a blurring of two modes 
of foundation: the formal, senatorially approved colony, and the informal community 
established on an ad hoc basis by an individual commander. 
The objective of this chapter is to consider the disposition of soldiers who, upon 
leaving military service, chose to remain outside Italy. Settlements such as Aleria and 
Lugdunum Convenarum, by virtue of their foundation through the impetus of individual 
commanders, might be regarded as early examples of the mode of veteran settlement 
that would become so prominent under Caesar and Augustus. The foundation of 
settlements specifically for veterans of the civil wars by individual magnates, with only 
the incidental approval of the senate, was a novel development. Nonetheless, it has 
parallels with the independent arrangements made by previous magistrates. The 
remainder of this chapter will thus be concerned with individual acts of migration, 
alongside earlier examples of the involvement of a commander in the foundation of a 
settlement. 
As Brunt noted, a great deal of the available evidence for individual settlement 
by veterans is derived from Spain,
32
 and it is there that this discussion will commence. 
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 Brunt (1988), p. 265. 
32
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 Established in 206 by P. Cornelius Scipio, Italica was the earliest Roman 
foundation in Spain, though the event is recorded by Appian alone.
33
 As a settlement of 
Romans and/or Italians located on the lower Baetis, and thus in a position to control 
communication and transportation further inland (an area of significant mineral wealth), 
it is likely that Italica was intended to assert Roman power over the region.
34
 Both the 
precise status and composition of the town at its foundation are unclear, though a 
predominantly indigenous population and peregrine status have been suggested.
35
 As 
Keay has noted, there is a dearth of physical evidence for the presence of large numbers 
of Italians in Italica, which is attributable in part to subsequent building on the site, but 
may also be a consequence of limited exploration.
36
 In any case, limited availability of 
material evidence is common for the early stages of Roman settlements.
37
 The only 
evidence that the town possessed any other status prior to Caesar comes from the 
Bellum Alexandrinum,
38
 where the term municeps was used to describe an inhabitant of 
the town. It is questionable, however, if this was intended to reflect the juridical status 
of the townsfolk, rather than their common origin.
39
 Subsequent Augustan and Tiberian 
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 App., Hisp. VII.38.  ...sunw|&kise tou\j traumati/aj e)j po/lin, h$n a)po\ th=j  )Itali/aj  )Italikh\n 
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 Keay (1997), p. 26; Knapp (1977), p. 111-114. 
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 Keay (1997), p. 26. 
37
 Sweetman (2011), p. 2-3. 
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 Potentially relevant to the status of Italica in the decades after its foundation is 
Appian’s reference to one Gaius Marcius, who was apparently serving with Roman 
forces in the war against Viriathus in 143.
41
 Appian describes how the Roman 
commander Quintus/Quinctius, out of timidity, had retired early to winter quarters near 
Corduba, but in the meantime sent Gaius Marcius out against Viriathus. Marcius’ names 
are clearly not Iberian in origin, probably reflecting descent from the original 
Roman/Italian population of Italica. He held a position of trust and authority among the 
forces on the Roman side, and must have been successful in the field, given the 
frequency with which he was sent into battle. Nonetheless, Appian described Marcius as 
an Iberian. Marcius’ name and position make it unlikely that this adjective would be 
correct as an ethnic descriptor, and so it is usually assumed that he was non-indigenous. 
Richardson raises the possibility, however, that he was an Iberian who had simply 
adopted a Roman name, and this possibility cannot be excluded.
42
 Nonetheless, 
Marcius’ military authority suggests otherwise, in which case ‘Iberian’ would indicate 
either place of birth or status. If the term ‘Iberian’ can be interpreted as a signal of 
Marcius’ legal status, it becomes unlikely that Italica held any formal legal status in this 
period, beyond being a peregrine city. While the status of a single individual is limited 
                                                 
40
 Burnett (1992), p. 77-78. Catalogue numbers 60-63 are dated to the Augustan period, and all bear the 
legend ‘MUNIC ITALIC’, as well as some variation referring to Augustus’ permission (60,61: ‘PERM 
AUG’; 62: ‘PERM CAES AUG’; 63: ‘PER CAE AUG’.) Burnett suggests that designs on the coins 
intentionally allude to the Roman origin of the town, as 60-62 include on their respective reverses the 
genius of the Roman people (labelled), Roma (labelled), and a she-wolf feeding two figures. No pre-
Augustan coinage from Italica is known. 
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po/lewj  )Italikh=j. Broughton, MRR, notes some confusion about the identity of this particular Roman 
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as Koi/ntou. See Richardson (2000), p. 158. 
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 Richardson (2000), p. 159. 
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evidence on which to draw any conclusions on the status of Italica, Appian may give an 
additional hint as to the initial status of Italica. 
 It is interesting to observe that Appian uses the word sunw|&kise  in order to 
describe Scipio’s foundation of Italica, given that the usual Greek term referring to a 
formal colony is a/)poikoj or one of its cognates. Accordingly, elsewhere in the Iberica, 
Appian describes the Saguntines as a)/poikoi Zakunqi/wn, and later refers to Carthago 
Nova as Karxhdoni/wn a)/poikon.43 One can also examine Appian’s use of these terms 
in his entire corpus. Thus, some 76% (29/38) of Appian’s uses of various forms of 
a/)poikoj and a)poiki/zw occur in his Civil Wars, whereas only 31% (11/36) of his uses 
of forms of su/noikoj and sunoiki/zw occur in that work.44 That is to say, in the same 
work where formal colonisation is most likely to be prominent, the corresponding Greek 
term is used more frequently. To return to the case of Italica, Appian’s own terminology 
indicates that it was not formally established through any process beyond the governor’s 
prerogative. 
If a settlement overseas had received any formal status at this time, such a 
precedent would almost certainly have drawn the attention of our sources. Their silence 
is a further demonstration of Italica’s early standing. What, however, may be said of the 
identity of the original colonists themselves? The name of the city itself suggests that 
many of the first colonists were Italian in origin, with only a small proportion being 
Roman,
45
 though it is only possible to speculate on the latter point. Appian’s only 
comment on the people who initially populated Italica is to describe them as 
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 It must be acknowledged that Appian’s description of the origins of both Saguntum and Carthago Nova 
is incorrect, though this is inconsequential to my argument, since Appian clearly regards both as formally 
established colonies. 
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 Figures for the incidence of these terms were compiled using word searches on the Thesaurus Linguae 
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 Knapp (1977), p. 114. 
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traumati/aj – wounded.46 How were these soldiers wounded? In Appian’s narrative, 
the foundation of Italica was preceded by a brief description of the defeat of Indibilis by 
Scipio.
47
 Conceivably, those wounded in this campaign were settled in Italica, and while 
Appian offers no indication that the Romans suffered an unusual number of casualties, 
Livy may give a hint that this was the case. In one of only two instances from books 21 
to 44 in which the numbers wounded in battle are mentioned,
48
 Livy gives a figure of 
1200 Romans and allies killed and 3000 wounded, and claims that losses would have 
been lower if easier routes of escape had been available to the enemy.
49
 The 
significance of this figure is open to interpretation. While the rare appearance of figures 
for those wounded might suggest this instance was exceptional, this rarity also denies 
opportunity for comparison. Furthermore, it is unclear how many of these casualties 
were drawn from indigenous allies, as opposed to Romans and Italian allies. Finally, the 
casualty figures are given, not primarily to draw attention to the scale of losses, but in 
order to emphasise the extent of the enemies’ defeat. Accordingly, it is emphasised in 
the preceding chapter that Scipio chose to fight in a confined valley, that he had 
dispatched his cavalry to attack the enemy in the rear, and finally that none of the 
Spanish fighting in the valley survived. 
Despite the numbers involved, it seems very strange that a population of 
wounded soldiers would, in effect, have been abandoned in the interior of southern 
Spain. Immediately before Appian’s account of the campaign against Indibilis, there 
                                                 
46
 The Loeb translation of this passage describes them as “sick and wounded soldiers”. There is no 
suggestion in the Greek text of sickness, nor is this normally implied by the word traumati/aj, although 
it is normally used to describe the wounds suffered by soldiers in combat. 
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 App., Hisp. VII.37. 
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 Rosenstein (2004), p. 128. The other instance, at XLIV.42.8, alludes to the relatively low losses 
suffered at Pydna. 
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 Livy, XXVIII.34.2. Romani sociique ad mille et ducenti eo proelio ceciderunt, vulnerata amplius tria 




was a description of Scipio’s response to a mutiny among his soldiers, particularly a 
group of 8000 on garrison duty south of the Ebro. This culminated in the leaders of the 
mutiny being beaten and beheaded, although the majority of them were pardoned.
50
 The 
same episode was recounted by Polybius and Livy, and both give versions of a lengthy 
speech by Scipio, in which the general upbraids his soldiers for their behaviour, and 
mocks the origins of the two persons named as the leaders of the mutiny, named as 
Albius of Cales and Atrius the Umbrian.
51
 While it is obviously necessary to use caution 
in drawing evidence from such an invented speech, Livy’s version raises an interesting 
argument against the mutineers. First, he describes a previous mutiny, by a garrison at 
Rhegium, who were said to have seized the town and held it for ten years, before all 
4000 were executed in Rome.
52
 Presumably, the fact that Scipio only executed the 
leaders of this mutiny was intended by Livy to reflect on his clemency,
53
 but Scipio 
returned to the idea of a garrison rebelling and taking up residence in the provinces 
through a rhetorical question in which he asked if the mutineers intended to make Sucro 
(the river along which they had been encamped) their home. 
Could it be that Livy, while composing this speech, has provided a hint as to the 
intentions of the mutineers? Having potentially served in Spain since 218, an unusually 
long term of service in comparison with the six years usually expected,
54
 many of 
Scipio’s soldiers had no doubt formed relationships with Spanish women, and it is 
entirely possible that some of them would have preferred to remain. This desire might 
have become particularly strong now that the Carthaginians had been expelled from 
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Spain, and Scipio’s departure for Rome was imminent. Furthermore, the leadership of 
the mutineers was evidently Italian, and one might guess that the Italian allies would 
have been preferred to citizen troops in the supporting role of forming such garrisons. In 
this situation, the most likely group to participate in the settlement of a city with a large 
Italian population, and a large peregrine population, but without any formal civic status, 
are these individuals. Later, upon his return to Rome, Scipio was attacked by Quintus 
Fabius Maximus, partly on the grounds that he had lost more soldiers to mutiny than to 
battle.
55
 Quite apart from the hyperbole likely to have been used in such a claim, the 
underlying reality might have been that some of these mutineers had simply been left in 
Spain. Although the leaders of the mutiny were executed, a step which was likely 
viewed as necessary for the maintenance of military discipline, Scipio may have 
accommodated the wishes of this group of soldiers (though only after the defeat of 




 The city of Gracchuris was established by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, during his 
praetorship of Hispania Citerior and campaign against the Celtiberians, in 179 or 178.
56
 
It has been argued that the population of the town was comprised of indigenous 
peoples,
57
 and accordingly Brunt concluded that the available literary evidence does not 
demonstrate Italian settlement.
58
 He thus described Gracchuris as a “non-Roman” or 
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“native” town, implicitly indicating a sharp distinction between Roman and other 
categories of settlement. Similarly, Knapp described it is a “purely native town”, and 
later noted a lack of evidence supporting the presence of a “double Romano-Iberian 
population”.59 By contrast, Harris took a more agnostic approach, suggesting that a 
mixed population was more likely, on grounds of provincial security,
60
 a claim which 
will now be elaborated. 
 The modern location of Gracchuris remains unknown.
61
 It was, however, on the 
upper Ebro, and the river itself was later described as one of the borders of its 
territory.
62
 Later Itineraries indicated that the town was located near the confluence of 
the Ebro and its tributary, the Aragón, in the vicinity of modern Alfaro.
63
 This location 
would thus have been on the major routes to the northwest, further up the Ebro, and 
north toward the Pyrenees (a fact reflected in the modern road network). As this 
location also lies along the route to Numantia,
64
 strategic considerations in its 
foundation are probable, in which case it seems unlikely that a purely indigenous town 
would have been established there. Furthermore, a precedent for the settlement of 
Romans and/or Italians in Spain had already been established by the foundation of 
Italica in 206, while the town of Carteia, comprised of the descendants of Italians and 
Spanish women, would be founded a few years after Gracchuris in 171. 
 The name of the town itself is partly Iberian in origin,
65
 though the names of 
later Roman foundations in Gaul and Britain frequently employed indigenous elements, 
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often in combination with Latin.
66
 That said, the use of Gracchus’ name in the town’s 
represents an innovation.
67
 Richardson suggests that this reflects the “non-involvement” 
of the senate in the foundation of the town,
68
 and certainly Gracchus appears to have 
been acting under his own initiative, as was the case when Scipio founded Italica. Given 
Gracchus’ efforts to establish administrative processes in his province (e.g., regularising 
taxation, as well as founding towns
69
), and given the relatively personal relationship that 
could exist between individual Roman magistrates and the indigenous Iberians (e.g., 
Scipio being hailed as rex in 206
70
), the impetus for naming the town after Gracchus 
could have come partly from its Spanish settlers. 
Although it was militarily expedient to relocate local populations from remote 
(and easily defensible) locations in the uplands to valley floors,
71
 the reorganisation of 
indigenous communities in this manner was relatively novel at this time. There is, for 
example, no mention in Livy, Polybius, or Plutarch, of Cato the Elder undertaking 
similar resettlements during his proconsulship in 194. Cato appears to have been 
concerned almost entirely with fighting, rather than with administrative 
reorganisation.
72
 In Livy’s version of Cato addressing his troops, a clear emphasis was 
placed on pillaging, particularly of cities.
73
 Given that Livy explicitly claimed to have 
used Cato himself as a source, such an emphasis is unlikely to have been a later 
invention.
74
 With the exception of Livy’s assertion that Cato brought about the 
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collection of revenue from iron and silver mines,
75
 the only mention of any 
administrative arrangements made by Cato appeared in Plutarch,
76
 where it was claimed 
that the senate resolved to make no alterations to his achievements, leaving his 
successor with little to do. Regardless of these claims, by 193 fighting was again 
underway in Hispania Citerior, as a revolt occurred immediately after Cato’s departure, 
thus raising doubts as to the extent of his success.
77
 
With respect to the indigenous communities, Cato’s only major achievement 
appears to have been to disarm “all the Spaniards on this side of the Ebro”,78 and to 
destroy their walls in a single day.
79
 Appian alone described how the latter was 
accomplished, by means of letters delivered simultaneously to each of the towns in 
question, demanding that they demolish their own walls.
80
 Since these accounts were 
likely derived from Cato’s own partisan account of his accomplishments, their silence 
on the matter of resettlement is striking. Even if the relocation of Spanish communities 
by Cato cannot be entirely disproven, this silence suggests that no significant changes 
were made by him. 
The only evidence for a reorganisation of any Spanish community prior to 
Tiberius Gracchus comes from an inscription dating to 191-190, in which L. Aemilius 
Paullus appears to have established the rights of the ‘servei  Hastensium’ to both land 
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and a town in the vicinity of Lascuta (modern Alcalá de los Gazules).
81
 Even in this 
example, however, rather than indicating the establishment of an entirely new 
settlement, the phrase ‘agrum oppidumqu., quod ea tempestate posedisent’ suggests 
prior habitation, and thus Roman recognition of occupancy, at least by the commander 
on the ground rather than the senate. By contrast, Gracchuris appears to have been 
significantly reorganised, or to have been an entirely new foundation,
82
 though again 
there is no evidence of senatorial approval. Furthermore, Gracchus engaged in the 
resettlement of people elsewhere, in the vicinity of Complega,
83
 all of which indicates a 
more direct involvement in supervising the population than had previously been the 
case. 
 Finally, it should be noted that Gracchuris was, by the time of Pliny, noted as an 
oppidum Latii veteris, a status it may have achieved under Augustus.
84
 Coinage 
indicates the town to have been described as the municipium Graccurris during the 
reign of Tiberius.
85
 It is, of course, doubtful that the subsequent status of the town 
would have corresponded to its status in the years immediately after foundation, 
suggesting its standing was elevated at a later date. To conclude, while the Spanish 
population of Gracchuris at its foundation may have been predominant, and while the 
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size of any Italian element in the town cannot be determined, the presence of some such 
people is likely, given the importance of the location and the presence in Spain of 




 The identification of Iliturgis in the sources is somewhat confused by the 
existence of two separate communities of the same name, one on the Mediterranean 
coast, the other in the Baetis (modern Guadalquivir) valley in the vicinity of Mengibar. 
For these purposes, only the latter community is relevant. Like Gracchuris, Iliturgis was 
founded by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, as indicated by an inscription found in the 
area in 1953.
86
 While there is a consensus that the inscription dates to a period later than 
the early 2
nd
 century, both its authenticity and its veracity have been questioned, and 
there is a suggestion that it may be a Renaissance forgery.
87
 Iliturgis was established on 
the site of an earlier settlement which had been razed, and the population massacred, by 
forces under P. Cornelius Scipio in 206,
88
 ostensibly on the grounds that the inhabitants 
had betrayed and murdered the survivors of Rome’s defeats in Spain in 212.89 The town 
would eventually gain the additional title of Forum Julium,
90
 leading Knapp to suggest 
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that it received municipal status under Caesar or Augustus,
91
 though the title alone is 
limited evidence on which to base any conclusions concerning status.
92
 
 Presuming that Iliturgis was genuinely a Gracchan foundation, it may be 
usefully compared with Gracchuris. Iliturgis’ location on the valley floor of the upper 
Baetis would have been useful for asserting control of that region,
93
 though its strategic 
value is less obvious than that of Gracchuris. Both towns may have been established on 
the site of earlier, indigenous settlements, but as previously noted this is not clear in the 
case of Gracchuris. It is also interesting to note that Iliturgis lies outside the boundaries 
of Gracchus’ province of Hispania Ulterior,94 which would point to the as yet ill-defined 
nature of Roman administration in this period. Recalling Aemilius Paullus’ 
reorganisation of the ‘servei Hastensium’, in neither case is there any hint that senatorial 
approval was required for the foundation of these towns. Ultimately, while there is no 
proof of the settlement of Romans or Italians in either town, both the military 
importance of their locations, and the presence in Spain of Romans and Italians no 




 An indigenous town had existed at Carteia, on the Mediterranean coast of Spain 
near modern San Roque, prior to Roman involvement in the area, as indicated when 
Scipio’s subordinate, Laelius, is said to have sailed there in 206 in order to threaten the 
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Carthaginian position at Gades.
95
 The arrangements made with respect to Carteia in 
171, however, represent a novel event in the history of Rome’s involvement in Spain. 
For the first time, a town was established in Spain with the prior approval of the Senate, 
a decision made in response to a delegation which had come from Spain, and which was 
explicitly comprised of the descendants of Roman soldiers and Spanish women.
 96
 As it 
was impossible for a legal (Roman) marriage to be constituted between these groups, 
their offspring technically possessed only peregrine status. In addition to these men, 
their freed slaves were to be included, as were the existing inhabitants of Carteia, with 
the stipulation that this last group would have land assigned to them. Finally, Livy noted 
that this settlement was given the title of a colony of Latins and freedmen,
97
 the first 
time such a status had been conferred on any settlement outside Italy. 
In addition to being the first formal Roman establishment outside Italy, the 
foundation of Carteia was unusual in certain other ways. There was, for example, no 
commission of tres viri sent to organise the colony, nor is there any evidence that any 
individual colonists came directly from Italy.
98
 Apart from having to provide their 
names to the praetor then in Spain, L. Canuleius, these individuals appear to have been 
responsible for organising their own settlement. As Herzig has suggested, it is probable 
that the founding population of Carteia is the earliest indication of a much broader 
phenomenon that would have existed wherever armies were sent beyond Italy, at least 
until Augustus: the formation of a ‘novum genus hominum’ as a result of the 
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cohabitation of soldiers and indigenous women.
99
 Accordingly, this is a suitable 
opportunity to discuss the phenomenon, at least in relation to Spain. 
The 4000 settlers of Carteia are an indication of the extent of the Roman and 
Italian presence in Spain, but they would have represented only a fraction of the number 
of such people. As Richardson notes, this number probably included only males, and 
given the location of Carteia, probably involved only people from Hispania Ulterior.
100
 
Furthermore, this group was comprised only of individuals who were willing to use and 
publicise their Roman/Italian background. No doubt many others would have preferred 
to emphasise their maternal heritage, particularly if they had been raised in a Spanish 
town rather than a Roman camp or garrison, a difference which would have depended in 
part on the stability of the relationship between their parents. A range of backgrounds is 
possible, from outright rape, to liaisons of varying duration, and to marriage, even if not 
recognised in Roman law. It need not be assumed that longer term relationships were 
pursued solely by Italians. It is entirely possible that Spanish women themselves would 
have pursued Italian men in order to promote their own connection, or that of their 
families, with an increasingly powerful group in the Iberian peninsula. 
Under what circumstances would Romans or Italians have formed relationships 
with Iberian women? The camps and garrisons just mentioned would have been a likely 
venue, particularly during Rome’s early involvement in the region, and Knapp has 
provided a convenient list of 24 such places throughout the Spanish provinces.
101
 As 
this list includes only those recorded in later sources, particularly itineraries, there may 
have been many more such locations. No doubt a certain fraction of time-served soldiers 
would have preferred to remain in Spain precisely because of relationships formed 
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while in service. Another significant possibility also exists and, as one might expect in 
this relatively early period, it is related to Rome’s military presence in Spain: 
deserters.
102
 Knapp noted that deserters are mentioned in a few instances in Spain, and 
these will be discussed below, but he considers that their numbers were small. While the 
numbers of deserters cannot be estimated, the fact that they are mentioned at all in the 
sources attests to their significance. It is instructive that, in Livy’s account of the siege 
of Syracuse (214-212), deserters played a major role in defending the city, a part which 
they could have played only if their numbers were significant. In addition, while en 
route to his province in Spain in 193, Gaius Flaminius is said to have recruited soldiers 
for Spain in Sicily, Africa, and Spain itself.
103
 His African contingent is said to have 
been drawn from soldiers of the army of Scipio Africanus, who had been ‘wandering’ in 
Africa for the last decade. It seems as if the armies of this period were surrounded by a 
penumbra of those who had absconded and were sometimes left behind. 
To return to Spain, however, the existence of deserters is mentioned on at least 
three occasions. Firstly, in 206, having cornered a Celtiberian and Spanish force under 
the command of Hanno, the Roman commander Marcius demanded first that Hanno and 
the deserters be handed over, which was done.
104
 Much later, in 137 during the 
Viriathan War, Sextus Junius Brutus demanded the deserters, prisoners and arms 
present in the town of Talabriga as a condition of its surrender.
105
 Finally, in 140, when 
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the population of Numantia offered its unconditional surrender to Quintus Pompeius 
Aulus, he first demanded from them hostages, prisoners and deserters, all of which were 
handed over.
106
 While the demand that deserters be produced by a surrendered enemy 
may have been standard, the variability in the demands that could be made suggests that 
the demand was not merely pro forma. The officers in command regarded seizing 
deserters as a priority, and this priority would not have existed in the absence of a 
significant number of deserters.
107
 In any case, these deserters represent only those who 
had gone over to an enemy of Rome, and it may be assumed that others would have 
sought to avoid fighting their former comrades. 
To return to the city of Carteia, which prompted the foregoing digression, the 
persons who settled there in 171, as the descendants of Roman soldiers and Iberian 
women, had no legal status in Rome, and no claim other than a moral one to merit the 
attention of the Senate. Regardless of their formal status, however, the decision of the 
Senate suggests that a moral obligation was felt to these people. Of course, one could 
also view the decision as an exercise in improving the Roman position in the region, by 
establishing a colony whose population recognised that they possessed a strong 
connection with Italy. No doubt, political considerations did play a role, but these would 
still have relied on the notion that this novum genus had a special relationship, based on 
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The next notable foundation in Spain was at Corduba, where a settlement was 
established by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, either during his praetorship in 169 or his 
third consulship in 152.
108
 While he does not specify a foundation date, Strabo indicates 
that Corduba was initially inhabited by a chosen group comprised of both Romans (with 
Italians presumably subsumed into this category) and individuals who inhabited the 
area.
109
 The only other mention of a connection between Marcellus and Corduba occurs 
in Polybius, who notes that he overwintered there at the end of 152.
110
 Unfortunately, 
there is no hint of the criteria according to which individuals, whether from Italy or 
otherwise, were chosen to settle in Corduba. While it is entirely possible that some 
portion of the founding population was comprised of veterans, there is no direct 
evidence for their presence.
111
 
Prior to considering the identity of the individuals who settled Corduba, some 
attention must be given to the status of the town at the time of the first settlement by 
Romans/Italians. After attributing the foundation of the town to Marcellus, and after 
describing the favourable locations of Corduba and Cadiz, Strabo then identifies 
Corduba as the first colony in the region. This has been deemed problematic, firstly 
because it was preceded by both Italica and Carteia, and secondly because Strabo’s 
usage of the term a)poiki/a is open to interpretation.112 One possible explanation 
involves the assertion that Italica was not a colony, while Carteia was sufficiently 
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distant as to be in a separate region. It is then claimed that Strabo’s description of 
Corduba as a colony corresponds with it being a Latin colony from its foundation.
113
 
Knapp notes that this hypothesis is not without problems, most obviously a lack of 
direct evidence, but also the fact that Corduba was host to a conventus civium 
Romanorum during the civil wars. It would be an unparalleled situation for a Latin 
colony to contain a conventus. An alternate explanation, however, is that Strabo 
employed the term a)poiki/a not as a reflection of the town’s status on foundation, but in 
reference to its later designation as a colonia civium Romanorum  by Caesar or 
Augustus.
114
 Although Knapp asserts that the “manner of Strabo’s account” excludes 
this possibility, no justification for this reading is given. Indeed, the initial description 
of the settlement as Marke/llou kti/sma implies an initially informal settlement, a status 
which could have been reflected in the lengthy gap until colonial status is mentioned. 
As Carteia was established on the instructions of the senate, it can provide no precedent 
for the establishment of a Latin colony by an individual commander in this period. Even 
if the possibility that Corduba was a Latin colony from its foundation cannot be entirely 
excluded, the absence of a formal status is more probable. 
While Corduba, and in particular the conventus of Roman citizens resident there, 
would become quite prominent during the civil wars, Strabo emphasises both the 
agricultural potential of the area around the city, and its commercially advantageous 
position on the Baetis. In the years after foundation, however, only Corduba’s military 
role appears noteworthy. So, in 144 during the war against Viriathus, Fabius Maximus 
Aemilianus is said to have wintered in Corduba after a successful campaign,
115
 while in 
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the following year the general Quintius is said to have retired early into winter quarters 
at Corduba.
116
 The strategic importance of Corduba, combined with its settlement by 
some combination of Romans, Italians, and individuals already resident in the area, 
recalls several of the locations in Spain already discussed. It is not unreasonable to 
envision that it was, like them, established with time-served soldiers, selected according 
to their willingness to remain in Spain, along with indigenous Iberians who were 
regarded as trustworthy.
117
 Indeed, given the duration of Roman involvement by the 
time of Corduba’s foundation, it is likely that some of its first settlers could have 
possessed a dual, Italian and Iberian, ancestry. 
It has been suggested that Corduba’s origins were connected with the presence 
of canabae, associated with the soldiers stationed in the area of Corduba.
118
 The 
application of the term canabae is potentially anachronistic, in so far as these informal 
settlements were established in proximity to relatively permanent military installations, 
which were more characteristic of the post-Augustan period.
119
 Corduba was clearly a 
strategic location, and served on multiple occasions as a suitable site for troops to 
overwinter, while the Spanish provinces overall contained a permanent garrison 
throughout this period,
120
 but this falls short of demonstrating the presence of such a 
garrison at Corduba. The military potential of the site may have been reason enough for 
Marcellus to establish a settlement, but it would no doubt have suited his purposes if 
time-served soldiers were willing to remain. One can only speculate how much the 
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settlement at Corduba owed to the decision of the commander, and how much it owed 




 Valentia was established by Decimus Junius Brutus during his consulship in 
Spain in 138 and, at least according to the Periochae of Livy, the population was 
initially composed of individuals who had fought sub Viriatho.
121
 The reference therein 
to an oppidum has led to the conclusion that it lacked formal status at the time of its 
foundation,
122
 though it has also been suggested that, like Corduba, it was initially a 
Latin colony.
123
 The latter claim is based on the non-indigenous name of the town, as 
well as material evidence of a connection with Italy in the form of imported goods, 
architectural styles, and funerary rites. While such evidence might point to the presence 
of a sizeable Italian population, it is merely an assumption that this must correspond 
with a particular legal status. Although it was devastated during the war against 
Sertorius,
124
 Valentia may have been able to describe itself as a colony by 60. Evidence 
for this is limited, and rests on an inscription from Cupra Maritima, Italy,
125
 which 




 In certain respects, Valentia was an unusual foundation. Unlike earlier Roman 
establishments in Spain, there is no evidence for the prior existence of an indigenous 
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community in that location.
127
 Furthermore, based on the relative proportions of pottery 
types, it has been possible to correlate material evidence with the foundation date of the 
town.
128
 As elsewhere in Spain, however, there is no evidence for the erection of 




 In part, this may have been a common 
feature of Roman foundations in Spain during the 2
nd
 century, as Keay has noted a 
shortage of identifiably Roman buildings throughout Spain during the Republic,
130
 and 
this corresponds in turn with the earlier comments of Ward-Perkins on the lack of such 
archaeological evidence throughout the republican provinces.
131
 
The prominence of the Italian component of Valentia must be reconciled with 
the statement from Livy that those who initially settled there had campaigned sub 
Viriatho. The town occupied a strategic position at the mouth of the River Turia,
132
 
approximately half-way between the important centres of Tarraco and Carthago Nova. 
Given the improbability of Brutus settling soldiers who had fought for Viriathus in such 
a location, it has been suggested that Livy’s description is mistaken.133 Wiegels and 
Knapp take this line of reasoning further, and speculate that Livy’s epitomator conflated 
the foundation of Valentia, and that of Brutobriga.
134
 Attested to on coinage and by 
Stephanus, the precise location of Brutobriga is unknown, although it was located 
somewhere within the conventus Scallabitanus in what is today central Portugal.
135
 As 
Wiegels notes, the name of the town recalls Gracchuris in combining the name of its 
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founder with an indigenous suffix, and this founder is almost certainly identical with the 
founder of Valentia since no other Brutus is known to have served in Spain.
136
 
While the most extensive body of evidence relevant to settlement by former 
soldiers relates to Spain, it is also necessary to examine other regions of the western 
Mediterranean, commencing with the Mediterranean Islands (the Balearics, Sicily, 
Corsica and Sardinia), and continuing with Gaul and Africa. As will be seen, the 
evidence for these areas is limited in comparison with that for Spain, which may be 
attributable in part to the relatively greater scale and duration of military involvement in 
Iberia. Despite these regional differences, however, similar patterns of behaviour by 
both individual soldiers and their commanders can be discerned. 
 
1.4 – The Mediterranean Islands 
 
Pollentia & Palma 
 
 The Balearic Islands were attacked in 123 by a Roman fleet under the consul Q. 
Caecilius Metellus, on the grounds that the inhabitants had engaged in piracy.
137
 After 
his victory, the consul is said to have brought three thousand Roman settlers from Iberia 
to the islands,
138
 an event which is usually combined with the description of the two 
towns of Palma and Pollentia as oppida civium Romanorum by Pliny
139
 to reach the 
conclusion that he founded them. Indeed, Strabo notes that Metellus founded towns in 
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the Balearics, but this falls short of conclusively demonstrating that he was responsible 
for the foundation of Palma and Pollentia. As well as this difficulty, there is a lack of 
archaeological evidence for construction on the sites of Palma and Pollentia prior to 70, 
leading to the suggestion that there was a complete absence of urban development, and 
only a military occupation.
140
 Conversely, however, a dearth of evidence for the early 
years of Roman settlements in Spain is not unusual, and there remains the matter of the 
3000 individuals whom Metellus brought from Iberia. 
 Because the migration of these 3000 settlers is one of the few instances in which 
overseas settlement in this period can be quantified, and because they are an indirect 
indication of the overall population of Romans, Italians, and their descendants in 
Spain,
141
 it has attracted interest on demographic grounds. Accordingly, Wilson sees 
this group as an indicator of a much higher population of Italian origin in Spain,
142
 
whereas Brunt chooses to emphasise that the size of these communities, and others like 
them, was not substantial.
143
 These views can be reconciled. Brunt is surely correct to 
see a population of 3000 as small (at least relative to the manpower of Italy), but is this 
figure likely to have reflected a correspondingly small pool of potential migrants in 
Iberia? As early as 171, there was a group of 4000 descendants of Roman and Italian 
soldiers willing to petition the senate for land. In subsequent decades Rome maintained 
a permanent military presence in Spain, as a consequence of which settlements 
composed at least in part of former soldiers were founded. No doubt there were also 
soldiers who, for various reasons, chose to remain in Spain, but did not participate in 
these settlements. In short, the 3000 who migrated to Majorca could have been 
                                                 
140
 Orfila (2006), p. 135. 
141
 While Strabo refers only to Romans, it is likely that he is not being precise, and that a more diverse 
founding population was drawn from Iberia. 
142
 Wilson (1966), p. 22. 
143
 Brunt (1971), p. 217. 
40 
 
representative of a much larger population of Italian origin or extraction that had been 




 On those occasions when Roman forces were active in Sicily, there is evidence 
for desertion from the armies, as was the case in Spain. Thus, in Livy’s account of the 
Roman siege of Syracuse, there are repeated references to the presence of deserters in 
significant numbers. For example, at the outbreak of hostilities between Rome and 
Syracuse in 214, a mixed group of 4000 deserters and mercenary auxiliaries were sent 
to Leontini,
144
 which then participated in raids on Roman-held territory. Furthermore, 
upon the fall of Leontini later in the same year, 2000 of these deserters are said to have 
been flogged and beheaded by troops under Marcellus.
145
 Despite these losses, two 
years later during the latter stages of the siege of Syracuse itself when the suburban 
Epipolae had been taken, a sufficient number of deserters remained to take 
responsibility for the defence of the Achradina district of the city.
146
 Where did these 
deserters originate? When Livy initially mentions them, he indicates that most of them 
were from among the socii navales,
147
 which consequently leads to the assumption that 
some were Sicilian.
148
 As Rome’s other naval allies were based in Italy, those deserters 
who were not Sicilian must necessarily have been of Italian origin. Furthermore, it is 
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possible that Livy or his sources would have emphasised desertion by certain groups 
and discounted the involvement of ostensibly more reliable troops. 
 While harsh penalties were meted out to deserters who joined the enemy, it is 
also clear that other troops who had served in Sicily remained there after the end of the 
Second Punic War, after their military service ended in less fatal circumstances. Thus in 
193, Gaius Flaminius recruited soldiers for service in Spain from both Sicily and 
Africa.
149
 While the origin of those recruited in Sicily is not explicitly stated, those 
recruited in Africa are specifically said to have been drawn from soldiers of the army of 
Scipio Africanus. Even if Flaminius was willing to accept Sicilian recruits, it is apparent 
that he sought experienced soldiers of Italian origin. 
 Although there is evidence for soldiers remaining in Sicily, it also appears that 
only limited numbers of Romans and Italians actually served there, and the scale of any 
garrison on the island is open to debate. In 225, Polybius mentions the presence of at 
least one strato/pedon on the island when he enumerates the manpower available to 
Rome before the Second Punic War.
150
 As this appears to be the term he regularly uses 
to describe a legion, this force was likely comprised of Romans. Thereafter, in 200, a 
force of 5,000 Latin and Italian troops was transferred from Cisalpine Gaul to Sicily to 
act as a garrison there,
151
 while two years later, 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry were sent 
to relieve those who had completed their service.
152
 As Prag notes, however, evidence 
for the retention of a significant Roman and/or Italian garrison in Sicily after ca. 190 is 
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 On the outbreak of the First Slave War, the general L. Hypsaeus was 
defeated while in command of 8,000 Sicilians,
154
 and when P. Rupilius defeated the 
uprising in 132, he did so with a few “picked troops” of unstated origin.155 In the early 
stages of the Second Slave War, 600 men of the garrison of Enna/Henna were sent 
under the command of M. Titinius to attack the slaves, only to be defeated.
156
 This is the 
only instance cited by Prag for the presence of a Roman garrison in Sicily between the 
early second century and the Civil Wars, though even in this case, Diodorus does not 
explicitly indicate that the garrison was comprised of Romans.
157
 Thereafter, it is said 
that the Romans undertook the war with a combination of Italian and Sicilian,
158
 or 
Roman and Italian troops,
159
 totalling 14,000 in the latter instance. In the case of the 
Italian troops at least, it is possible that some portion of them was already resident in 
Sicily before their recruitment.
160
 
 As Prag concedes, one of the difficulties involved in assessing the scale and 
composition of the military forces on Sicily in this period is the loss of the text of 
Livy,
161
 and the alternative possibility of a permanent garrison has been supported. 
Serrati, for example, discusses the nature of this garrison during the late third century, 
suggesting that in that period the garrison was billeted in the cities and towns of 
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 As he acknowledges, however, there is a dearth of archaeological evidence 
supporting the presence of such garrisons, even in a period when literary evidence 
indicates them to have been present.
163
 Serrati is keen to interpret the evidence to 
support the presence of this garrison, to the point that he claims troops transferred from 
Sicily to Italy in 217 were drawn from it.
164
 Polybius 3.75 makes clear, however, that 
forces had been sent from Italy to Sicily earlier that year, rendering this claim dubious. 
Nonetheless, it is entirely possible that a relatively limited number of soldiers from Italy 
could have been in Sicily, while leaving little evidence of their presence. 
 The limited evidence available for Sicily suggests that, when Roman and Italian 
soldiers were present, they behaved much like those who served in Spain, however their 
numbers were relatively limited. The probable lack of a large number of soldiers on a 
permanent basis would help to explain the absence of settlements associated with 
former soldiers, but proximity to Italy, and the interest of the Roman elite in the 
exploitation of Sicilian agriculture are also possible explanations. In short, the model for 
Roman imperialism in Sicily may not correspond neatly with that for Spain. 
 
Sardinia and Corsica 
 
 As large islands proximal to Italy, which were occupied by Rome in the 
aftermath of the First Punic War, Corsica and Sardinia can be compared profitably with 
Sicily. Relative to Sicily, these islands were the scene of significantly more military 
activity during the second century. Perhaps corresponding with this is evidence, though 
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usually slight, for the establishment of settlements comprised predominantly of Romans 
and Italians. While there was clearly a population of Italian origin in Sicily, there is no 
evidence for their organization into independent communities, as opposed to conventus 
in existing towns. 
 The scale of Rome’s military endeavours in Sardinia and Corsica is indicated 
well by the number of campaigns undertaken there. From the seizure of Sardinia in 237 
to 100, at least 26 annual campaigns are known to have been fought there.
165
 These can 
be divided into six distinct campaigns against indigenous peoples, including an initial 
one from 236-225 in order to establish Roman control of the island. This is in addition 
to a somewhat limited degree of activity there during the Second Punic War, accounting 
for two of the 26 campaigns. A number of these operations were undertaken by consuls, 
including those related to the initial takeover of the island from 236-231 and in 226/5, 
as well as the later campaigns of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (177, 176, 162), L. Aurelius 
Orestes (126-122), and M. Caecilius Metellus (115-111). The presence of a consul 
necessarily entailed the deployment of relatively large forces: in 177 Ti. Sempronius 
Gracchus was authorised to raise 10,400 Roman infantry with 600 cavalry, and 12,000 
allied infantry with 600 cavalry.
166
 By comparison, when M. Pinarius Rusca was sent to 
deal with revolts in Sardinia and Corsica four years earlier as praetor, he was allotted 
only 8,000 allied infantry with 300 cavalry.
167
 Furthermore, eight triumphs are known to 
have been awarded for victories in Sardinia and Corsica during this period.
168
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 Despite the number of campaigns undertaken in Sardinia and Corsica, outside 
those periods it is not clear that the islands were garrisoned by anything other than allied 
troops, or perhaps even by local levies.
169
 A similar shift in the composition of the 
Sicilian garrison from the 190’s has been commented upon by Prag, and brought into 
connection with an attempt to employ allied troops alone in Spain in 197, though the 
latter decision was quickly reversed.
170
 A certain lack of priority accorded to this 
command under normal circumstances may also be indicated by the tendency for the 
praetor who would normally be assigned to Sardinia to be given alternate tasks, usually 
in Italy, that required the attention of one holding imperium.
171
 Nonetheless, given the 
greater number of campaigns fought in Sardinia and Corsica relative to Sicily, one 
might expect more evidence for the settlement of soldiers there, although the scale of 
settlement would also have been a function of the duration of campaigns, and the 
perceived amenability of the island to settlement. 
 Direct evidence for the settlement of former soldiers is limited, and it has been 
suggested, based on a comment by Strabo, that despite the fertility of the place, soldiers 
were dissuaded from settling in Sardinia by the unhealthy quality of the island in the 
summer.
172
 While Strabo’s comment is indicative of a general attitude toward Sardinia, 
it need not have reflected the attitude of individual soldiers who had served there. That 
there was a need for soldiers who had served in Sardinia (as well as Spain and Sicily) to 
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be allocated land is clear, at least in 199.
173
 Furthermore, it is also clear from an 
inscription found at Falerii Novi that individuals of Italian origin were present in 
Sardinia during the second century, though they need not have been soldiers.
174
 
 One location that may have involved the settlement of soldiers is at Valentia 
(modern Nuragus). This town probably dated to the latter half of the second century, in 
which period other settlements bearing the same name were founded in Spain, 
Narbonese Gaul, and northern Italy.
175
 Located in south-central Sardinia, Valentia lay 
on a route from Carales to Olbia, via the interior of the island, and was thus in a 
strategic location, particularly given that Roman campaigns were usually directed 
against the inhabitants of the more mountainous northern and eastern regions.
176
 The 
town was sufficiently significant that Pliny later recorded its inhabitants among the best 
known on the island.
177
 Other settlements, at Aquae Hypsitanae (later Forum Traiani) 
and Uselis, both of which lay in the interior of Sardinia on a route from the west coast to 
Olbia, were founded in this period, and may have served a similar purpose to 
Valentia.
178
 Although there is no evidence for a Sardinian analogue to Gracchuris, 
despite the two separate campaigns of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus on the island, the 
establishment of settlements in strategic locations is similar to the pattern observed in 
Spain. 
 Two somewhat later settlements in Corsica must also be mentioned, the first of 
which was undertaken by C. Marius at Mariana, and the second by Sulla at Aleria. Both 
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of these are described by Pliny as coloniae,
179
 and it is likely that they received veterans 
of the armies of their respective founders.
180
 These settlements are of a different type 
than those previously discussed, partly because they appear to have followed the 
precedents of Junonia and Narbo Martius as formal colonies established outside Italy. 
That is to say, they were formal in the sense that they were probably founded with the 
consent of authorities in Rome, rather than on an ad hoc basis by an individual 
commander. In the case of Mariana, it was likely founded in association with 
Saturninus’ legislation of 100, whereas the settlement of veterans in the existing town of 
Aleria had the approval of Sulla as dictator. Of course, under such political 
circumstances one might argue that these colonies were founded purely at the 
prerogative of Marius and Sulla. It may be best to understand these as settlements of a 
transitional type, incorporating a tradition of generals outside Italy looking after the 
interests of their soldiers, with the earlier tradition of the establishment of colonies by 
authorisation of the senate. 
 
Comparing the Islands 
 
 It would be useful at this point to contrast patterns of settlement in the 
Mediterranean islands. As the Balearics were settled significantly later, and the 
settlements there are intimately connected with Roman activity in Spain, this discussion 
will concentrate on Sardinia and Sicily. For both islands, the available evidence 
provides only sporadic indications of the presence of soldier settlers. When campaigns 
occurred, it appears that soldiers in those areas behaved much as in Spain, with 
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instances of desertion and of individual soldiers remaining in province. While there is 
some evidence for generals founding communities containing soldiers in Sardinia, and 
while Marius and Sulla were involved in foundations in Corsica, there is no evidence 
for an equivalent pattern in Sicily. 
 One can speculate on the causes of this difference. As is clear from Cicero’s 
Verrines, there was a significant Roman presence on the island by the 1
st
 century, and 
this was heavily involved in the economic life of the island as traders, businessmen, and 
holders of public contracts. While these may have been connected with military 
settlement in previous generations, this is purely speculative, and it appears that the 
scale of such settlement was relatively small. While a low level of military activity there 
might contribute to this situation, the different political and economic circumstances of 
the island are also relevant. In Sicily, Rome encountered a long standing urban culture, 
involving both Punic and Greek elements. Most notable among the Greek cities was 
Syracuse which, under the rule of Hieron II from 270 to 215, had developed an effective 
means of exploiting the agricultural surplus of its territory. When Syracuse fell in 212, 
Rome was perfectly content to adopt the same methods of administration, extracting 
grain tithes under the so-called lex Hieronica. 
 In comparison with Sicily, Sardinia was more akin to a frontier province.
181
 
Although there were some Punic towns in the coastal plains, particularly in the south-
west, much of the island was mountainous, and it was against the inhabitants of those 
regions that Roman campaigns were repeatedly directed. Regions of agricultural 
potential appear to have been exploited while leaving the pre-existing social structures 
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intact, in the same manner as in Sicily.
182
 Nonetheless, as was the case for some Spanish 
foundations, new settlements were founded in the interior, and these seem to have been 
placed strategically. Partly as a result of greater military activity, and partly as a result 
of the usefulness of settling key locations, military settlement appears to have played a 
somewhat more obvious role in Sardinia than in Sicily. 
 
1.5 – Africa 
 
 Rome’s direct involvement in Africa (apart from the presence of armies there 
during the Punic Wars) began later than in the regions thus far discussed. Prior to the 
defeat of Carthage and the annexation of a portion of its territory in 146,
183
 one might 
expect a correspondingly more limited body of evidence for military settlement there. 
Even in the aftermath of the Second Punic War, however, it is clear that some soldiers 
of Scipio Africanus’ army remained in Africa. In 193, nearly a decade after the war 
concluded, enough men remained ‘wandering’ there for Gaius Flaminius to recruit 
soldiers for service in Spain.
184
 While this could refer to African allies of Scipio, the use 
of the term milites, and reference to the administration of a formal oath, suggest they 
were indeed of Italian origin. One might easily imagine that a similar situation prevailed 
after the destruction of Carthage,
185
 though there this cannot be verified. The best 
evidence for the activity of military settlers in Africa pertains to the Jugurthine War and 
to the subsequent foundation of settlements there in connection with Marius. 
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 Desertion from the Roman armies is prominent in Sallust’s description of the 
Jugurthine War, to the extent that he seems unusually willing to acknowledge the 
existence of the phenomenon. To some extent, this may reflect an idiosyncrasy of 
Sallust, given his preoccupation with the general corruption and decline of Rome.
186
 
There is a concentration on Jugurtha’s bribery of members of Rome’s political elite, the 
success of which precluded Roman success in the early years of the war.
187
 Claims of 
bribery were not, however, limited to that elite, as we are told that Jugurtha sought to 
suborn centurions and junior officers while Aulus Postumus Albinus was in command 
in 109.
188
 Deserters are mentioned on a number of later occasions, as when all deserters 
were demanded, and most handed over, by Jugurtha while negotiating his submission to 
Metellus.
189
 Both sides in the war used deserters in order to gather intelligence,
190
 which 
perhaps contributes to the parity Levene notes in Sallust’s portrayal of Jugurtha and his 
opponents: both sides have been corrupted.
191
 Jugurtha, however, gave these men 
another significant military role, using them as garrisons of towns
192
 and other 
strongholds.
193
 In fact, the deserters so feared capture that, when the town of Zama fell, 
they preferred to commit suicide.
194
 Clearly, it suits Sallust’s purposes to focus on the 
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role of desertion, but it is equally apparent that desertion was a feature of the Jugurthine 
War. 
In order to act as spies, desertion must have been reasonably common, and to 
serve as garrisons, a significant number of deserters must have been present. Given the 
indiscipline which Roman forces seem to have experienced, at least in the early stages 
of the war,
195
 some soldiers would be expected to abscond, to the enemy or otherwise. 
Admittedly, claims of indiscipline are likely to be somewhat conventional, and Sallust 
shows a particular interest in it, as well as in bribery and corruption.
196
 Although this 
might lead to some exaggeration of the scale of desertion, it remains apparent that it was 
a problem, and thus that the Jugurthine War likely left a considerable group of former 
soldiers in Africa. 
Within five years of the conclusion of the Jugurthine War under Marius’ 
command, he was involved in at least some settlement projects in Africa. The late 4
th
 
century source, de Viris Illustribus, indicates that Saturninus, as tribune, arranged for 
grants of 100 iugera to be made to veterans of Marius.
197
 The date of the source might 
lead to doubts as to the veracity of such a project, however, additional support for 
settlement in Africa at this time comes from a damaged inscription, found in the Forum 
of Augustus, which indicates that Julius Caesar’s father was involved in the settlement 
of coloni on the islands of Cercina (modern Kerkennah, off the east coast of Tunisia).
198
 
Only a section of the line pertaining to Cercina survives, which reads OLONOS 
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CERCE, and has accordingly been reconstructed as colonos Cercinam / Cerceinam.
199
 
Marius himself took refuge on the island in 87,
200
 perhaps precisely because of his 




In addition to Cercina, three other mainland towns used to be regarded as 
Marian veteran colonies established in accordance with Saturninus’ legislation: 
Thibaris, Thuburnica, and Uchi Maius.
202
 In each case, the identification of the town as 
a Marian foundation was based on assertions to that effect found in inscriptions of a 
later period.
203
 Brunt argued that this hypothesis is problematic, given that all three of 
these towns lay beyond the borders of the province of Africa, as then defined by the 
regia fossa. Accordingly, objections have been raised over the improbability of the 
establishment of dedicated veteran colonies in Numidian territory, leading Brunt to 
suggest that their founding populations were indigenous Gaetulians.
204
 If so, the 
inscriptions asserting a connection with Marius would simply represent a claim of 
antiquity in a later period.
205
 
Accepting Brunt’s argument that these were probably not veteran colonies as 
such, it is interesting to note that he draws parallels between them and the foundation of 
Gracchuris. While he believed that to be a “native” town, as discussed above, given the 
strategic nature of its location it is entirely possible that Italians were present among its 
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 With Thibaris and Uchi Maius located on the southern heights 
of the Bagradas valley, and Thuburnica at its western end, they were in a position to 
control a major east-west route inland, from Africa into Numidian territory. In support 
of an indigenous population in the towns, Brunt noted that a large number of Gaetulians 
deserted Scipio Metellus’ army for Caesar’s in 47/46, and are said to have explicitly 
referred to themselves as clients of Marius.
207
 Conversely, the absence of references to 
the descendants of Italians as clients of Marius is taken by Brunt as evidence of their 
absence. This argument from silence is necessarily weak, and in any case, former clients 
of Marius would have been unlikely to advertise this connection. Furthermore, it is clear 
that Caesar’s opponents, specifically Labienus, subsequently recruited people of (partly) 
Italian origin locally.
208
 In any case, a perceived obligation to Marius need not have 
been the main cause of the Gaetulians’ change of allegiance, even if this was how they 
justified the act. As Fentress describes, the period between the end of the Jugurthine 
War and the Civil Wars saw struggle between the Gaetulians and the Numidian kings, 
and their decision to join Caesar may have had much more to do with local politics.
209
 
In short, even if these were not specifically veteran colonies, it is entirely possible that 
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1.6 – Transalpine Gaul 
 
 In comparison with the regions thus far discussed, the direct involvement of 
Roman armies in campaigns in Transalpine Gaul began relatively late. Although their 
forces had passed through the region en route to Spain at the start of the Second Punic 
War, and on several occasions thereafter, the first such engagement was not until 154.
210
 
This, however, was directed against two Ligurian peoples, the Oxybii and Deciates, and 
marked the completion of Rome’s conquest of the Ligurian territory, as well as 
supporting Massiliote interests and guaranteeing a land route to that city.
211
 Rome’s 
next known military activity in the region was not until 125, against the Salluvii, and it 
is only from this point that signs of settlement can be discerned. 
 When the Salluvii were defeated in 123/2, the proconsul C. Sextius Calvinus 
sacked their central town of Entremont, and established the settlement of Aquae Sextiae 
(modern Aix) in their territory, approximately three kilometres to the south.
212
 While 
Strabo says that a garrison of Romans was placed there, Livy’s epitomator describes the 
settlement as a colony,
213
 though this cannot be a true reflection of the town’s status, as 
Pliny describes Aquae Sextiae as a Latin town.
214
 Furthermore, Velleius Paterculus, in 
the same passage in which he claims that Junonia was the first colony established 
outside Italy, alludes to the roughly contemporaneous foundation of Aquae Sextiae 
without indicating that they were of comparable status.
215
 Dyson notes the presence of 
both native and Roman pottery, dating to the period after the foundation of the 
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 While this is only tenuous evidence for the ethnic composition of the 
town’s population, ethnically blended settlements, established on the prerogative of a 
Roman general, and bearing his name, have certainly been encountered previously in 
this discussion, for example, at Gracchuris. 
 Aquae Sextiae may not have been the only town established under these 
circumstances. Though a very late source, Stephanus, citing Apollodorus of Athens, 
records the existence of a town called Fabia, named for Quintus Fabius Maximus,
217
 
who as consul fought against the Allobroges in 121. Further details about this 
community, including its location, are not known. A third settlement which may have 
been founded in this period, and in connection with strategic concerns relating to the 
Allobroges, is Valentia (modern Valence).
218
 This town should immediately bring to 
mind the identically named communities in Spain and Sardinia, both of which likely 
combined Italian and indigenous populations. While the foundation date of this Valentia 
is unknown, the name itself suggests a late second century date, and its identification as 
a colony by Pliny might hint that it was then a long established community.
219
 A 
dedication by coloni et incolae to the propraetor L. Nonius Asprenas has been found, 
though this can be dated only approximately to the early 40s BC.
220
 Dio may indicate 
that Valentia was the target of a Roman campaign in 61, which would point to a 
predominantly indigenous population at that time, but this identification relies on an 
emendation of the manuscript.
221
 Rivet supports this emendation, and further suggests 
                                                 
216
 Dyson (1985), p. 150-151. 
217
 Steph. Byz. (Meineke 654). Fabi/a, po/lij Keltogalatw~n, kti/sma Fabi/ou 
strathgou=  9Rwmai/wn.  0Apollo/dwroj e0n deute/rw| xronikw~n. 
218
 Dyson (1985), p. 155. 
219
 Pliny, NH III.36. In mediterraneo coloniae ... in agro Cavarum Valentia... 
220
 CIL XII.1748 = ILS 884. [L. Non]io L. Fil. | [asp]renati prop | [c]oloni et incolae|  patron. Broughton 
MRR 3.147 suggests 49 BC, but notes the difficulties involved in establishing a precise date. 
221
 Dio, XXXVII.47.2. kai\ Ma/llioj me\n Lenti=noj e0pi\ Ou0alenti/an po/lin strateu/saj... The 
manuscript reads Ou0enti/an. 
56 
 
that the name of Valentia represented a Latinisation of an earlier Gallic form,
222
 though 
this is hypothetical. Based on these two assertions, Rivet argues for a later date of 
foundation in 46, and this possibility cannot be discounted. Nonetheless, this only hints 
at an award of colonial status at that time, and says little about the population of 
Valentia prior to 61. 
 Finally, the foundation of Lugdunum Convenarum (modern Saint-Bertrand-de-





though only the latter makes a parenthetic reference to the inhabitants as a rabble. 
Details of the actual foundation of the town appear only in late sources. Thus, Isidore of 
Seville records that the town was established by Pompey in the wake of the Sertorian 
War, ostensibly while he was hastening to Rome in order to celebrate a triumph.
225
 
Isidore’s description is a direct quotation of Saint Jerome, who described the town in the 
context of his invective against Vigilantius, who was evidently from there.
226
 
Accordingly, Jerome’s version also includes a number of pejorative details, twice 
describing the original inhabitants as bandits, and likening their behaviour to his 
subject’s. Given their context, one could reasonably doubt Jerome’s assertions about the 
banditry of the founding population of Lugdunum Convenarum, and perhaps Isidore 
excluded those claims for the same reason. Conversely, Strabo’s description of them as 
a rabble could have inspired Jerome’s aspersions. Esmonde Cleary suggests that the 
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entire concept of the Convenae as bandits may have rested on a false etymology, which 
assumed that the word necessarily referred to the gathering together of people.
227
 
Whether Jerome can be relied upon for the identification of Pompey as the 
founder of the town is not clear.
228
 Such a measure on his part did, however, have 
general precedents in Gaul, in the shape of the towns discussed earlier, as well as a 
precedent specific to Pompey. At the end of the war against Sertorius, Pompey 
established a settlement named after himself on the other side of the Pyrenees, opposite 
Lugdunum Convenarum, at Pompaelo (modern Pamplona).
229
 With regard to these 
foundations, Pompey was behaving in much the same manner as earlier Roman generals 
in Spain and Gaul. Pompey’s actions in the west would later be recalled by his own 
foundation of Nicopolis in Armenia, which involved both soldiers and indigenous 
elements, as well as his resettlement of pirates in various towns in the eastern 
Mediterranean.
 230
 Certainly, Lugdunum had strategic significance for communications 
between Spain and Gaul, while the importance of this line of communication and supply 
had been demonstrated during the Sertorian War.
231
 Given this location, Lugdunum 
could have had a military role at the time of its foundation, in which case one might 
expect an Italian element among the founding population. Furthermore, such an Italian 
contingent could have included supporters of Sertorius who had originated in Italy, as 
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1.7 – Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this foregoing discussion, several themes have been recurrent. 
Firstly, there is the rarity with which the available sources describe the settlement of 
soldiers. Then, there is the recurring role of individual generals in arranging and 
rearranging populations, indigenous and Italian. Related to the latter is a question of the 
sort of society that would have existed on frontiers populated by indigenous peoples, 
and those former soldiers who lived among them. 
 The paucity of references to settlement by former soldiers in the regions in 
which they had served could be a function of two phenomena. Either their numbers 
were very limited or, more likely, the sources available simply chose not to discuss 
these individuals, a problem compounded by the limited material available for the last 
half of the second century. This discussion of military settlers began by considering the 
demography of migration. While quantification of the scale of migration is not possible, 
it is nonetheless interesting to consider some possible numbers. When examining 
casualty figures for campaigns in the late republic, Rosenstein concluded that 
somewhere between 34 to 40 % of soldiers who left Italy died overseas.
233
 Regardless 
of the accuracy of his assessment, the degree of error he allows is noteworthy: if only a 
few percent of soldiers chose to remain overseas, it is unlikely that their emigration 
could be distinguished, as far as the demography of Italy is concerned, from military 
mortality. 
If the rate of this migration was substantially less than the casualty rate, which 
itself was rarely commented upon, then it comes as little surprise that it received 
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relatively little attention, unless in combination with some other phenomenon. Desertion 
and the need to maintain military discipline, for example, were clearly more worthy of 
comment, as is evident before the foundation of Italica, and during the Jugurthine War. 
Other unusual circumstances also attracted comment, for example, the foundation of 
Carteia after the offspring of Roman/Italian soldiers and indigenous women 
successfully petitioned the senate for a city. Otherwise, the presence of soldier-settlers 
could be indicated in the context of rearrangements of populations by individual 
generals, as in the several instances described of generals naming new foundations after 
themselves (e.g., Gracchuris, Aquae Sextiae). 
For most of the second century, individual generals were establishing new 
communities, and the foundation of settlements containing some proportion of former 
soldiers existed in continuum with the reorganisation of indigenous peoples. This is 
closely connected with Richardson’s concept of peripheral imperialism, though his 
formulation is more concerned with the competence of generals to deal with local 
diplomacy and military affairs without reference to the senate.
234
 The independent 
authority of praetors and consuls clearly extended to the establishment of new towns. 
Prior to the foundation of Junonia in 122, the only extra-Italian foundation in which the 
senate had been involved was Carteia. Even there, the senate’s role was basically 
passive, reacting to a petition, and ordering the praetor there to administer the 
foundation of the town. 
In this respect, Roman imperialism in the second century operated in ad hoc 
fashion, though perhaps this should not be surprising. One might expect that the actual 
behaviour of generals in their provinciae would be refracted when represented to and by 
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individuals in Rome. As Thomas describes, individuals engaged directly in colonial 
projects can be “half here, half there, sometimes disloyal, sometimes ‘on the side’ of the 
people they patronize and dominate, and against the interests of some metropolitan 
office”.235 The limited attention given in the sources to acts of settlement and 
resettlement by individual generals, and their freedom to undertake these projects, point 
to the same lack of concern for them among the elite in Rome. 
Certainly by the Augustan period, the establishment of veteran colonies, and the 
assignment of formal statuses to particular communities, were central to Roman 
imperialism. If Roman culture of that later period was itself a product of imperialism, in 
the same way that Gosden describes British culture as a product of its imperial 
activity,
236
 then the second century should be expected to be a period of development. If 
generals in the second century were resettling both indigenous peoples, and a diaspora 
including soldiers who had served under them, it should come as no surprise that 
Pompey, Caesar, and Augustus did the same, though on a larger and more formalised 
scale, with their own soldiers. 
Returning to the second century, one can ask what sort of a society those 
generals created on the margins of the republican empire. After the Carthaginians were 
expelled from Spain, the relationship between Rome and the indigenous Iberians can 
hardly be described as one of equality. Conversely, it cannot be said that the Romans 
were yet in a position to dictate to peoples throughout the peninsula, though the 
disparity in power grew over time. The arrangements made by Roman generals do not 
suggest a simple case of acculturation, but of mutual adaptation to a new and evolving 
dynamic. Former soldiers who settled and had children with indigenous women were, in 
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effect, the points of contact for this cultural relationship. At least in second century 
Spain, what developed was a middle ground, corresponding with White’s formulation of 
a cultural contact involving adaptation and accommodation, rather than acculturation or 
reliance entirely on force.
237
 White was describing a very different situation, involving 
the relationship between New France and the indigenous peoples of the upper Great 




 centuries, but the early years of Roman involvement in 
Spain are broadly comparable. Of course, there were variations in this system both 
geographically and chronologically. Roman power grew over time, and was inevitably 
more concentrated on the Mediterranean coast rather than the interior. Furthermore, 
there would have been a continuum of responses by the Iberians themselves. Some were 
willing to intermarry with Romans, and perhaps even sought to do so, while others took 
arms against them. Nonetheless, the individual solders who settled in Spain contributed 
to the development of a new society there. No doubt, something similar would have 
occurred in Sardinia, in Africa, and in Gaul, though with regional variations according 
to the timing of Roman intervention and the particulars of pre-existing societies. 
However minimal the impact of these soldier-settlers was in terms of the 
demography of Italy, they played in important role in the cultural contact between Rome 
and the peoples of the western Mediterranean. The ways in which Roman imperialism 
developed during the late republic were influenced by their behaviour, and the 
independent undertakings of the generals who had commanded them. In short, they 
were an important component of the Italian diaspora.  
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Chapter Two – Non-Combatants & Military Suppliers 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 
 The presence of Roman armies in various regions of the western Mediterranean 
resulted in a population of former soldiers remaining in those areas. In addition to 
soldiers, a variety of non-combatants was associated with these armies, and was 
attached to them with varying degrees of formality. Their presence with the armies 
suggests that they, like former soldiers, would have been a component of the Italian 
diaspora in the provinces. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter will be to describe 
the various groups who accompanied the armies, ranging from the slaves and servants 
of soldiers and officers, to sutlers (small traders, selling supplementary goods to 
soldiers), and through to merchants involved directly and officially in the provisioning 
of the armies. For these purposes, individuals contractually involved in military supply 
will be considered in a separate section. 
 Any attempt to describe the groups accompanying the armies necessarily suffers 
from a shortage of evidence. Even military supply, the smooth operation of which was 
fundamental to the success of a campaign, is only mentioned incidentally by 
historiographers, as when it is necessary to explain the actions of an individual 
commander.
1
 A similar situation prevails for those in the category of camp followers, 
whose status normally rendered them beneath notice, except on rare occasions, such as 
when they became involved in battle, or when assigned blame for indiscipline among 
the troops. The principal exception to this shortage of evidence, however, is Caesar, 
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particularly in his Gallic Wars. The supply of grain is particularly prominent (the term 
frumentum appears on nineteen occasions) in this first-hand account, and it can be 
assumed that maintaining provisions was fundamentally important to any army. 
Conversely, however, Caesar’s concern for his troops’ food supply is an element of his 
self-representation as a careful commander,
2
 and one who possesses greater foresight 
than any other individual.
3
 Furthermore, it is possible that the supply situation in Gaul 
was somewhat exceptional, given that those campaigns were frequently distant from the 
Mediterranean littoral, or from rivers permitting easy communication with it.
4
 
Consequently, it should not necessarily be assumed that the circumstances of Caesar’s 
troops were identical to those experienced by others during the period under 
consideration. 
 The restricted nature of the evidence imposes a difficulty in determining the 
numbers of individuals associated with the armies. Erdkamp, for example, suggests as a 
conservative estimate a 5:1 ratio between soldiers and non-combatants.
5
 This figure, 
however, includes only individuals who were involved with the army in some sort of 
official capacity, as muleteers or servants, rather than camp followers in the broadest 
sense. It appears, however, that overall numbers of camp followers could have varied 
widely. At one extreme, Livy claims that the armies campaigning in Liguria in 187 were 
entirely unaccompanied.
6
 At the other, his epitomator indicates that 40,000 non-
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combatants were killed, in addition to 80,000 troops, at Arausio in 105.
7
 Both of these 
extremes must be treated as hyperbole, and unreliable in any absolute sense; Livy 
himself criticises Valerius Antias elsewhere for inflating the numbers he provides. 
Nonetheless they do give an indication of the range of proportions of camp followers to 
soldiers that might plausibly exist. 
 
2.2 – Non-Combatants 
 
 Thus far, the phrase “camp followers” has been used as a general descriptor for 
the non-combatants who regularly accompanied Roman armies. This phrase 
encompasses a number of different terms, the use of which in the available sources 
suggests that they were applied to overlapping groups of people. Little attention has 
been given in the scholarship to the categories of individuals found in association with 
Roman armies, not least because the ancient sources themselves imply contradictory 
roles for them. The first modern scholar to give significant consideration to these 
categories of individuals was Jonathan Roth,
8
 but while he recognised that the 
conventional understanding of terms such as calones and lixae was problematic,
9
 he 
reached few conclusions about the distinction between these categories. The tendency of 
scholarship on the Roman army to give little or no attention to these groups was noted 
by Vishnia in 2002,
10
 and this pattern appears to have continued. The Cambridge 
History of Greek and Roman Warfare makes no mention of these categories of camp 
followers at all, and while the Blackwell Companion to the Roman Army refers to lixae 
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twice, in the first instance it describes them as sutlers,
11
 but in the second equates them 
with camp followers in general.
12
 Clearly, some confusion persists. Accordingly, each 
of these groups will be considered in turn, commencing with military slaves, and 
proceeding to calones and then lixae. 
 
Slaves of Soldiers 
 
 The presence of slaves with the republican armies is occasionally acknowledged 
explicitly. So, for example, Caesar describes Vercingetorix presenting two Roman 
slaves, captured while foraging, to his troops, claiming them to be soldiers.
13
 The loss of 
slaves while engaged in foraging is also described in the following year, though the 
significance of such losses is minimised.
14
 The unintentional involvement of slaves in 
battle while collecting material for the army had also been seen at Aquae Sextiae in 102, 
when those collecting water were attacked.
15
 The normal roles of these slaves are also 
indicated in 47 when, prior to Zela, Caesar orders them to carry material for the 
construction of a rampart,
16
 a detail perhaps included because his opponent, Pharnaces, 
is subsequently said to have confused these men for soldiers. The normal duties of these 
slaves thus involved various forms of manual labour: foraging, responsibility for 
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draught animals (iumentum), and physically carrying goods. These details, however, 
appear only incidentally. 
 Not surprisingly, slaves may also be mentioned when involved in battle, without 
details of their customary activities. So, Appian describes how one of Pompey’s legions 
was defeated in Spain immediately after his arrival there in 76, a defeat which explicitly 
involved the soldiers’ servants also.17 On several occasions, slaves are mentioned in the 
narratives when a camp itself comes under attack. During the Third Mithridatic War, 
Lucullus’ legate, Fabius, is said to have freed the slaves in his camp, and to have 
managed to hold Mithridates off for a day as a result.
18
 Similarly, a foray from Thapsus 
by Caesar’s opponents is defeated when the slaves in his camp use stones and pila 
against them.
19
 Such efforts at defending a camp were not always successful, as when 
the capture of Pompey’s camp after Pharsalus was accompanied by the slaughter of its 
defenders and the servants.
20
 The involvement of slaves in battle is a sign of 
desperation, while references to their deaths in large numbers, whatever the actual 
number of casualties, serves to indicate the magnitude of a defeat. Thus (though slightly 
later than the period in question), when Velleius describes Antony’s unsuccessful 
campaign in Parthia in 36-35, the loss of one third of the calones and servitia, as well as 
most of the baggage, is explicitly noted and contrasted with the claim of victory.
21
 
 As well as being noteworthy for their presence in battle, their complete absence 
from an army could be worthy of attention. When Metellus took command of the army 
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in Numidia in 109, one of the measures he took to restore discipline in the army was to 
deny common soldiers the privilege of having either slaves or pack animals.
22
 In 
Metellus’ case, it is unclear if this measure remained in effect once the campaign 
against Jugurtha was resumed, but Caesar does seem to have campaigned under such 
conditions. On two occasions Caesar ordered his soldiers to leave their slaves and 
baggage behind, the first prior to bringing his forces across the Adriatic from 
Brundisium in 48,
23
 and the second prior to invading Africa from Sicily in 47/46.
24
 In 
both instances this can be seen as an indication of Caesar’s celerity, but what does it 
indicate about the role of said slaves? If they could be abandoned, their presence with 
the army was not, strictly speaking, critical. That said, the soldiers at Brundisium had to 
be convinced that it was necessary for them to travel without slaves, while in the case of 
the invasion of Africa it is explicitly noted that they were useful (usui) to the soldiers. 
Indeed, this claim of utility is something of an understatement, occurring in the context 
of a description of the privations initially experienced by the army in Africa. Lacking 
adequate provisions and proper accommodation, the soldiers’ lack of slaves is likewise 




 Closely related to, and perhaps identical with, the military slaves just discussed 
are the calones. Speidel, for example, though dealing mainly with a later period, regards 
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them as entirely equivalent to servants, and implicitly not free.
25
 Roth demonstrates a 
similar view, concurring that calones were military slaves, though questioning whether 
they were owned privately, which is the commonly held opinion, or by the state.
26
 The 
following discussion will concentrate on the tasks fulfilled by calones, and compare 
these with the duties of slaves not described by that term. 
In general, calones appear to have assumed roles similar to those of slaves. 
Caesar describes how, on the Sambre in 58, calones left the camp in order to gain booty 
when they perceived the Nervii to be falling back, only to flee in panic when the enemy 
exploited a gap in the Roman lines to attack the camp.
27
 Once the situation was 
recovered through Labienus’ intervention, however, it is claimed that the calones were 
able to resist the now terrified Nervii.
28
 Later, in 53, a group of calones accompanies 
five cohorts on a foraging expedition from the camp of Q. Cicero.
29
 This camp is 
attacked by Germans shortly thereafter and, when the foragers return, the enemy prepare 
to attack them. The calones then rush to a nearby height,
30
 only to be pushed back and 
subsequently saved when they follow a group of veteran troops who successfully break 
through the enemy lines. In the Civil Wars, calones are twice mentioned, on one 
occasion when a number are killed near Ilerda along with 200 Gallic archers,
31
 and 
again soon after. When his grain supply grew precarious, Caesar requisitioned food 
from friendly communities, and sent calones to the more distant ones, thus reducing the 
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amount of food required in the camp.
32
 It seems clear that the calones fulfilled similar 
functions to those individuals described more straightforwardly as slaves. Both groups 
are routinely involved in manual labour, and are frequently mentioned alongside beasts 
of burden, yet are only mentioned when they become involved in battle.
33
 Also, as 
Caesar demonstrates, both calones and slaves could be separated from the army as 
military needs dictated. Conversely, the passage from Velleius cited earlier, describing 
Antony’s losses in 36-35, refers to calonumque servitii.34 Rather than implying two 
separate groups, this might be understood as a hendiadys, employed to emphasise the 
servile nature of the calones. The available evidence indicates no difference in status 
between calones and slaves. In essence, the defining feature of the calo was his 
appearance in military contexts. 
The term calones may, however, carry pejorative implications beyond implied 
servility. On the Sambre, their involvement in battle is a direct consequence of their 
premature departure from the camp in search of booty. The rush of the calones to seek 
higher ground while returning to Q. Cicero’s camp is likewise premature, and exposes 
them needlessly to the enemy. Livy, too, describes calones in a clearly negative way at 
times. On one occasion near the end of the First Samnite War, he notes that a camp 
could be established in a confined area specifically because the army had marched 
without a mob (turba) of calones,
35
 and the same word is later applied in describing 
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Philopoemen’s arrangement of his forces against Nabis of Sparta in 192.36 A negative 
connotation is even clearer in Sallust’s description of those individuals supporting the 
consul M. Aemilius Lepidus in 78, in which they are set alongside sicarii and said to be 
willing to sell their lives for a day’s pay.37 The denigration of camp followers of all 
descriptions is, as shall be seen, commonplace, yet calones seems to have been a 
particularly negative term. This reflects a social attitude and a military ideal, which 
emphasised the superiority of a well-disciplined and austere army, over one corrupted 
by luxury. An overabundance of servants would certainly have been associated with the 
latter. The disdainful attitude to calones thus reflects not a concern over actual 




 Another category of camp followers distinguished in our sources are lixae, 
though again it is difficult to establish precisely what individuals were encompassed by 
the term. In some instances, they appear to be small-traders engaged in private exchange 
with soldiers in the armies they accompanied, and the term lixa is thus commonly 
translated as “sutler”.38 Accordingly, rather than bearing responsibility for the routine 
supply of the armies, e.g., with grain, these individuals helped to supplement the 
provisions officially given to soldiers.
39
 At times, they may be described as akin to 
mercatores, as when the rear of Caesar’s column was harassed by Labienus during the 
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African War, and the baggage of both lixae and mercatores captured.
40
 Nonetheless, the 
two groups were not necessarily coterminous. In describing the indiscipline of the 
Roman army in Africa prior to Metellus’ arrival in 109, Sallust claims that lixae, along 
with soldiers, ravaged the African countryside and sold their booty to mercatores, 
necessarily implying some disparity between them.
41
 
Roth has expressed further doubts concerning the equation of lixae with sutlers, 
using instances of the term in Quintilian, Vegetius and Lucan to demonstrate the low 
status accorded to these individuals. He even suggests that lixae were regarded by 
certain sources as slaves, though in each of the cases cited, the evidence for his claim is 
weak.
42
 Furthermore, Livy provides a counter-example when he has the consul of 200, 
G. Aurelius Cotta, ask rhetorically why no witnesses, not even a lixa, was called upon to 
testify to the senate, and to confirm the praetor L. Furius Purpureo’s eligibility for a 
triumph.
43
 As Roth himself notes, such testimony would have been impossible if lixae 
were not free, since the evidence of a slave would have been inadmissible.
 44
 
Admittedly, lixae and calones could be grouped together at times. Livy describes 
Marcellus in 216 ordering both, along with injured soldiers, to perform manual labour,
45
 
and shortly thereafter has them shouting together, thus deluding Hannibal into believing 
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he faced a larger army than was actually present.
46
 Nonetheless, the fact that the two 
categories could be grouped together does not demonstrate that they were identical. In 
short, while lixae might not have been highly regarded, the evidence is not adequate to 
demonstrate that they were actually slaves. 
A repeated theme of Roman military history involves certain generals taking up 
the command of a disorganised army and re-establishing discipline, with the exclusion 
of camp followers, sometimes explicitly lixae, a key element. When Appian describes 
Scipio Aemilianus taking command in Africa in 147, the army is said to be in a state of 
extreme indiscipline, while the soldiers have turned themselves to idleness, greed, and 
rapacity.
47
 Directly involved in these activities is a plh=qoj a)gorai=on, following the 
camp in order to receive booty, and even accompanying the soldiers on illicit raids.
48
 
The word a)gorai=oj refers to traders, though of lower status than would be implied by 
e)\mporoj, and is thus roughly equivalent to lixa.49 This description is followed by a 
speech to the soldiers, in which Scipio emphasises that victory should have priority over 
procuring booty. Accordingly, non-soldiers, with the exception of those granted 
permission or those bringing basic food, are excluded from the camp, though provision 
will be made for a supervised sale of booty at a later date.
50
 Appian records a similar 
sequence of events when, thirteen years later, Scipio took command of the campaign 
against Numantia. The army is said to be idle, disorderly, and inclined to luxury.
51
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Consequently, all traders are excluded from the camp, and in this instance prostitutes 
and soothsayers are also specified.
52
 Again, no goods that are deemed extravagant or 
superfluous are to be permitted in the camp. 
To some extent, these incidents reflect Scipio’s self-presentation (or Polybius’ 
version thereof), and not necessarily the particulars of the situations he actually 
encountered. Subsequently, Scipio’s example would become something of a locus 
classicus for the imposition of traditional discipline on an unruly army, with versions 
similar to Appian’s appearing in Livy,53 Frontinus,54 and Plutarch.55 Regardless of the 
original events, the accounts of his actions in Africa and Spain must have been at least 
plausible. That is to say, Roman armies must often have attracted individuals of the 
sorts described. Moreover, whatever the actual impact of small-traders, a Roman 
audience must have believed that their presence in more than minimal numbers would 
have a negative influence on military discipline. 
Sallust gives a similar description of Metellus restoring discipline in Africa in 
109, a similarity to which Frontinus draws explicit attention immediately after 
recounting Scipio’s actions.56 Discipline under Metellus’ predecessor, Spurius 
Postumius Albinus, is said to have been so lax that lixae and soldiers together ravaged 
the countryside to seize booty which they exchanged for wine and other luxuries. So 
serious was the situation that grain rations were sold in exchange for bread.
57
 Metellus’ 
remedies involved banning the sale of cooked food to the soldiers, and forbidding 
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soldiers to be accompanied by slaves or draught animals on the march. The key 
similarity between Metellus and Scipio, however, is that in each instance the activities 
of lixae are restricted.
58
 It is entirely possible that Metellus, or Sallust’s version of 
Metellus, was intentionally appealing to the example of Scipio. 
The lixae themselves appear to have been a class of comparatively humble 
merchants, engaged in trade with soldiers. We can speculate that this trade involved the 
sale of personal goods to soldiers, supplementing provisions provided by the military. It 
is also likely that such traders purchased a portion of the booty and slaves acquired by 
soldiers on campaign.
59
 In both instances, the traders who accompanied the armies must 
have been connected with larger trade networks, in order to acquire or dispose of goods. 
Operating at the extremities of these networks, lixae were the individuals who actually 
mediated trade with the armies. Semantically, the difference between lixae and 
mercatores might be something akin to the difference in English between “peddler” and 
“merchant”. Whether lixae actually promoted indiscipline among the troops, or their 
reputation was a matter of convention rather than reality, probably cannot be 
determined, though some combination of the two seems likely. Nonetheless, Roman 
armies of the republic were accompanied by a significant number of individuals of 
modest status, and these men must have provided some useful services. On the rare 
occasions when traditionalist, moralizing historians choose to mention them, however, a 
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2.3 – Military Suppliers 
 
 The groups thus far described had little involvement in the routine supply of the 
armies. How then were these armies normally supplied, e.g. with grain, and what 
individuals were involved in this process? With the exception of Caesar who, as noted 
in the introduction, displays an idiosyncratic concern for the supply of his soldiers, and 
perhaps faced unusual logistical challenges imposed by the geography of Gaul, there are 
few earlier references to the process of supply. While some portion of these supplies 
was acquired locally, through a combination of purchase and requisition, importation 
also played a role. In regard to the latter, incidents in 215 and in 195, both involving 
armies in Spain, are key in considering the system of supply, the nature of which must 




 Livy describes how, in 215 after the defeat at Cannae in the previous year, the 
senate was presented with a report from the proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio, and his 
brother Cn. Cornelius Scpio Calvus,
60
 detailing a need for money, clothing, and grain 
for their soldiers, as well as whatever the naval allies serving with them required.
61
 
While it is interesting that there is a claimed inability to acquire grain and clothing 
(though not money) from local Iberian sources, it is the consequent events that are more 
relevant. Lacking funds as a result of its military commitments elsewhere, the senate 
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directed that those who had in the past benefitted from public contracts should be 
encouraged to accept contracts for supplying the forces in Spain on condition that 
payment would be made at a later date.
62
 Three societates, comprised of nineteen 
individuals in total, took up the contracts on condition that the public should assume the 
risk to their cargoes against enemy action or storms.
63
 This arrangement was initially 
successful, as Livy goes on to state that the army in Spain was furnished with the 
requisite supplies. It was only three years later, early in 212, that a scandal broke out. 
 To summarise Livy’s account,64 the  publicani (now explicitly named as such) 
had been falsely reporting shipwrecks, as well as placing cargoes of minimal value on 
decrepit ships, sinking them, and reporting losses of far greater value. Though the 
senate, and specifically the praetor M. Aemilius, had been aware of this fraudulent 
activity, no action was taken, ostensibly on the grounds that the senate wished to avoid 
offending the ordinem publicanorum.
65
 Consequently, the tribunes Sp. and L. Carvilius 
sought to impose a fine on the worst offender, one M. Postumius, which he attempted to 
appeal before the concilium plebis. When it became apparent that this appeal was going 
to fail, and since a friendly tribune could not be prevailed upon to impose his veto, the 
publicani resorted to violence and disrupted the assembly. This matter was referred to 
the senate and, in light of the use of violence against the res publica, the Carvilii 
brought capital charges against Postumius, who went into exile. A similar procedure 
followed for the other individuals involved in this disorder. 
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Objections to Livy’s version of events have been raised. Badian, for example, 
notes that various elements of the story are anachronistic and reflect political conditions 
at the end of the republic.
66
 The most obvious of these is the existence of an “organized 
ordo publicanorum”, of sufficient stature that the senate actively sought to avoid 
offending it. He thus reinterprets the story, though without expressing doubt as to the 
existence of fraud. In his version, the senate’s delay in pursuing the matter is attributed 
to a preference for dealing with the matter at the start of the next consular year, the 
tribunes acted throughout with the approval of the senate, and it was not a broad group 
of publicani that disrupted an assembly and were punished, but just the friends and 
clients of M. Postumius. 
Erdkamp, in comparison, attacks Livy’s account in much stronger terms, though 
on fundamentally the same grounds as Badian, regarding it as wholly “discredited by 
untruths, inconsistencies and anachronistic elements”.67 More seriously, because the 
notion that the military was supplied by means of private contracts appears in such a 
story, and because there is a lack of other evidence to corroborate its existence, 
Erdkamp rejects the idea that the military was supplied in this way at all. In his 
conception, even when generals and their subordinates could not arrange supply locally, 
the Roman administrative structure was itself capable of acquiring the necessary goods 
and supplying them to the army, without resorting to contracting. In this regard, he 
directly contrasts Rickman’s view that the “machinery of government” was too 
“rudimentary” to achieve this.68 Quite apart from any assessment of the republic’s 
bureaucratic capacities, there is the matter of adequate shipping, to which Rickman also 
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referred. As Erdkamp acknowledges,
69
 and at least one reviewer points out,
70
 there is 
little indication for the existence of the large amounts of state-owned shipping that his 
model requires. Indeed, he suggests that it would have been necessary to employ private 
ships on contract in order to meet transportation needs.
71
 In a sense the debate has come 
full circle, and all that is at issue is the degree of private involvement in military supply. 
In this regard, Cato’s treatment of the merchants, redemptores, he encountered on his 
arrival in Spain in 195 is pertinent. 
Upon reaching Spain during his consular year, M. Porcius Cato is said to have 
first assessed the situation and, noting that local supplies of grain were readily available, 
forbade the contractors to provide it, and sent them back to Rome. The occasion then 
gave him the opportunity to claim pithily that the war would feed itself.
72
 Given Cato’s 
reputation for parsimony and self-restraint, particularly in matters of public 
administration,
73
 this incident likely reflects his representation of his own behaviour. 
Nonetheless, in order for this anecdote to carry weight, it must normally have been the 
case that a commander would have availed himself of such merchants to supply his 
army. 
Based on the few details offered, Erdkamp interprets this incident as concerning 
only the transportation of grain, rather than its acquisition, and such an interpretation is 
feasible if not provable.
74
 Furthermore, he is correct in asserting that it offers no 
evidence for the participation of publicani in military supply, if by publicanus one 
understands a representative of a large societas in Rome. Still, even a contract to 
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transport grain entailed dealing with public property and, in that broader sense, 
individuals holding such contracts could be regarded as publicani. One should reject an 
anachronistic model involving the letting of supply contracts in Rome, which relies on a 
single example when the republic was under enormous strain. This does not, however, 
require the minimal levels of private involvement preferred by Erdkamp. Under normal 
circumstances, individuals involved in the grain trade were likely to have followed 
Roman armies to the provinces. Particularly in Spain, given the near permanent 
presence of legions there, these traders, and/or individuals employed by them, must 
likewise have established a permanent presence there. No doubt this was connected with 
the larger trade in grain destined for the civilian market, though that subject will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Caesar and Local Supply 
 
 What conclusions can be reached about military supply, based on material from 
the Caesarian corpus? As mentioned in the introduction, there is some risk that sources 
are somewhat idiosyncratic, but the concern for supply which they demonstrate renders 
them indispensable. Rather than isolating specific references to the grain supply (which 
often involve little more than an assertion that Caesar took care to ensure it was 
maintained), the following will concentrate on the role of mercatores in these texts, and 
primarily in the Gallic War. 
 The presence of mercatores in company with the armies is indicated on several 
occasions. For example, during the African War, we are told that Labienus attacked the 
81 
 
rear of Caesar’s column, and seized baggage belonging to mercatores, as well as lixae.75 
Furthermore, the camp of Q. Cicero, which was attacked by Germans in 53, is said to 
have had mercatores encamped around it.
76
 Certainly in the former example, given the 
civil war context and the presence of the merchants’ baggage in the army, the 
mercatores are closely associated with Caesar’s forces. The same may also have been 
true of those encamped alongside Q. Cicero, however, at other times mercatores are 
present in the narrative who were clearly not attached on a semi-permanent basis to the 
army. 
 That mercatores were present in Gaul independently – or at least somewhat so – 
of the army is demonstrated by their repeated role as sources of information. Thus, 
Caesar himself says that he called upon traders over a wide area in order to gather 
information on Britain.
77
 Less beneficially from Caesar’s perspective, he also relates 
how traders terrified his troops with stories of German military prowess.
78
 In fact, this is 
said to have occurred while the army was delayed, waiting for provisions, though it is 
not clear if the mercatores involved in spreading stories were also involved in the grain 
supply. It is indicated that traders shared information with Gauls, as they did with 
Caesar, though one might question the detail that they did so under compulsion.
79
 In 
fact, merchants trading in grain seem to have been present even at times when Caesar 
was faced with particularly challenging circumstances. At Ilerda, when rising rivers are 
said to have cut Caesar’s supply lines, grain was still available for purchase though at a 
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 Similarly, high prices are also indicated for the army shortly 
after it crossed into Africa, having brought only minimal supplies with it.
81
 All of these 
instances point to the ubiquity of grain traders alongside the armies. 
At other times, it is shown that traders were travelling from the army to other 
areas. When the Aduatuci were sold into slavery, it is clear that traders dealing at least 
partly in slaves were present with the army, and that these slaves were conveyed 
elsewhere for sale, with the numbers sold then reported to Caesar.
82
 Caesar also asserts 
that he took care to ensure that merchants could travel without interference or tolls 
through the Alps, sending a legion to an area south of Lake Geneva for the purpose at 
the start of 56.
83
 While it is not stated that this had a specifically military objective, 
Caesar must have benefitted from securing a supply line in this way. Conversely, since 
it seems unlikely that the merchants travelling this route were exclusively involved in 
military supply, Caesar’s actions must have had the effect of encouraging, or at least 
easing, trade into this region of Gaul. 
On two occasions, both in 52, Caesar draws attention to attacks on Roman 
citizens involved in trade. So, at the start of Book VII, it is said that the Carnutes 
massacred traders at Cenabum. Moreover, among the casualties was one Gaius Fufius 
Cita, described as an honestum equitem Romanum, who was superintending the food 
supply for the army.
84
 When the Romans then besieged Avaricum, the memory of 
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Cenabum is invoked as demanding vengeance,
85
 and to have enraged the Roman troops 
to such a degree that they massacred the besieged.
86
 Events at Cenabum thus justify a 
departure from Caesar’s customary clemency, and perhaps helped to justify Caesar’s 
continued presence in Gaul. Nonetheless, from a purely military perspective, it seems 
that Cenabum was attacked precisely because the individuals there were involved in 
supplying the Roman army. Later, the Aedui under Litaviccus would attack traders at 
Noviodunum, and one might suppose that the traders there were similarly occupied.
87
 If 
a sizeable number of these traders were involved in the grain supply, and were being 
coordinated by Fufius Cita or comparable individuals, this implies that military supply 
was undertaken by relatively small-scale merchants. Recalling the situation with lixae, it 
is likely that these suppliers were part of larger systems of trade: they may have 
purchased grain from larger importers, or acted on behalf of those individuals. While 
one should be cautious about generalising from Caesar’s situation, there does seem to 
be a similarity with the earlier period of Scipio and Cato. Private traders were closely 
involved in military supply, but there is little evidence for the involvement of large 
societates in Rome. 
 
2.4 – Conclusion 
 
A running theme of this chapter has been its concentration on individuals of a 
somewhat lower social status than have generally been considered. Accompanying the 
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armies of the republic throughout our period, though perhaps in varying numbers, was 
an assortment of non-combatants. Slaves, calones, and lixae are only occasionally 
mentioned by our sources, and this disregard hints at their ubiquity in association with 
the armies. That said, precisely because they are so easily overlooked, it is also difficult 
to define these groups precisely, and perhaps impossible to get a sense of their numbers. 
When they are discussed, it is in the context of campaigns, rather than settlement. 
Nonetheless, given that former soldiers chose to settle in the provinces, it is likely that 
some of the non-combatants who accompanied them likewise chose to remain. A soldier 
who settled overseas would presumably have retained his slaves, while small-traders 
like lixae could well have seen former soldiers as a potential market. Indeed, if deserters 
contributed to that overseas population, then surely the slaves and servants of soldiers 
would have been even more likely to abscond from the army. 
With regard to military supply, this chapter has suggested that it was normally 
undertaken through merchants of modest means, relative to those involved in the large 
societates publicanorum in Rome itself. Military supply was intertwined with the 
broader trade in grain, and individual grain traders were probably involved in the 
civilian trade also. There is evidence that merchants involved in military supply were 
present in the provinces both at the start of the second century, and 150 years later. It is 
quite legitimate to question the extent to which they were actually resident in these 
areas. Nonetheless, Roman military involvement in a given region would have attracted 
grain traders from elsewhere, as well as providing a new market for those already 
involved in the civilian trade. The nature of trade would thus have varied between 
regions. Grain merchants resident in Spain would have been much more likely to be 
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involved in military supply than those in Sicily. This would reflect the army’s near 







Chapter Three – Grain Trade 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 
 Whereas chapter two dealt with those individuals who participated directly in 
supplying the armies, this one will consider how the overall grain trade functioned 
during the republic, and its implications for the Italian diaspora of the period. The 
categories of military suppliers and civilian traders are not, of course, mutually 
exclusive. While some traders may have simply followed the armies, campaigns were 
undertaken against the background of a pre-existing civilian trade.
1
 Caesar, for example, 
hints at the presence of such traders in Gaul, in advance of his armies, when he 
describes their exploitation as sources of military intelligence.
2
 While Caesar does not 
explicitly indicate the origins of such merchants, he at least implies that they were a 
source of information distinct from the Gauls.
3
 On another occasion, the presence of 
traders from other regions is mentioned, though this could refer to locations both within 
and beyond Gaul.
4
 Finally, prior to his first expedition to Britain, Caesar summoned 
traders undique, despite which he claims that he was unable to gain a great deal of 
information.
5
 While it is unlikely that many Italian merchants had penetrated this far 
north, Caesar does indicate that a diverse group of merchants in northern Gaul was 
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res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat. 
5
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questioned. A variety of merchants, both local and from overseas, thus appears to have 
been operating in Gaul. 
Italian merchants already active in a given region prior to a military campaign 
there may have seen military supply as a potentially lucrative business. Thus, it is 
claimed that Caesar, in response to a delegation from Thysdra during the African War, 
provided the town with a garrison specifically in order to preserve the three-hundred 
thousand modii of wheat that had been brought there by Italian negotiatores and 
farmers.
6
 The reality of the situation remains obscure. Was the collection of grain in 
Thysdra the normal practice, or was it undertaken in anticipation of military demand? 
With a garrison in place, to what extent was military need fulfilled by compulsion? 
Whatever the specifics of this wartime situation, it is clear that Italian negotiatores were 
active in this part of Africa, and that they had a relationship with the farmers of that 
region, perhaps of long-standing. 
The objective of this chapter will be to examine the trade in grain outside a 
purely military context, although the trade may sometimes become visible only in that 
light. Discussion will proceed on a geographical basis, commencing with Sicily by 
virtue of the abundance of evidence for that province, and continuing with Spain and 
Gaul. Prior to that regional analysis, however, it will be necessary to contextualise the 
trade in grain – as well as in other commodities – by setting out a general description of 
the nature and development of the economy of the study region during the last two 
centuries of the republic. 
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 Caes., B. Afr. 36. legati interim ex oppido Thysdrae, in quod tritici modium milia CCC comportata 
fuerant a negotiatoribus Italicis aratoribusque, ad Caesarem venire, quantaque copia frumenti apud se 
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3.2 – The Economic Background 
 
 Consideration of the economies of the ancient Mediterranean has, until relatively 
recently, been dominated by debates over theoretical approaches to this field.
7
 Hence, 
modernists argued that the economy of the late republic was comparable to that of more 
recent societies, such as those of early modern Europe, and involved high levels of 
trade.
8
 Conversely, primitivists responded by emphasising the agricultural basis of the 
economy, with trade occurring only for a limited range of high-value goods which 
excluded the majority of the population.
9
 This debate overlapped with a clash between 
formalism and substantivism, the former asserting that neo-classical economic theory 
could validly be applied to the ancient world, while the latter held that ancient 
economies could be understood only within their particular cultural contexts.
10
 
These debates of the 1970s and 1980s highlighted aspects of the ancient 
economy, but a reconciliation leading to a final synthesis was not initially forthcoming. 
Indeed, it was claimed as early as the mid-1990s that they had culminated in a 
stalemate.
11
 More recent works, however, treat these positions as part of the intellectual 
background to the subject. Taking the Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-
Roman World as representative of a modern consensus, the authors advocate pursuing 
research in directions influenced by both formalist and substantivist positions. 
Reflecting the former, they call for “more systemic analysis” in order to better quantify 
the performance of the ancient economy. Simultaneously, they call for the continued 
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 See Morley (2007a) and Morris et al. (2007). Both summarise the earlier debates in detail, while 
advocating that future research seek to integrate the findings of all positions. 
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 Morley (2007a), p. 3-4; Morris et al. (2007), p. 2. 
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 Morley (2007a), p. 4; Morris et al. (2007), p. 2-3. 
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 Morley (2007a), p. 11; Morris et al. (2007), p. 3-4. 
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application of “social-scientific thought” in order to stimulate new developments in 
ancient economic theory.
12
 Ideally, theoretical developments could then be subjected to 
testing, based on gradually improving quantitative data. The objective of the following 
is to describe the late republican economy in general terms. The main focus will be on 
the social organisation of the economy, on transportation, and on general characteristics 
of the trade. 
 
Social Organisation of the Economy 
 
 What was the social position of the traders, in all goods, who operated in the 
western Mediterranean? Prior to Roman domination of the region, trade has been 
described in terms of “complex micro-scale relations between human agents,” 
undertaken by “heterogeneous traders” sailing along the coastlines between indigenous 
and colonial centres, and taking on diverse cargoes based on their perceptions of 
consumer need.
13
 Trade on this scale is dubbed by Morley, among others, as cabotage. 
While this could be quite sophisticated,
14
 it could also have been undertaken without 
reliance on literacy, currency, or legal institutions.
15
 Consequently, there may be 
comparatively little evidence for its practice, outside the archaeological remains of the 
goods themselves. Such trade would normally tend to fall beneath the notice of our 
literary sources, both by virtue of its scale, and the elite attitude towards those engaged 
in commerce. Consider Cicero’s view of the matter, as expressed in De Officiis: trade 
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on a small scale is held to be sordida, yet if it involves high volumes of goods over 
broad areas (and is conducted without deception), it ought not be criticised 
excessively.
16
 The stigma of being involved in trade, in this view, can only be 
eliminated properly by investing in agriculture. Nonetheless, the real significance of this 
statement is that it assumes the existence of a background tier of trade, which is then 
specifically maligned. The existence of large numbers of independent traders is assumed 
again later in the same work. Cicero suggests that a good trader, finding himself able to 
fulfill a need for grain in time of famine, while also aware that other traders are en route 
to the same location, would not seek to take advantage of the situation by selling at a 
high price. Regardless of the morality of the situation, or the probability of a trader 
behaving thus, the anecdote assumes the existence of numerous independent traders.
17
 
 A social stigma among the elite against direct involvement in trade was reflected 
by the lex Claudia of 218, which barred senators or their children from owning ships 
above a certain capacity.
18
 That said, the lex Claudia itself was reputedly passed without 
significant support among the senators themselves, and the extent to which it was 
subsequently enforced is unclear. Thus, in prosecuting C. Verres, Cicero was able to 
claim that his opponent, Hortensius, sought to exculpate Verres for having had a ship 
built, on the grounds that the relevant laws were old and dead.
19
 Cicero is, of course, 
putting these words in his opponent’s mouth, while making an appeal to what he asserts 
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 Cic., Verr. 2.5.45. ...noli metuere, Hortensi, ne quaeram qui licuerit aedificare navem senatori; 
antiquae sunt istae leges et mortuae, quem ad modum tu soles dicere, quae vetant. 
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was the traditional severity of judges in the past, but his description of the law falling 
into desuetude would have had no weight if it was being rigorously enforced. In any 
case, even during the second century, senators were able to participate in commerce, 
despite the law and prevailing attitudes. As traditional a senator as Cato the Elder is said 
to have loaned money for shipping, insisting that a partnership be formed among a large 
group of borrowers, and taking one share in the partnership himself, while being 
represented by a freedman.
20
 Furthermore, he seems to have promoted commerce in 
Rome itself while in office, as he was responsible for the construction of two atria, 
among a variety of other public works.
21
 
While there was a stigma against direct participation in trade, this did not 
preclude the involvement of senators by indirect means. Thus, D’Arms sought to 
establish the extent to which shipping and commerce could constitute part of a senator’s 
negotia. In his view, the familia was an ideal basis around which to organise business, 
with a single individual at the apex of the structure, and others playing a subordinate 
role as either dependents or clientes.
22
 This was coupled with an inverse relationship 
between the visibility of individuals, and the profit which they derived from the 
enterprise.
23
 Slaves, freedmen, and free persons thus operated businesses nominally and 
on a day-to-day basis, while the majority of the financial benefits were reaped by their 
wealthy backers. Senators did not necessarily refrain from commerce, they simply 
avoided the perception of direct involvement in it, and simultaneously shielded 
themselves from the relevant risks. Correspondingly, D’Arms places senators on a 
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social continuum with equestrians and the decurial class of the Italian municipalities. 
Both senators and equestrians could have commercial interests, but those equestrians 
without an interest in pursuing a political career could engage in certain categories of 
business more openly.
24
 Furthermore, both groups could be found living alongside the 
wealthier municipales, e.g., around the Bay of Naples. Describing the period ca. 50 BC, 
D’Arms hints that the physical proximity of representatives of different classes 
corresponds with both social proximity and overlapping commercial concerns.
25
 
Wallace-Hadrill takes this connection a step further. He argues that, since urban 
development involved the construction of tabernae and shops adjacent to the homes of 
the wealthy, it is not feasible to postulate a sharp separation between them and 
individuals involved directly in trade.
26
 Despite the social pretensions of the senatorial 
elite, they participated in commerce, though on a relatively silent basis. 
If the wealthiest individuals in society could not be seen to be involved in 
commerce, then more humble persons had to act on their behalf. Correspondingly, the 
legal framework surrounding agency was developed in precisely the period of this 
study. Roman law had not previously recognised the capacity of one individual to create 
a legal obligation on the part of another.
27
 An exception to this predisposition 
developed, however, in the form of the actio institoria and the related actio exercitoria. 
Briefly, the actio institoria, created by praetorian edict,
28
 gave a legal action to a third 
party who had undertaken a contract with the agent of another party. The actio 
exercitoria, similarly, provided an action against a ship owner for the conduct of a 
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captain. There were, of course, certain restrictions on the use of these legal remedies. 
Thus, in order for a principal to be liable, it was necessary for his agent (institor) to be 
acting in strict accordance with the terms under which agency had been established 
(praepositio). If the agent had been acting outside those limits, a third party could make 
claims only against the agent’s property. In the event that the agent was a slave or other 
dependent, liability was limited to the value of the peculium, unless this agent was 
acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions. This raised the possibility that a 
wealthy backer could limit his liability by having his business interests operated at 
arm’s length by his own slaves.29 
Who, then, were these agents, and what role might they have played in the 
Italian diaspora? Though they were most active in the second and third centuries AD, 
where the jurists present cases involving the actiones described above, they portray 
most institores as dependents, usually slaves.
30
 Among the jurists, Gaius explicitly notes 
that slaves and freedmen were undertaking business transactions overseas.
31
 
Admittedly, he was writing in the late 2
nd
 century AD, and the possibility exists that 
practices in the late republic were different. Indeed, the term institor does not appear in 
a contemporary text until 44 BC, though the word was freely used by later authors with 
reference to earlier events.
32
 Consider the situation among bankers, some of whom 
operated outside Italy, acted there as intermediaries representing wealthy individuals in 
Rome, and could be regarded as a subset of institores.
33
 Based on funerary inscriptions, 
Andreau has argued that roughly half of such individuals in the period 50 BC – 150 AD 
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 He also asserts that free-born bankers were particularly prominent in 
the preceding period, a claim based on Cicero’s references to them, as well as on 
examples of conspicuous euergetism by wealthy free-born bankers that are without later 
parallels.
35
 This implies that the status of the group of individuals involved in banking 
gradually diminished. An evolution in practice over the last two centuries of the 
republic should also be anticipated from the development of actiones in that period. 
While the date at which these were first incorporated in the praetor’s edict is not 
precisely known, Aubert considers a date in the late 2
nd
 century BC to be most probable, 
though a range from 150 to 50 BC is possible.
36
 Assuming that these laws were 
developed in response to the needs of society, it is likely that the use of agents had 
grown during the preceding decades. If so, the growth in the use of agents is roughly 
correlated with the extension of Roman control over more distant overseas regions. 
  A spectrum of individuals was involved in commerce, from small-traders to 
members of the elite. While members of the propertied classes are prominent in the 
political history of the period, by virtue of the role of some as publicani, participation in 
trade extended well beyond this group. Among the diaspora in the provinces, one should 
probably not expect to see members of the elite, but instead agents and other personnel 
acting on their behalf.
37
 These agents might themselves range from slaves to free born 
individuals. Furthermore, nothing precluded an agent (even a slave agent, provided he 
possessed a peculium), from undertaking other business on his own account.
38
 Thus, one 
might expect agents to be operating with varying degrees of independence and, 
presumably, retaining amounts of wealth for themselves that reflected their level of 
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independence. In short, the traders in the diaspora were a diverse group in terms of their 
status, wealth, and connection with Rome. 
No doubt this diversity grew as the Roman citizenship was extended throughout 
Italy. Italian elites thus gained the legal capacity to undertake contracts enforceable in 
Rome, the right to undertake public contracts, and ultimately the right to participate in 
the economic benefits of empire on an equal footing. It is possible that the desire among 
Italians for these advantages was a contributing cause of the Social War,
39
 though how 
significant is not clear. Regardless, the consequent extension of citizenship must have 
opened opportunities for the numerous Italians who had been involved in trade. 
 
Transportation and the Grain Trade 
 
 It has generally been held that transportation of goods by land, and particularly 
the transportation of so bulky a commodity as grain, was prohibitively expensive in 
comparison with transport by sea or river over any significant distance.
40
 While this 
would seem to be a logical conclusion, and while marine and riverine transportation of 
goods was doubtlessly cheaper than by land, the disparity was not so great as to 
inevitably render the latter unaffordable. As Laurence has discussed, the traditional 
picture is an overstatement, derived in large part from Yeo’s 1946 paper comparing the 
two modes of transportation.
41
 While Laurence acknowledges the cost difference 
between land and sea transport, he asserts that this does not demonstrate that land 
transport could not be undertaken at all. Instead, the overall distance, the difficulty of 
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the intervening terrain, the quality of the available roads, and the cost imposed by 
transferring goods between transportation modes, must all be considered. 
 The transportation of grain, however, was unusually challenging, by virtue of its 
bulk. The low value of grain per unit volume rendered it more susceptible than other 
goods to being prohibitively expensive to transport. Consequently, for inland locations 
where marine transport was unavailable, grain shortages were most difficult to 
alleviate.
42
 Even in circumstances where transport by water was an option, the 
movement of large quantities of grain demanded significant infrastructure to 
accommodate ships, and to unload and store their cargo.
43
 The infrastructure required to 
support trade is likely to be greater as the distance involved in that trade increases, since 
greater distances demand larger shipments in order to be profitable. In Hopkins’ model 
of the grain trade, most grain was transported over short distances, e.g., to the nearest 
town. Less than a third as much was transported over medium distances (e.g., intra-
provincial), while only one-sixth as much was transported over longer distances (e.g., 
inter-provincial). As Hopkins himself concedes, his figures should be taken only as 
estimates,
44
 but it is at least plausible that most of the trade in grain was undertaken over 
relatively short distances. That said, it is trade over medium to long distances that is of 
concern here. 
Transportation of grain over long distances in the late republic was concerned 
mainly with the supply of Rome, and of the armies in so far as local sources of supply 
for them were not sufficient. A portion of this consisted of taxes levied in the provinces, 
but these alone were not sufficient to feed the city. Consequently, a private grain trade 
existed in parallel with a system of public contracts for the shipment of grain. In times 
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of shortage, it was necessary for the political elite to take action to address the shortfall, 
usually on an ad hoc basis. A recurring theme of Garnsey’s Famine and Food Supply in 
the Ancient World is that, rather than establishing state institutions to deal with shortage, 
ancient cities tended to rely on the intervention of wealthy individuals who purchased 
grain from neighbouring regions. By contrast, in the 2
nd
 century BC and earlier, 
shortages in Rome were dealt with by the responsible magistrates, who sought 
emergency supplies overseas and made them available to the populace.
45
 Increasing 
attention was given to supply problems in the last century of the republic. For example, 
when Pompey was given charge of the grain supply in September 57, he sent legates to 
Sardinia, Sicily and Africa in order to secure additional supplies there.
46
 Furthermore, 
Pompey had citizenship granted to individuals from those regions, likely in exchange 
for services rendered during this time as merchants or shippers.
47
 What this suggests is a 
certain latent shipping capacity, capable of addressing shortfalls on a regional level. The 
individuals who worked with Pompey in the mid-50s may, under normal circumstances, 
have been involved in a more medium-range trade, or operated between other ports. 
They would fall into a smaller class of merchants than was normally involved in the 
grain trade, perhaps participating because the elevated price of grain, and the guaranteed 
demand in Rome, made them more able to realise a profit.
48
 
Outside periods of shortage, however, it is likely that the long-distance trade was 
predominantly in the hands of wealthy individuals, or of agents acting on their behalf. 
This condition was imposed simply by the capital outlay involved in owning a ship and 
its cargo. For construction of a ship of 400 tonnes, and a cargo of wheat, Hopkins 
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estimates a total cost of 400,000 to 600,000 HS.
49
 Only the wealthiest individuals, or a 
relatively large group of individuals, would have had the resources to engage in 
shipping on this level. The high risk and high outlay involved in shipping is also 
indicated by the way in which maritime loans (pecunia traiecticia) operated. These 
involved the provision that, if a voyage was undertaken during the normal sailing 
season, and the ship was lost, the borrower need not be repay.
50
 The lender was, 
however, compensated for this risk by receiving an unusually high rate of interest on the 
loan. 
For long-range shipping, involving large vessels, large cargoes, and a low 
number of potential voyages in the year, it stands to reason that only a wealthy minority 
was likely to have participated. Hopkins’ precise figures could be questioned, given that 
he relies on comparison with a small sample of ship construction costs for the late 
mediaeval period. Nonetheless, one would expect the largest common vessels to have 
been relatively expensive, as Hopkins argued. This does not, however, preclude the 
existence of shippers operating with smaller, cheaper vessels. In the 2
nd
 century AD, 
special privileges were given to grain shippers operating single vessels over 330 tonnes 
capacity, or operating multiple vessels over 65 tonnes. Even at that date, shippers with 
varying degrees of wealth must have existed. Presumably, these would have operated 
over relatively shorter distances on grounds of efficiency; ships below a certain size 
would have been too small to profitably carry a bulky cargo such as grain over great 
distances. For the late republic, a similar range of shippers is likely, though the 
particular conditions of the grain trade would have rendered the smallest scale ship-
owners unable to participate profitably. 
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Over the last two centuries of the republic, one might expect to see some 
variation in this pattern. Growth in the population of Rome, coupled with the 
elimination of commercial competition from Carthage and Corinth after 146, must have 
led to the trade in grain being increasingly centered on the city itself. Furthermore, the 
period saw increasing Roman control over the major sources of grain in the western 
Mediterranean: Sicily and Sardinia after the First Punic War, and Africa from 146 and 
increasingly thereafter. This can be combined with a gradual diminution of pirate 
activity before it was largely eliminated by Pompey. Rome thus dominated sources of 
grain, gradually improved security for its transport, and provided the most consistent 
demand for it. Each of these reasons would have provided interested parties with an 
incentive to invest in the construction of larger vessels, as they could more profitably 
concentrate on the transport of grain to Rome. 
 
General Characteristics of the Grain Trade 
 
The production of grain, and demand for it in the ancient Mediterranean, were 
ubiquitous. While a range of food crops were available to Mediterranean peoples, grains 
were the most significant among them, providing the bulk of the energy needs of most 
of the population.
51
 Ecologically, the Mediterranean features a large number of regional 
micro-climates, each of which experiences a high level of inter-annual variation.
52
 As 
argued by Horden and Purcell, these facts may have rendered the food supply of 
Mediterranean peoples particularly insecure.
53
 Highly variable rainfalls meant that food 
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yields in a given location could be unpredictable. Simultaneously, the number of micro-
climates meant that yields in neighbouring regions could be quite dissimilar.
54
 Such a 
pattern of local abundance or shortage could be addressed by a short-range trade in 




It seems reasonable to think that ecological conditions played a role in 
determining the nature of the Mediterranean grain trade. We should expect to see a 
short-range trade throughout the period and, as Hopkins discussed, most traded grain 
may always have been moved only over such short distances.
56
 Inter-regional climatic 
variability meant there could be shortages over larger areas, which could not be met 
through local trade. Meeting these needs would have required the exploitation of 
relatively more secure sources of grain, such as were provided by fertile river valleys 
and selected other areas. The Nile is most obvious in this regard, as are Sicily, Sardinia, 
and North Africa. The prominence of these areas as grain suppliers is derived from the 
greater – though never absolute – reliability of the surpluses produced there. A different 
variety of trader, willing and able to invest in larger vessels, could have been better 
suited to exploiting this niche. 
Finally, the extraordinary needs of the city of Rome, and perhaps of other large 
cities, opened opportunities for an even wealthier class of businessman. This long range 
trade, however, was dependent on a degree of security, and of assured demand, that was 
increasingly a feature of the last two centuries BC. Obviously, these categories of trade 
are not intended to be rigid. They are, however, a reflection of prevailing conditions in 
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the Mediterranean, and of likely responses to them. In the various regions considered 
below, larger traders are the more visible, but it is likely that they operated against a 
pre-existing background of traders of somewhat lesser means. 
 
3.3 – The Sicilian Grain Trade 
 
 The island of Sicily is a useful starting point for considering the grain trade for 
several reasons. It was the first of Rome’s overseas provinces, an area which was 
exporting grain to the city and its armies from at least the last decade of the 3
rd
 century, 
and a location renowned for its agricultural productivity. Sicily would thus have been 
one possible model for how Rome could extract grain from other regions. Furthermore, 
we are fortunate to have the evidence of Cicero’s speeches against C. Verres, which, 
amongst a litany of purported transgressions, concentrate in large part on that 
governor’s abuses of agricultural tithes in Sicily. 
Some grain was privately traded, while some was state owned and consisted of 
tithe grain. In Sicily, state-owned grain was acquired through taxation in accordance 
with the arrangements of the former king of Syracuse, Hieron II. After the fall of 
Syracuse in 212, these were implemented across the island as the lex Hieronica, 
probably between 210 and 205.
57
 The situation in the Roman province prior to the 
annexation of Syracuse is not fully known. Tithe-grain was devoted specifically to the 
supply of the city of Rome itself, ensuring that under normal circumstances there would 
be a supply there.
58
 Any surplus remaining in Sicily thereafter would have been 
available for private trade to Rome, or to other Mediterranean locations. 
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Given a tithe of 3,000,000 modii, it has been suggested that a further 5,000,000 
modii were available for private export.
59
 It is not clear if this trade occurred in the 
context of a single, connected market, in which price fluctuations in one region quickly 
impacted the price across the entire market. As Rathbone argued for the Hellenistic 
East, a regional surplus could have the system-wide effect of reducing price, but local 
variations could still allow individual merchants to gain significant profits.
60
 The more 
efficiently local demand for grain was fulfilled, the more limited that local variation 
would have been. The difficulties involved in communication would have contributed to 
inefficiency, but need not have precluded a connected market.
61
 Along the lines 
described in section 3.2, we might expect wealthy individuals or their agents to react to 
perceptions of need elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Wealthier individuals, or groups of 
individuals, invested in the larger vessels, and were correspondingly more able to 
participate in trade at longer distances. Alongside them were smaller-scale shippers, 
capable of meeting the demand created by more local variations in agricultural yield. 
Among Romans, there was a broad awareness of Sicily’s agricultural potential 
from an early date. Immediately after the Carthaginians were expelled from the island in 
210, the consul M. Valerius Laevinus reported to the senate that the population of Sicily 
had returned to farming, and that the island could be relied upon to supply grain.
62
 By 
204, the Sicilians were already being required to provide grain beyond the requirements 
of the tithe, in order to support the army of Scipio prior to his invasion of Africa.
63
 
Furthermore, in that same year, it is clear that Italians were present in Syracuse, 
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continuing (in disregard of the instructions of the Roman senate) to hold property seized 
during the fall of the city six years earlier.
64
 Clearly, there was no shortage of 
willingness to exploit the resources of Sicily quickly. 
How, then, did the grain tithe function? Cicero describes how the lex Hieronica 
was maintained throughout Sicily, with the exception of a small amount of land that was 
ager publicus and to which the lex did not apply.
65
 In each town, the farmers were 
obliged to declare how much land was under cultivation, and with what crop, in a given 
year. Based on this information, and their familiarity with prevailing conditions, 
prospective tithe collectors bid at auction before the governor on the amount of the tithe 
they believed could be collected from a given community. The successful collector then 
established pactiones with the farmers of that community, stipulating the amount of 
grain to be provided.
66
 In the event that such an agreement was not reached, the amount 
to be handed over by the farmer was determined after the harvest.
67
 The farmers 
themselves were responsible for conveying the grain to the tithe collector,
68
 who was in 
turn responsible for transporting it least as far as the coast of Sicily.
69
 Thereafter, it is 
unclear who was responsible for conveying the tithe to Rome itself, though Rickman 
suggests that Cicero’s use of the word mancipes to describe the managers of these 
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What, then, was the identity of the individuals involved in this procedure? The 
collection of the tithe, and its shipment (at least within Sicily), were arranged locally, 
and it appears that it could have been undertaken by anyone in Sicily. This included 
Romans in the province, but could also include individual Sicilians, or the towns 
themselves.
71
 Indeed, Verres himself employed a range of individuals as collectors, 
including Romans such as C. Sergius,
72





 The one group which was not permitted to bid on these contracts in Sicily, 
however, were the publicani in Rome. They had sought this privilege just a few years 




The farmers themselves, also, seem to have had a range of origins, though the 
relative scale of land-holding by Sicilians, Italians, and Roman citizens in Sicily is not 
entirely clear.
76
 Diodorus claimed that the blame for the outbreak of the First Servile 
War in 135 could be attributed to both Sicilian and Italian landowners.
77
 Furthermore, 
during the Second Servile War, he mentions the death of one P. Clonius at the hands of 
slaves.
78
 By the period of the Verrines, some sixty years after the first war, Cicero was 
able to remark in general that Sicily had attracted many Roman citizens, some of whom 
may only have gained citizenship after the Social War. Some of these citizens profited 
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from a distance, while others remained, settled there, and engaged in farming, stock-
raising and other business activities.
79
 Admittedly, Cicero has an interest in emphasising 
the presence of Roman citizens in Sicily, precisely because Verres’ abuse of Romans, as 
opposed to Sicilians, would likely have been regarded as more serious by a senatorial 
court. Nonetheless, Cicero makes repeated references to individual Roman land-holders 
residing in Sicily. One hears, for example, of Q. Septitius, who sought to resist the 
excessive claims of the tithe collector Apronius.
80
 Another equestrian, Q. Lollius, 
similarly attempted to resist Apronius, and was seized and abused by him as a result.
81
 
We hear also of senators owning land in Sicily. One, Anneius Brocchus, was compelled 
to give money, in addition to grain, to Symmachus,
82
 while the wife of another, C. 
Cassius, found the produce of lands inherited from her father confiscated.
83
 While 
senators are unlikely to have been resident, a range of wealthy Romans clearly held land 
in Sicily. 
Of the 180 individual residents of Sicily mentioned by Cicero, 42 were Roman 
citizens,
84
 and many of these were negotiatores. Given Sicily’s reputation for 
agricultural productivity, and given the capacity of negotiatores to have relatively 
diverse business interests, one could well imagine that many of these people were 
involved in aspects of the grain trade. These may have involved shipping tithe grain 
within and beyond Sicily, or involved the transportation of any additional surplus. There 
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is no reason to think that the shipment of public grain was an entirely separate affair 
from that of private; indeed, the two were probably closely connected. Nor need it be 
assumed that this trade was necessarily in the hands of a very narrow elite. The capital 
investment involved in shipping restricted the participation of some individuals, 
particularly with respect to ventures involving large vessels and longer distances. On the 
other hand, smaller vessels, undertaking shorter voyages, could have been operated by 
somewhat less wealthy individuals. Furthermore, the ability of individuals to form 
partnerships allowed a somewhat broader group to participate in shipping. Regardless, 
we should not expect owners of the smallest, and numerically more common, vessels to 
have normally participated in the grain trade. 
 
3.4 – The Spanish Grain Trade 
 
 The first evidence for grain being sent to Rome from Spain appears only slightly 
after Sicilian grain began to be systematically exploited by Rome. In the subsequent 
decades, the trade in Spanish grain receives comparatively little attention in our sources, 
except on two occasions when the abuses of governors in connection with grain brought 
about scandal in Rome. In comparison with Sicily, Spain seems to have been less 
important in terms of the supply of the city of Rome.
85
 This is apparent both from the 
fact that the levy on the Spanish crop was only one-twentieth, half of that applied to 
Sicily. Furthermore, the continual presence of the legions, often in large numbers, must 
have diminished the quantity of any surplus that might have been available to the 
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market. Nonetheless, the early exploitation of Spanish grain means that the situation 
there can usefully be compared with that in Sicily. 
 In 203, three years after the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain, Livy 
indicates that food in Rome was particularly cheap as a consequence of the arrival of a 
large quantity of Spanish grain. This was distributed to the people at a reduced cost, 
resulting in a depressed price for grain.
86
 No further details are offered, thus one can 
only conjecture as to the circumstances under which this grain was collected. The 
consulars Lentulus and Acidinus together commanded Roman armies in Spain during 
this period, and it is likely that indigenous peoples, particularly those along the fertile 
Ebro, were compelled to supply those forces with grain. In that case, the grain provided 
to Rome represented a surplus beyond military requirements. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the low price at which the grain was sold in Rome points to collection by 
the consuls, rather than purchase from private shippers.
87
 Even if this grain was not 
acquired through a market, shippers must already have been present in order to convey 
it to Rome. 
Apart from Cato’s dismissal of redemptores in 191 (see Chapter Two), the next 
occasion on which Spanish grain comes to our attention is in 171. In this year, delegates 
from the indigenous people of both Spanish provinces came to Rome, complaining of 
the greed and arrogance of several recent governors, particularly in connection with the 
seizure of money.
88
 The praetor assigned to Spain that year, L. Canuleius Dives, was 
ordered by the senate to appoint recuperatores to judge the matter. Meanwhile, the 
delegates obtained the counsel of M. Porcius Cato, P. Cornelius Scipio, L. Aemilius 
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Paulus, and C. Sulpicius Gallus. Initially, M. Titinius Curvus (pr. 178 for Hispania 
Citerior, prorogued until 175) was tried and acquitted. Accusations were then made 
against P. Furius Philus (pr. 175 for Hispania Citerior, prorogued until 174), and M. 
Matienus (pr. 173 for Hispania Ulterior). Both of the latter individuals went into 
voluntary exile, in Praeneste and Tibur respectively. Livy suggests that the senate 
subsequently sought to forestall any further trials as L. Canuleius departed for his 
province shortly thereafter.
89
 Nonetheless, the senate did stipulate that, henceforth, a 
governor would be permitted neither to set the price of grain, nor to compel the Spanish 
to sell the vicensuma (the one-twentieth levy on grain) at the price of his choosing.
90
 
It is reasonable to assume that the decisions of the senate were designed to 
extinguish abuses which had occurred in the provinces. When was this system 
implemented? Richardson has argued that this was undertaken by Ti. Gracchus, during 
his governorship from 180-178. This would then be among the taxes and treaties which 
Gracchus is said to have established.
91
 The dispatch of grain to Rome in 203 and Cato’s 
dismissal of redemptores in 191 give no hint that the vicensuma existed that early, while 
the trial of M. Titinius suggests it was in place by the time of his governorship in 178. 
Indeed, the timing of the trials is used by Richardson to suggest that the system had 
been implemented shortly before 178.
92
 He also argues that, for the preceding period, 
resources were extracted from Spain on an ad hoc basis, according to the prerogatives 
of the particular governor. The limited interest of the senate in Spanish affairs in this 
period is also suggested by the inscription in which L. Aemilius Paulus established the 
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rights of the servei Hastensium. In this instance, it is explicitly indicated that his 
arrangements are valid so long as the senate and people of Rome concur with them.
93
 
In contrast to Richardson, however, Harris argues on the basis of probability that 
Rome would not have waited until the 170s to extract taxes from Spain.
94
 Clearly, 
Rome was extracting resources from Spain as early as 203, and despite the paucity of 
evidence, it likely continued to do so in the decades thereafter. That said, as long as 
Rome was benefitting from its occupation of Spain, there is no reason to suppose that a 
need for a specific system of taxation was recognised. Richardson suggests that 
Gracchus’ own measures did not reflect the will of the senate, but were undertaken on 
his own initiative.
95
 Indeed, whatever fiscal arrangements were made by Gracchus, it is 
clear that the governors who followed him felt no obligation to abide by them. What is 
significant, however, is that the senate itself chose to enforce a set of arrangements that 
were in line with Gracchus’. The senators who counselled the Spanish delegates not 
only had connections with Spain, but were among the most prominent of the period. It 
is, of course, possible that aristocratic competition, or senatorial self-interest, played a 
role in these trials. If Livy can be trusted on the point, the senate was believed to have 
manipulated events to mitigate the damage produced by them. Nonetheless, the senate’s 
decisions demonstrate an interest in asserting the authority of the senate over governors, 
and Gracchus’ arrangements could have been the basis for their decisions. Whatever the 
earlier situation, in 171 the senate selected the example of a recent, successful governor 
in order to define a new set of fiscal arrangements in Spain, with clearer rules for the 
extraction of grain. This would explain why Gracchus’ name was invoked by both the 
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senate and the Spanish in the years to come.
96
 Indeed, it may be that Gracchus’ name 
still carried weight decades later. 
In 123, Spanish grain again came to the attention of the senate, when C. 
Gracchus is said to have persuaded the senate to address the actions of Q. Fabius 
Maximus Allobrogicus. The latter, as propraetor, sent grain to Rome which had been 
improperly acquired. Through Gracchus’ influence, the senate responded by selling the 
grain, remitting the money to the cities of Spain, and censuring Fabius.
97
 No lasting 
damage seems to have been done to Fabius, given that he was elected consul only two 
years later. Furthermore, as an opponent of Gaius’ legislation, it is entirely likely that 
the censure vote was connected more with politics in Rome than with concern for 
Spanish cities. Nonetheless, Fabius’ abuses seem to have been genuine. Gaius, 
meanwhile, may have presented his actions as an effort to uphold his father’s 
settlement. 
Precisely how the vicensuma operated is unclear.
98
 In Richardson’s view, cash 
could be remitted in lieu of grain, at the discretion of the governors who set the price in 
a frumenti aestimatio.
99
  The reforms described by Livy in the year 171 relate directly to 
abuses involved in this procedure. Alternately, it may be that the process involved a 
mandatory sale of five percent of the grain crop to the Roman authorities at a fixed, 
presumably low, price.
100
 It has also been suggested that the funds raised by sale of this 
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portion of the grain were remitted to the Roman government,
101
 though this appears to 
be conflation of the vicensuma with the fixed stipendium.
102
 
What does the nature of the vicensuma demonstrate about individuals 
participating in the grain trade in Spain? If it was possible for the Spanish to remit cash 
in lieu of grain, then a private grain trade must have existed to allow funds to be raised. 
Moreover, given that coinage was only just coming into use in Spain in the early second 
century, such a market is likely to have involved traders from Italy. Most of the grain 
remitted in kind was probably used to supply the armies in the provinces, but any 
surplus amount would have been shipped to Rome, just as occurred in 203. A spectrum 
of individuals, analogous to that in Sicily, would have been involved in such trade, 
though the Spanish trade was likely to be more variable, and less lucrative, than the 
Sicilian. 
Despite the similar dates at which the Spanish and Sicilian grain began to be 
exploited by Rome, the grain trade of the regions took a different trajectory. The lex 
Hieronica was implemented across Sicily shortly after the fall of Syracuse, yet there is 
no evidence for the existence of a system for the extraction of grain from Spain until the 
170s. In effect, a pre-existing system persisted in both areas. In Sicily, this consisted of 
an effective, centrally organised tax system, operating in a relatively urbanised society. 
In Spain, while the matter is open to debate, it appears that governors were free to 
extract grain almost as they saw fit. The surpluses produced there were more limited, 
and there was no pre-existing administrative regime to efficiently extract them. These 
factors must have reduced the amount of grain available for trade, and this situation 
would have been exacerbated by the demands of the army.  The absence of a document 
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such as the Verrines makes it difficult to characterise conditions in Spain. Nonetheless, 
a lower volume of trade might correspond with the involvement of fewer individuals, 
and with the grain trade tending to be on a more local level. Furthermore, those who had 
invested in grain shipping might have preferred the more secure returns offered by the 
Sicilian trade. A spectrum of individuals might still have traded in Spanish grain, but 
under average conditions, a more limited range of traders is likely. 
 
3.5 – The Sardinian Grain Trade 
 
 Much like Sicily, Sardinia is known to have been exploited by Rome as a source 
of grain from as early as the final years of the Second Punic War. Perhaps partly due to 
its proximity to Rome, Cicero was able to count the island among the three key 
suppliers of grain for the republic.
103
 In contrast to Sicily, however, Sardinia had a 
reputation as a distinctly unhealthy place,
104
 and experienced a series of military 
campaigns against the indigenous peoples of the interior. A contrast also exists in the 
evidence pertaining to these two islands. Nothing comparable to the Verrines, with its 
extensive treatment of the abuses of the Sicilian grain tithe, is available for Sardinia. As 
a result, only more limited conclusions can be reached about the grain trade in Sardinia. 
 As early as 215, we hear of allied communities in Sardinia supplying the Roman 
garrison there,
105
 though one may question how voluntary these contributions were.
106
 
In the same year, Livy describes the Carthaginians being encouraged by the Sardinian 
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Hampsicora to send forces to the island. Part of Hampsicora’s argument for their 
involvement invokes the excessive demands for grain which Rome had placed on the 
Sardinians.
107
 The Carthaginians accepted Hampsicora’s invitation, but their attack and 
the revolt of some of Sardinia’s inhabitants were defeated. As was typical, the defeated 
communities were compelled to pay money or grain, according to their ability or their 
degree of involvement as Livy says.
108
 Sufficient grain was exacted from Sardinia, not 
just to supply the garrison, but to allow some quantity to be sent to Rome.
109
 Several 
times during the remaining years of the war, notice is given of grain being sent from 
Sardinia to Rome, and/or to the armies.
110
 In 202, the large quantity of grain shipped 
from Sicily and Sardinia to Rome depressed the price of grain to such an extent that the 
sailors who had conveyed it were simply paid in kind.
111
 Whether this referred to public 
or private grain is unclear, but the merchants involved evidently received the market 
rate in Rome, rather than a pre-established price. 
 The end of the Second Punic War does not appear to have substantially altered 
the way in which Sardinian grain was exploited. Occasionally, the island would be 
subjected to a second grain tithe. In all the instances cited by Livy, the additional 
demand for grain was ultimately created by Roman campaigns in Greece. In 191, this 
grain was sent to Rome, apparently to compensate for the diversion of Sicilian grain to 
Greece.
112
 A similar redistribution plan was implemented in the following year, though 
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Sardinian grain was sent to both the army and to Rome.
113
 Later, in 171, the army in 
Macedonia was supplied with a combination of Sicilian and Sardinian grain.
114
 As was 
discussed with regard to military supply in Chapter Two, this grain was probably 
conveyed by traders contracted for the purpose. No doubt a similar group of traders 
would have been involved in shipping grain, public or private, under the normal 
circumstance of a single tithe. 
 Repeated and excessive exactions of grain may have contributed to unrest on the 
island, as had been the case during the Second Punic War.
115
 Following a revolt by the 
indigenous Ilienses in 178, ambassadors from Sardinia travelled to Rome. Part of their 
appeal to the senate involved a claim that the fields had been abandoned,
116
 no doubt 
because a perceived threat to the agricultural output of the island was likely to motivate 
the senate. In response, Sardinia was assigned as a consular province to Ti. Sempronius 
Gracchus, who defeated the Ilienses in campaigns in 177 and 176. As punishment for 
this revolt, additional taxes and grain were levied from the defeated.
117
 This outcome 
ensured that the peoples of the interior of Sardinia were thereafter compelled to 
contribute money and/or grain, as was presumably Rome’s objective from the outset.118 
 The available sources do not reveal precisely how the tithe system normally 
operated in Sardinia. Whatever the system, however, it appears to have been open to 
abuse by the governor, as was the case in Sicily. Although we lack a source comparable 
to the Verrines, Cicero’s pro Scauro does comment on the behaviour of a governor of 
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Sardinia, though from the perspective of the defence. Unfortunately, the extant portions 
of this speech concentrate on Scaurus’ character, rather than on the particulars of the 
case against him. All that can be gleaned from Cicero is that the former governor was 
accused of making improper demands and requisitions, which were probably related to 
a supposed crimen frumentarium,
119
 the details of which are not elaborated.
120
 It is 
entirely possible that Scaurus was involved in abuses comparable to those of Verres, but 
their precise details remain a mystery to us. 
 It is clear, nonetheless, that there were landholders in Sardinia of Italian origin. 
Epigraphic evidence, in the form of boundary markers, refers to Patulchiae, Euthychiae 
(possibly from Magna Graecia), and Numisiae, all of whom apparently held land in 






 The presence of Italian family names has been 
taken as evidence for the development of latifundia in Sardinia during this period. 
Caution is needed, however, since the simple presence of large estates need not signify 
that they dominated the agricultural economy.
122
 In part, the assumption that Sardinian 
agriculture was dominated by latifundia is rooted in a comparison with the situation in 
Sicily, though it is not clear that latifundia were so prevalent even there.
123
 Given the 
unhealthy reputation of the island, Italian landholders may have been less likely to be 
resident there than holders of land in Sicily. Regardless, the operation of such farms 
would have relied on the use of agents, who may themselves have been of Italian origin. 
It is difficult to reach conclusions about the Sardinian grain trade, and care must 
be taken in analogising with other regions. The island’s indigenous people were subject 
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to repeated exactions of grain, much as was the case in Spain. Sardinia was also subject 
to a combination of monetary taxation and taxation in kind, as in Spain. On the other 
hand, Italians clearly held land in Sardinia, and the island was subject to a tithe as was 
Sicily. The ambassadors who came from the island in 178 probably originated from the 
more urbanised, and more heavily agricultural, SW of the island. This may suggest that 
a tithe system was implemented more quickly in that region. Perhaps Sardinia should be 
viewed as a sort of mid-point between Spain and Sicily, with the interior regions 
comparable to the former, and the coastal regions more akin to the latter. In that case, 
the collection of grain in the southwest, and it’s shipment to Rome, might be modelled 
on the Sicilian analog, while recognising that conditions were not uniform across 
Sardinia. 
 
3.6 – The African Grain Trade 
 
 After the destruction of Carthage in 146, Rome found itself in control of a large 
area of fertile territory around the coastal cities and in the Bagradas valley.
124
 Even at 
the outbreak of the Third Punic War, Italian traders had been present in Carthage itself, 
when they are said to have suffered abuse at the hands of Carthaginians outraged by 
Roman demands.
125
 Over time, Africa would become a major source of grain for Rome, 
with substantial areas in the Bagradas valley incorporated into imperial estates by the 
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 In the late republic, however, one may identify the presence of both 
individuals involved in farming, and of grain traders. 
 The earliest instance in which the actual settlement of Italians in Africa can be 
demonstrated is that of C. Gracchus’ attempt to found a colony on the site of Carthage, 
as established by the lex Rubria. Although the law was swiftly repealed, a group of 
colonists that may have numbered in the thousands had already been dispatched to 
Africa, rendering questionable the legal basis of their land tenure. A portion of the lex 
agraria of 111 BC was thus dedicated to addressing this situation, by having the present 
possessors of land originally assigned under the lex Rubria declare their ownership to a 
duovir assigned the task.
127
 While the situation was more complex than has been 
described here, the important question is the extent to which a significant presence of 
Italian origin is indicated. In Brunt’s view the lex agraria, as indicated by its frequent 
references to the management of land by magistri or procuratores,
128
 indicates that the 
bulk of the land was held by absentee landlords rather than emigrant peasants. Indeed, 
the law makes frequent references to both colonists and those who could be regarded as 
colonists, which indicates the possible presence of owners of various statuses. This is 
further indicated by the fact that the original land grants seem to have been of varying 
sizes.
129
 While it is difficult to ascertain an exact population figure for these settlers, the 
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presence of a migrant population, whether of free-holders or of agents, is apparent. 
Perhaps some indication of the eventual impact of this population is provided by the 
claim that, by the time of Caesar’s campaign in Africa, his opponents were able to raise 
a force of some 12,000 men.
130
 These individuals appear to have been citizens drawn 
from a resident population in Africa, and could easily be descendants of the earlier 
colonists around Carthage. 
 In the wake of the destruction of Carthage, a city with a population of perhaps 
200,000-300,000
131
 and thus a major consumer of grain, the hinterland of the city and 
the Bagradas valley ought to have been producing a substantial surplus. Just as this land 
attracted settlement from Italy, the availability of a reliable surplus in Africa would have 
presented a significant opportunity for Italian merchants. Given this situation, and given 
the presence of large estates under Italian ownership, it comes as no surprise that there 
is also evidence for the presence of Italian merchants in a number of cities in Africa, 
possibly trading in grain. During the Jugurthine War, Metellus installed a garrison in the 
city of Vaga shortly after assuming his command in Numidia in 109. Sallust specifically 
indicates that a large number of Italian merchants were present in Vaga, and that it was 
a significant centre of trade in Numidia
132
 Moreover, he claims that Metellus placed a 
garrison there specifically because he believed that the traffic of merchants and goods 
through the city would permit his army to be supplied more easily.
133
 Admittedly, the 
presence of grain and of Italian traders doesn’t quite demonstrate that Italians were 
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trading in grain, but it seems unlikely that they would have refrained from that trade if 
they could profit from it. 
 During the African War in 46, Caesar likewise provided the town of Thysdra 
with a garrison, and again military supply was the motivation. In this instance, three-
hundred thousand modii of wheat were already present in the town, having been brought 
there by Italian negotiatores and farmers.
134
 Clearly in this instance, the negotiatores 
were involved in the grain trade, and presumably involved in commercial relationships 
with farmers in the region. These are not the only locations in which negotiatores from 
Italy are known to have been present. Cirta, Utica, Thapsus, and Hadrumetum all hosted 
such individuals. While no explicit connections are made between merchants in these 
towns and the grain trade, it is entirely possible that grain was among the negotia of 
some of them. 
 The grain trade in Africa appears to have had some broad similarities with that 
in Sicily. Both regions were highly productive, and in both there is evidence of a 
substantial number of merchants. In Africa, however, the evidence of the lex agraria 
suggests the presence of a significant number of individuals involved in agriculture, 
either as resident-owners or as agents. Even in Sicily, however, there was some 
evidence of land ownership by Italians. Given the similarities between Sicily and Africa 
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3.7 – The Gallic Grain Trade 
 
Much like the Ebro valley in Spain, areas of Gaul could act as a source of grain 
for Rome, though the region was normally of only secondary importance during the 
republic.
135
 Evidence for the grain trade in this region only becomes available in the 1
st
 
century, principally in the context of two of Cicero’s legal speeches. Nonetheless, 
traders from Italy may have been active in the region centuries earlier. Etruscan 
amphorae and other vessels have been found along the coast of southern France, 






 Such material has also been 
found in the Phocaean Greek settlement of Massilia/Marseille in the first decades after 
its foundation in 600.
137
 The presence of these goods does not definitely confirm the 
presence of traders from Italy, but they, along with the Etruscan language inscription 
from Pech Maho, are suggestive.
138
 
Rome would subsequently claim a long-standing relationship with Massilia, 
with an alliance between the two ostensibly initiated ca. 400.
139
 This pact was clearly 
operative during the Second Punic War, when Massilia briefly contributed ships to 
support the Roman campaign in Spain. The alliance was again invoked in 155/4, when 
Rome campaigned against Ligurians east of Massilia, at the request of the Massiliots. 
Conflict between Massilia and the Salluvii in 125 led to direct Roman involvement in 
Transalpine Gaul, and provided a pretext for the occupation of non-Massiliot territory 
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by the end of the decade.
140
 It is unclear, based on the evidence available, if Rome 
officially established a province there by means of a lex provincia at this time, or some 
decades later.
141
 Whatever the legal situation elsewhere in the region, Massilia 
maintained both formal political independence (until 49), and economic importance 
with respect to trade up the Rhone. After Marius defeated the Teutones in 102, customs 
revenues from the canal which he had built in support of the war were assigned to 
Massilia, thus demonstrating the city’s continued economic role. Amphorae from 
indigenous sites in the region demonstrate that wine and olive oil were imported from 
Italy during the second century.
142
 As with the earlier period, this is not definite proof 
that Italian traders were present. Nonetheless, it is likely that a significant portion of this 
trade passed through Massilia and that such traders were present there. 
Shortly after the establishment of Roman military control along the Gallic coast, 
a colonia was established at Narbo/Narbonne in 118, with L. Licinius Crassus and Cn. 
Domitius Ahenobarbus as its commissioners.
143
 As a settlement outside Italy, yet 
formally established through a deductio with legally appointed commissioners, Narbo 
was highly unusual. There had been a recent precedent, with the Gracchan foundation of 
Junonia in 122, though the lex Rubria which had authorised that colony was repealed 
amid deadly violence only two years thereafter. Three years later, and despite the still 
recent bloodshed, Crassus successfully promoted the foundation of Narbo. One can only 
speculate as to how he gained the approval, tacit or otherwise, of the senate. The 
outcome, however, was the establishment of a group of Roman citizens in a strategic 
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 on the Mediterranean terminus of a route to the Atlantic via the area of 
modern Toulouse and along the Garonne. The importance of trade along this route is 
clearly demonstrated in the 70s, as M. Fonteius was accused of illegally exacting 
portoria on Italian wine shipped through the area while governor, a charge which 
Cicero deems the most significant.
145
 
Two of Cicero’s speeches provide the earliest direct accounts of Roman 
economic activities in Gaul.
146
 In the first of these, delivered in 81, Cicero sought to 
defend P. Quinctius against the claims of Sextus Naevius. The two had become business 
partners after the death of Quinctius’ brother, and an estate in Gaul was held in 
common. In the second speech, delivered sometime after 70, Cicero defended the 
former governor M. Fonteius before the quaestio de repetundis. According to Cicero, 
Fonteius stood accused by the Gauls of various financial abuses. While the legal 
intricacies of the cases are not a concern here, each speech includes a variety of 
incidental details on conditions in Gaul in the early first century. On this basis, 
comments can be made on contemporary land holding and trade in the province. 
At the centre of the dispute between Quinctius and Naevius was a parcel of land, 
described by Cicero as saltu agroque, from which Quinctius was forcibly driven by the 
communally owned slaves.
147
 The primary use of these lands appears to have been to 
allow cattle-raising,
148
 though Quinctius and Naevius themselves dwelt there for a time. 
It is an important element of Cicero’s argument that, although Qunctius and Naevius 
lived in Gaul for nearly a year, Naevius did not take the opportunity to discuss the debts 
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he later claimed were owed to him by Quinctius. Moreover, Cicero claims that 
Quinctius was forcibly separated from his household lares and penates.
149
 While this is 
a deliberate overstatement intended to provoke sympathy, it must have been plausible 
that there was a residence associated with this estate. 
As becomes clear, Quinctius also owned other property in Gaul, solely in his 
own name.
150
 He was not alone. Quinctius himself had earmarked some property to be 
auctioned in Narbo, in order to allow him to settle some debts.
151
 Though it is unclear 
what property was involved, this measure suggests that a market for such property 
existed in Gaul at this time. That is to say, buyers must have been available.
152
 Better 
evidence for the extent of the Roman presence in Gaul is provided in the pro Fonteio. 
Cicero claims that Gaul is full of traders and Roman citizens, to the extent that any 
business undertaken there involved a citizen.
153
 In this speech, however, Cicero 
attempts throughout to undercut the prosecution by arguing that its case is reliant on the 
testimony of Gauls, as opposed to Roman citizens. If no reliable witnesses could be 
produced from this ostensibly large citizen population, the opposing case would be 
correspondingly weakened. In the context of this hyperbole, Cicero offers a list of the 
individuals potentially involved in Gaul, specifically referring to farmers and 
ranchers.
154
 Under the circumstances, it can be assumed that Cicero has in mind the 
owners of large estates. These estates might at times have played host to owners like 
Quinctius and Naevius, but would usually have operated under the direction of an agent. 
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Similarly, land in Gaul that appears to have been under the control of an Italian town 
must have been supervised by an agent of some description.
155
 
Cicero’s list is repeated, in a slightly modified form, later in the speech when 
Cicero claims that these individuals unanimously defend Fonteius.
156
 The reference to 
ceteri negotiatores, coming after agricolae and pecuarii in the list, was taken by 
Clemente as evidence that negotiatores included agricultural interests among their 
affairs.
157
 This agrees well with the expectation that wealthier individuals would have 
had a diversity of business interests. No doubt, some of these individuals or their agents 
were involved in the private grain trade. Cicero also provides evidence for the public 
export of grain from Gaul. We are thus told that Fonteius ensured that grain was 
collected from the Gauls in order to support the war against Sertorius in Spain.
158
 It has 
been suggested that Fonteius’ governorship was a watershed moment in the organisation 
of the province, though his efforts were undertaken primarily to secure the area north of 
the Pyrenees and supply Pompey while he campaigned to the south.
 159
 Even Gauls who 
were otherwise treated favourably were repeatedly compelled to provide grain, as well 
as money and cavalry.
160
 While these contributions were made under military 
compulsion, the repeated nature of the demands suggests something approaching a 
regular system of taxation. 
If Gauls favoured by Rome were nonetheless forced to supply grain, what sort of 
treatment was given to those who were not so favoured? Cicero twice informs us that 
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they have been forced to forfeit their farms and lands.
161
 Although Cicero alleges that 
the Gauls would be unreliable witnesses, it is almost certain that forfeiture of grain and 
land had been common in Gaul. One wonders how Quinctius’ disputed estate originally 
came into his brother’s possession. If it was part of his patrimony, as Cicero seems to 
imply, then it may have been held by the family for several decades,
162
 perhaps since 
shortly after the foundation of Narbo in 118. Precisely how Quinctius’ family gained 
this property, or any other in Gaul, is obscure, but much land must ultimately have been 
seized from the indigenous people. 
The Ciceronian evidence demonstrates the presence of both traders and farmers 
from Italy in Transalpine Gaul in the first decades of the 1
st
 century, and it is likely that 
traders had long been present in the region. It is also clear that grain was shipped from 
Gaul to the army when its requirements dictated. What is somewhat lacking, however, 
is evidence of a broader role for Gallic grain in the Mediterranean trade during the 
republic. Nonetheless, under the empire it is clear that a large number of individuals 
were involved in shipping grain. An inscription of the 3
rd
 AD century refers to five 
corpora of navicularii marini based in Arles, employed by the annona, and therefore 
involved in shipping grain to Rome.
163
 The presence of at least five distinct 
organisations shipping grain from Arles surely points to the scale of grain exports from 
Gaul in that period. Moreover, they engaged collectively in a dispute with the annona 
and threatened the withdrawal of their services, a threat which could only have carried 
weight if they were a relatively important group. While this does not necessarily bear 
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upon the situation in the republic, the presence of Italian landholders and traders then 
may have initiated the pattern of trade visible in the later period. 
 
3.8 – Conclusion 
 
 So far as the available evidence allows, a few patterns can be observed in the 
grain trade in the regions that have been considered. In each instance, it appears to have 
taken several decades before a system, other than direct military compulsion, was 
established for the extraction of surplus grain. In Spain, Sardinia, and Gaul, it appears 
that grain was regularly extracted from local populations, in connection with the 
military activities of governors. In Sicily, although little can be said of the situation 
prior to ca. 210, the implementation of the lex Hieronica across the island placed the 
extraction of grain on a relatively regular footing. 
 Certainly in Sicily, Africa, and Gaul, as well as to some extent in Sardinia, we 
have evidence for Roman ownership of large estates, though their overall extent in this 
period remains unclear. Nonetheless, wealthy Romans clearly owned land overseas, 
which was likely exploited under the supervision of agents/procurators. Meanwhile, at 
least for Africa, there is some evidence for smaller landholdings, which would admit the 
presence of a somewhat less wealthy class of individual. In each of these regions, one 
also finds evidence for the presence of grain traders and shippers, involved in either the 
private or the public trade, or some combination thereof. It is unclear to what extent 
these individuals operated independently, or on behalf of wealthier individuals, but a 
variety of roles seems likely. Unsurprisingly, the best evidence tends to concern the 
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wealthiest land-holders, and the public grain supply for Rome. By contrast, other land-
holders, and the short and medium range grain trade, are much less visible to us. 
 Interestingly, the basic system of supplying the city of Rome by means of public 
contracts awarded to private shippers seems to have remained relatively stable. At no 
time does there appear to have been an effort to impose a uniform system for the 
collection of grain overseas. Instead, arrangements for the collection of grain were 
unique to each region, with governors administering the matter, usually as precedent 
dictated. Furthermore, there is little to indicate that individual entrepreneurs tended to 
specialise in grain over time. Despite the growth in the city of Rome, and the increasing 
extent of the empire, private merchants remained able to supply the city throughout the 
late republic. Correspondingly, the diaspora must have been large enough to handle the 




Chapter Four – The Diversity of Traders 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, I established the general circumstances of trade in the 
late republic, applied the resulting model to a consideration of the grain trade, and drew 
some conclusions from it about the nature of the Roman diaspora in the west. A variety 
of goods other than grain were exchanged in the western Mediterranean during this 
period, and this chapter will examine the trade in those items, and those involved in it. 
Generally speaking, the trade in other goods occurred under different conditions from 
that in grain. Firstly, the restrictions imposed on trade by the low weight/volume ratio of 
grain are less relevant to the movement of other products. While other goods have their 
own unique properties, their higher weight/volume ratio means that a cargo of goods 
other than grain would normally have a relatively greater value, allowing for a greater 
profit per voyage. Smaller vessels would thus be able to ship these goods, while 
maintaining a profit. This implies that a relatively less wealthy group of individuals, less 
focussed on a single item of trade, could be involved. Secondly, while the grain trade 
was concerned primarily with supplying the city of Rome, the same dynamic need not 
apply to other goods. So, for example, wine was exported from Italy to the provinces, 
especially Gaul, as well as to Rome. 
 It is only possible to examine the trade in a subset of the goods that were 
exchanged. This is a consequence of the availability of adequate evidence. The pertinent 
literary sources occasionally provide information on long-distance trade, though these 
details are usually incidental. Thus, while Cicero’s forensic speeches allude to economic 
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conditions in Gaul and Sicily, such details are subordinate to his rhetorical purposes. On 
this sort of basis it is possible to discuss the trade in slaves (section 4.4). Meanwhile, 
archaeological evidence for trade is necessarily limited to those materials which have 
been preserved. Plant and animal products, and goods produced from those materials, 
survive only rarely, though some can be traced by their containers.
1
 So, for example, 
while textiles could well have been traded in the western Mediterranean, there is little 
evidence for such a trade, apart from military supply.
2
 Items such as metal ingots, 
finished metalwork, ceramics (both fine and coarse wares), marble, glass, and even 
objets d’art, are more durable, and are known from shipwrecks.3 Of these goods, only 
some are found in the west in sufficient quantities to justify analysis, though it is worth 
noting that the rarer items could also have been traded. 
Metal ingots are relatively common, but given their association with mining, 
will be discussed in the following chapter. Finished metal products are less common, 
but lead pipes and joints are known from the Las Amoladeras wreck (Spain, 125-100 
BC), while adzes and parts of mills have been recovered from La Chrétienne J (Gaul, 
125-75 BC).
4
 Ceramics, such as fine Campanian ware prior to ca. 50 BC, are commonly 
found in association with wine amphorae in shipwrecks. The distribution of Campanian 
ware on land in Gaul more or less mirrors that of the wine amphorae which they 
accompanied from Italy.
5
 Such evidence of a similar pattern of trade could indicate that 
a largely similar group of traders was involved in the movement of both commodities. 
Although most of the stone imported into Italy was eastern in origin, coloured marble 
quarried from Simitthus in northwestern Tunisia was a notable exception. Examples of 
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its use in opus sectile are known from houses in Ostia of the second century BC.
6
 M. 
Lepidus, cos. 78, was the first person known to Pliny to have used Numidian marble in 
Rome, for the limina of his doors,
7
 while columns of the same material were employed 




 During the republic, Rome alone seems to have imported 
marble over great distances, and the city’s consumption continued to increase 
throughout the period, after its first use ca. 146. While the quarries were placed under 
imperial control by Tiberius,
9
 it is unclear how they were managed previously. 
Ownership by Romans seems likely, by analogy with metal mines in the west. The trade 
in works of art was principally with the eastern Mediterranean. While some portion of 
this was simply seized or stolen, it has been suggested that a portion of the money 
collected as tributum in the east was returned there via the purchase of art.
10
 Some 
evidence for this trade has been recovered from shipwrecks, such as bronze and marble 
statues from the Antikythera wreck.
11
 Although the wreck dates to 80 BC, at least some 
of the bronze statuary is as old as the 4
th
 century. Some works of art were also moved to 
the west. The La Fourmigue C wreck, found off southern France and dated between 80 
and 60, contained bronze couches inlaid with silver and copper. Three of Cicero’s 
letters to Atticus, sent in 67, include eager requests for specific items to be acquired and 
sent from Athens.
12
 The specific requests are, in each instance, accompanied by a more 
general one, for Atticus to send whatever other works he judges suitable.
13
 Clearly, 
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Athens was host to a significant market in art, destined for Italy. In the west itself, 
however, Sicily may also have acted as a source for art. Cicero provides an extensive 
list of the classes of item which he accuses Verres of seeking out and seizing if they 
suited his taste.
14
 There is certainly in element of hyperbole in Cicero’s claims about the 
scale of Verres’ rapacity, but no doubt the items described did attract the interest of 
wealthy Romans, and could be acquired in Sicily. 
Given the state of the evidence, a detailed consideration of the social 
circumstances of trade can only be attempted for a limited range of goods. The trade in 
some food products, most notably wine, olive oil and garum, can be traced indirectly 
through finds of the amphorae in which they were commonly transported. Indeed, it is 
often the case that the locations of shipwrecks are known solely because of the presence 
of amphorae on the seafloor. While the trade in wine will be traced based on the 
evidence of amphorae in section 4.2, the situation with oil and garum is somewhat more 
challenging, and they will be dealt with in the following section. Section 4.4 will then 
consider the slave trade, while section 4.5 will focus on the social conditions of trade, 
and on the locations and patterns of movement of traders. Throughout, the objective of 
the discussion will be to use evidence concerning the conditions of trade to shed light on 
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4.2 – Wine 
 
 As has been described, wine is one of the categories of food product whose trade 
can be traced indirectly through finds of amphorae, both on land and under water. In the 
western Mediterranean, easily the most numerically significant of these are the Dressel 
IA and IB, produced almost entirely on the north-west coast of Italy.  The massive wine 
trade with Gaul during the century after ca. 125 was largely comprised of this type, 
though the earliest definite examples of it have been found at Numantia and thus date to 
just before 133.
15
 Also important is the Greco-Italic type, which first appeared in the 
mid 4
th
 century, and which ultimately developed into the earliest Dressel I amphorae.
16
 
By contrast, the Lamboglia 2 type predominates in the Adriatic and Aegean, but 
represented only a small portion of the western trade.
17
 This evidence will first be used 
to describe the distribution of amphorae in the west, with a particular focus on Gaul. On 
that basis, comments will be made on the probable organisation of the wine trade and 
the personnel involved therein. 
 Wine amphorae have been found throughout the western Mediterranean, in 
contexts that demonstrate their contents were the object of long distance trade. While it 
is not possible to describe their distribution comprehensively in this chapter, and while 
Gaul was undoubtedly the foremost destination for wine in this period, some general 
comments on other regions of the west are pertinent. In North Africa, we find a 
shipwreck dominated by Lamboglia 2 amphorae,
18
 while in Carthage itself several 
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forms of Greco-Italic amphorae have been identified for the period prior to 146.
19
 
Perhaps some of the Italians, whose presence in Carthage immediately before the 
outbreak of the Third Punic War is described by Appian,
20
 were involved in the wine 




In Sicily, Greco-Italic amphorae of various types (perhaps reflecting origins both 
local and from different regions of Italy) are widespread. In some instances, these bear 
the names of the owners of the vineyards on which the wines were produced, either in 
Greek or in Latin. So, for example, the name C. ARISTO / ΓΑΙΟϹ ΑΡΙϹΤΩΝ appears 
in both languages.
22
 To these may be added instances of the name TI.Q.IVENTI, an 
amphora label also found in the eastern Mediterranean, and in the southern mainland of 
Italy.
23
 This name may be connected with a senatorial family, the Iuventii,
24
 the earliest 
known member of which was a tribunus militum in 197, while another, M’ Iuventius 
Thalna, held the consulship in 163.
25







 members of the Roman elite were clearly involved in the production 
of wine that was traded to Sicily and beyond shortly after the Second Punic War. It is 
unclear if this wine was produced in Sicily or mainland Italy,
27
 but the widespread 
distribution of the amphorae demonstrates the extent over which it was traded. 
Additional evidence of a wine trade encompassing Sicily and the eastern Mediterranean 
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is provided by amphora labels bearing the name TR.LOISIO. These have been linked 
with one Trebius Loisios, identified in an inscription from Delos as a trader owing a 
debt to the Temple of Apollo.
28
 In short, from the start of the 2
nd
 century, wine from 
southern Italy and/or Sicily was being traded in the central and eastern Mediterranean.
29 
In Spain and the Balearic Islands, all three of the types thus far considered have 
been found. Lamboglia 2 dominates the amphora finds in a shipwreck off the coast of 
Catalonia,
30
 while Greco-Italic amphorae are known from a number of coastal sites.
31
 
Sherds of Dressel 1 are common on indigenous sites in Spain, but their numbers are 
significantly outweighed by those found at Emporion and in the mining areas of the 
Sierra Morena and near Carthago Nova.
32
 This pattern, consisting of finds 
predominantly in mining areas and an abundance of amphorae along the Iberian coast 
rather than the interior, has some superficial parallels in Gaul. The quantity sold to 
indigenous peoples relative to immigrants is unclear and, in any case, the situation 
probably varied between regions and over time. Nonetheless, the quantities of wine 
imported into Gaul were of a different order of magnitude, and it is on that region that I 
shall now concentrate. 
 No shortage of superlatives has been used to describe the scale of the wine trade 
from Italy to Gaul during the last century of the republic. To Tchernia, it is a unique 
phenomenon representing “the only important trade movement exporting food products 
over large distances where the principle destination was not Rome or the armies”.33 
More recently, Dietler has described wine as “the overwhelmingly dominant form of 
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alien food desired by native peoples of Mediterranean France”.34 Based on known 
shipwrecks, and the probable rate at which wrecks occurred, an average annual export 
of at least 50,000 hL, and perhaps as much as 120,000 to 150,000 hL, has been 
estimated.
35
 This would have entailed the shipment of as many as 650,000 amphorae per 
year. So much wine was available that, at least in some regions, amphorae are common 
on almost every indigenous site.
36
 
The geographic extent of the trade can be demonstrated, to some extent, by 
distribution maps of find sites. The Dressel I amphorae which comprised the vast 
majority of those imported can be found throughout Gaul, and find spots tend to cluster 
along the coast and rivers. Simple mapping of find sites, however, may obscure the 
great abundance of amphorae found in certain locations. At Toulouse alone, Tchernia 
estimates that amphorae may number in the hundreds of thousands, which can be 
compared with a total of 30 fragments in the three departments of lower Normandy.
37
 
While the area from Narbonne to Toulouse represents a major concentration of 
amphorae, six locations north-east of the Massif-Central (in the territory of the Aedui, 
Arverni, and Segusiavi) can also boast amphorae numbering in the tens of thousands.
38
 
By contrast, some 26 of France’s 95 departments possess less than five find sites, 
mostly in eastern and northern areas.
39
 Even given the need to account for possible 
biases introduced by varying degrees of archaeological exploration,
40
 and conditions of 
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 it is clear that certain regions of Gaul imported exceptional quantities of 
wine in comparison with other regions. 
The wine trade from Italy to Gaul was undoubtedly significant, yet it was a 
particular phenomenon of the period from approximately 125 – 25 BC. Nonetheless, a 
trade in wine in Gaul had existed for centuries previously, in the hands of a series of 
foreign peoples who each had the capacity to transport goods overseas. Prior to, and 
even for some decades after the foundation of Massilia, wine was shipped from Etruria 
to the coast of southern France.
42
 There is even some evidence that traders from Etruria 
were themselves present in the region, as suggested by the presence of Etruscan 
language graffiti at Lattes.
43
 After 525, however, Massiliote amphorae replaced 
Etruscan along the Mediterranean coast of France, and began to appear in the interior.
44
 
The predominance of Massiliote wine would be maintained until the second century, 
when it was replaced by Italian imports. In 175 BC, 25% of amphorae in France 
originated in Italy, a figure which rises to 66% by 150, and 99.3% by the end of the 
century.
45
 Even in Marseille, one finds that imports from Italy dominated the market 
from this time.
46
 Initially, these consisted primarily of Greco-Italic amphorae, most of 
which are found along the Mediterranean coast, but with a scattering in central France.
47
 
The overall number of these amphorae remained relatively small, however, and it was 
only after ca. 125 that the overall quantity of wine imported from Italy grew 
dramatically. This is precisely the period in which Dressel I amphorae came into 
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widespread use, and when Rome established a permanent military presence in 
Transalpine Gaul. 
Tchernia has suggested that the Roman conquest of Gallia Narbonensis and the 
rapid growth of Italian exports to Gaul were not coincidental, and that military control 
produced safer conditions under which traders could operate inland more securely.
48
 
Certainly, the abundance of amphorae located in the vicinity of Toulouse, and in the 
nearby mining area of the Aude, seems likely to be connected with the Roman 
foundation of Narbo in 118. This foundation could have provided a secure location, 
facilitating the movement of traders further inland. While it may go too far to suggest 
that Narbo was founded specifically to facilitate the trade in wine, the Romans are 
unlikely to have been blind to its economic potential.
49
 Furthermore, whether 
intentionally or otherwise, Narbo clearly contributed to the competitive replacement of 
Massiliote wine with Italian imports. In this regard, one is reminded of the economic 
impact of Delos on Rhodes during roughly the same period, though in contrast to the 
Rhodian case, there is no evidence that Rome intentionally sought this outcome. 
Regardless of the relative advantages of Italian traders in this period, demand among the 
Gauls must have been a key factor, without which this wine trade could not have 
developed.
50
 It is against the background of Gallic demand, and Roman military 
involvement, that the activities of wine traders must be considered. 
The distribution of amphorae, both geographically and chronologically, has 
implications for the operation of the wine trade. Certain regions of Gaul received much 
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larger quantities of wine than others, and to some extent this reflects the ease with 
which those regions could be accessed from the Mediterranean coast. As Woolf has 
pointed out, the social contexts under which wine was consumed were impacted by its 
cost and availability.
51
 In the north and east, consumption of wine would have been 
restricted to a narrower segment of society, and/or a smaller set of occasions, than in the 
south. A corresponding pattern of variation may have existed in terms of trade. In the 
north and east, the very cost and unavailability of wine may have meant that it was an 
object of reciprocal exchange rather than of trade. Such exchanges would necessarily 
have been in the hands of the Gallic elite.
52
 At the other extreme, in Narbonne and 
Toulouse, we should expect the wine trade to be almost exclusively in the hands of 
Italians, whether acting on their own behalf or as agents of others. These are the 
individuals from whom, as Cicero describes, Fonteius was accused of exacting 
portoria.
53
 It may have been part of Cicero’s argument that these levies should be 
viewed as applying only to the Gauls.
54
 Nonetheless, even if these charges were passed 
on to the end consumer, it was Roman merchants who initially had to pay them. 
In central Gaul, given the presence of tens of thousands of amphorae on several 
indigenous sites, we might expect that Italian traders were physically present, whether 
permanently or periodically. These may have acted as “cross-cultural brokers” and 
mediated exchange on both sides in a region beyond nominal Roman control in a 
relationship reminiscent of White’s middle ground.55 If Italian traders were present at 
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Arles from as early as 180,
56
 then this is precisely the sort of role we would expect them 
to have undertaken. A similar role may have been undertaken by the freedman P. 
Umbrenus, who became entangled in the Catilinarian affair precisely because of his 
familiarity with leading individuals among the Allobroges.
57
 While Umbrenus’ 
particular business activities are not specified, his knowledge and influence among the 
Allobroges suggest that he had adopted a mediating role in Gaul. Between the areas of 
mass importation, and those where wine was a rare commodity, an intermediate 
situation may have prevailed, with the movement of wine increasingly in Gallic hands. 
One should also consider the changes in the conditions of trade contingent on 
the dramatic growth in the scale of the wine trade in the last quarter of the 2
nd
 century. 
Prior to 125, there was a wine trade between Italy and Gaul, but the smaller quantities 
involved suggest qualitative differences. For example, shipwreck evidence indicates 
that, although cargoes even in the earlier period were dominated by wine and ceramic 
tableware, the origins of this wine were hetereogeneous.
 58
 Moreover, wine in Greco-
Italic amphorae could simply have travelled to Gaul via cabotage, or perhaps, as 
Tchernia has suggested, arrived there as a by-product of shipments of wine to Italians in 
Spain.
59
 By contrast, the period after 125 sees a dramatic shift. Ships carrying wine 
became far larger, with an average capacity twenty times that of the earlier period.
60
 
From being comparatively minor or even incidental, the wine trade between Italy and 
Mediterranean Gaul became direct and focussed. 
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The distribution of name stamps on amphorae may also indicate how the 
shipment of wine to Gaul was organised. The best known examples bear the legend 
SES. These have been linked with the senatorial family of the Sestii, which owned land 
in the vicinity of Cosa where the greatest abundance of these amphorae has been 
found.
61
 P. Sestius had a noteworthy political career, attaining the praetorship in 54 or 
50, and subsequently serving in Cilicia as a promagistrate in 49 and 48. Partly because 
of the social stigma against direct involvement in business, and partly because of the 
chronology of the wine trade with Gaul, it has been suggested that Publius’ father, 
Lucius, was largely responsible for establishing the family in the wine trade.
62
 Although 
the presence of these stamps on the amphorae cannot definitely connect the Sestii with 
the wine therein, it is probable that the family was involved in the production of both 
items. Likewise, it is probable that the family had a financial interest in at least some of 
the ships that conveyed their wine to Gaul.
63
 The find spots of these amphorae in Gaul 
generally reflect the overall distribution of amphorae in the region: there is a 
concentration in the vicinity of Toulouse, a smaller number in central Gaul, and a 
scattering elsewhere.
64
 This suggests that, even though estate owners may have helped 
facilitate the shipment of wine to Gaul, they had little impact on its subsequent 
distribution. Furthermore, given that the amphorae contained in individual shipwrecks 
could bear the stamps of multiple producers, it is unlikely that shippers were necessarily 
limited to carrying the cargoes of single producers.
65
 Cato describes the sale of wine by 
an estate owner to a wholesaler of some description,
66
 but this example is only one of 
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several possible models for the wine trade, and in any case it necessarily belongs to the 
period before 149. The expansion in the Gallic wine trade, and particularly the 
investment required in the much larger ships used after 125, suggest financial backing 
from comparatively wealthy individuals like the Sestii. Under these conditions, we 
should expect that some shipping was undertaken by individuals acting as the agents of 
others, perhaps the producers themselves. This need not have precluded agents from 
shipping cargoes from several sources, and on behalf of several parties including 
themselves. While there is little evidence of vertical integration (in the sense of 
centralised management of multiple stages in production and movement) in the wine 
trade, modest steps in that direction could have been a consequence of the unique 
conditions of the period from 125 – 25 BC. 
Italian wine was being traded along all the shores of the Mediterranean from at 
least 200, but on a small scale in comparison with the trade that developed between the 
west coast of Italy and Gaul after 125. In the case of Gaul, it appears that the wine trade 
was in the hands of several different connected groups. Italian estate-owners may have 
responded to Gallic demand for wine by planting vines, as well as by providing 
financial backing to those who shipped wine to Gaul. In many instances, these shippers 
could have acted as agents of the estate-owners, though they were not necessarily 
limited to conveying solely their employers’ cargoes. In the larger centres of southern 
Gaul, and in regions where large quantities of wine were consumed, trade was likely 
undertaken by individuals from Italy, some of whom had cultivated a relationship with 
indigenous groups. The movement of smaller quantities of wine to less accessible 
regions is more likely to have been undertaken by the Gauls themselves. The trade 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean, and in Gaul prior to about 125, perhaps entailed a 
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simpler version of this model. It would have required less investment in shipping, 
diminishing the involvement of the wealthy. Furthermore, while Italians in major 
coastal centres are likely to have been participants, this trade is less likely to have 
needed an extensive network of traders further inland. In short, the intensity of the 
Gallic wine trade was associated with a more complex system of exchange, which 
represented a development of a pre-existing system. 
 
4.3 – Oil and Fish Products 
 
Oil and fish products are the other two major commodities which can be traced 
through distribution of amphorae. Since consideration of both goods relies on 
fundamentally the same type of evidence, they can be treated in the same section. 
During the first two centuries of the Principate, large quantities of olive oil were 
shipped from Baetica to Rome, and the scale of this trade is demonstrated by the 
quantity of sherds of discarded Dressel 20 amphorae which make up Monte Testaccio. 
This best known example of the large-scale trade in oil does not appear even to have 
begun during the republic. Even the antecedents of the Dressel 20 amphora type date to 
the Augustan period,
67
 while the greatest expansion of oil production in Baetica belongs 
to the first-century AD.
68
 Nonetheless, other regions were producing a surplus during 
the late republic. Oil from North Africa, which would eventually supplant Baetica in 
supplying Rome, was already being exported in the first-century BC.
69
 A small number 
of Tripolitanian amphorae were recovered from the Madrague de Giens shipwreck off 
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the French coast, which dates to 70-50 BC.
70
 In 46 Caesar compelled the population of 
Leptis to contribute three million pounds of olive oil annually. Even if the precise figure 
may be doubted, this incident suggests a local surplus that would otherwise have been 
traded.
71
 In Sicily, Cicero alludes to the collection of a tithe in oil.
72
 Given the political 
volatility of issues affecting the grain supply in this period, it may come as little surprise 
that Cicero devotes comparatively little attention to the tithe in oil. Nonetheless, when 
combined with the paucity of archaeological sites demonstrating evidence of oil 
production,
73
 it seems likely that Sicily was a relatively minor source. 
Though some overseas sources of oil were available, the question remains of 
how Rome itself was supplied in this period. Samnium, Campania and Apulia all 
produced oil for consumption in the city,
74
 while closer regions such as south Etruria 
and Latium may also have played a role.
75
 Evidence for the regions proximal to Rome is 
limited, partly because only a limited number of oil presses are known from these 
regions, and because the vessels in which oil was transported over such short distances 
are likely to have been perishable. Furthermore, it has been suggested that production of 
wine for the city of Rome may have supplanted production of oil in parts of this region 
after ca. 100 BC.
76
 Meanwhile, in both Campania and Apulia, it is clear that quantities 
of oil were exported, although the lack of a sizeable concentration of oil presses in these 
regions suggests that production was undertaken by a large number of small-scale 
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 In the case of Apulia, Brindisi amphorae demonstrate that oil was traded 
from Brundisium during the last two centuries of the republic, particularly in the period 
ca. 125-50.
78
 The distribution of these amphorae suggests that most of this trade 
occurred via Delos,
79
 though further amphora studies in the region may refine our 
knowledge.  Corresponding with this pattern is a dedication from that island, made in 91 
BC by oil traders there.
80
 Nonetheless, examples from the west are known from both 
Iberia and Gaul.
81
 Campanian oil, particularly from Venafrum, had a high reputation in 
the early empire.
82
 No doubt this reputation was somewhat chauvinistic, but it is clear 
that oil production was widespread in Campania.
83
 More importantly, there is evidence 
for Campanian oil being shipped to Gaul. The Cap Camarat B wreck, dated to 75-25 
BC, carried a cargo of spheroidal amphorae which likely contained oil from 
Venafrum.
84
 The Planier C wreck, belonging to a similar period (60-40 BC), carried 
amphorae similar to the Brindisi type, and which were stamped 
M.TUCCI.L.F.TRO.GALEONIS.
85
  It has been suggested that this individual can be 
identified with the M. Tuccius mentioned in a letter to Cicero by M. Caelius Rufus.
86
 In 
this instance, we have evidence that members of the Roman elite were involved in 
producing oil for trade by the end of the republic. Nonetheless, it remains difficult to 
draw detailed conclusions on how this trade operated, particularly with respect to 
individuals involved in it outside Italy. 
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In comparison with olive oil, the trade in garum and other fish products during 
the republic is even more obscure. A significant trade certainly existed from southern 
Spain to Rome during the early empire, and garum amphorae from Iberia (Dressel 7-14) 
are found in abundance in Rome.
87
 This trade seems only to have started getting 
underway by the mid-1
st
 century BC. Thus, roughly 700 Dressel 12 amphorae 
containing parts of tuna were recovered from the Titan wreck off southern Gaul, dated 
to 50-45 BC.
88
 The lack of evidence for Spanish exports to Rome prior to this date is 





can speculate that this reflects shifting patterns in both demand and supply. Demand in 
Rome could have grown as tastes were Hellenised, and fish sauces were consumed by 
broader sections of the population. Supply, meanwhile, could have been enhanced 
through investment in the infrastructure required for production of garum. Whatever the 
relevant factors in the development of this trade, tuna appeared on coins from Gades 




If not from Spain, where did Rome’s supply of garum originate? It is clear that 
fish sauce was widely consumed from at least the mid 2
nd
 century, since Cato describes 
its distribution (calling it hallec) to slaves.
91
 In approximately the same period, Polybius 
informs us that preserved fish from Pontus was fetching extreme prices in Rome.
92
 By 
analogy with oil, however, we might look for sources closer to the city, particularly 
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Sicily and Magna Graecia.
93
 From Sicily, while pre-Roman exports are known, there is 
no evidence for a republican trade, except in fresh fish.
94
 In Italy, tituli picti demonstrate 
production in Pompeii, and possibly in Antium and Puteoli, while salteries are known or 
implied to have existed in Magna Graecia.
95
 Evidence of exports from Italy is limited, 
and in any case pertains to the first century AD.
96
 In short, the available evidence 
surrounding garum in the republic is only sufficient to demonstrate some trade was 
taking place. 
Perhaps the best way to model the trade in olive oil is by analogy with that in 
wine. The wine trade with Gaul operated on an exceptional scale, therefore the trade 
with other regions may be more useful for comparison. As has been seen, at least one 
wealthy Roman was involved in the olive oil trade, and it is unlikely that he was alone, 
particularly given the likelihood that the cost of larger ships demanded the involvement 
of the wealthy.
97
 One might expect that oil produced by such individuals was shipped 
by their agents to Italian traders operating in larger coastal centres. If the wine trade 
outside Gaul is an apt analogy, one might also expect that a network of Italian traders is 
unlikely to have extended much further inland. While garum could have been traded in 
a similar fashion, the smaller quantities involved may point to it being traded alongside 
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4.4 – Slaves 
 
 Slaves were ubiquitous in Italy during the republic, and their purchase there was 
sufficiently commonplace as to attract little attention in the literary sources of the 
period.
99
 Evidence concerning individuals who engaged in the slave trade is 
correspondingly limited throughout Roman history,
100
 a paucity which is particularly 
acute for the western Mediterranean during the republic. Thus, Harris identified no 
slave-traders in the west during the republic, though this should come as little surprise 
given the lack of republican inscriptions in the region.
101
 The more general lack of 
evidence, however, may be attributed partly to a societal antipathy towards slave-
traders.
102
 This was perhaps coupled with a tendency for individuals trading in a variety 
of merchandises to de-emphasise the role of slaves in their interests.
103
 Consequently, 
we are left to deduce the conditions of the slave trade from its scale, the circumstances 
under which it was undertaken, and by analogy with other areas and periods. 
Despite the challenges involved in determining ancient population figures, 
estimates for the proportion of slaves in the population of Italy under Augustus have 
ranged from 15-25% up to 35%.
104
 From the perspective of the trade in slaves, however, 
it is the replacement rate that is of concern. For the period from 65 to 30 BC, it has been 
suggested that 100,000 new slaves were needed annually to maintain a stable population 
in Italy.
105
 Alternately, for the entire empire between 50 BC and AD 150, figures from 
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250,000 to 500,000 have been proposed.
106
 Some of this demand was met internally, 
mainly through natural reproduction and the fostering of abandoned infants.
107
 Whereas 
Harris takes the view that natural reproduction could not have come close to 
maintaining the population of slaves, his perspective can be contrasted with Scheidel’s, 
who concludes that, in a worst case scenario, at least 80% of the demand for new slaves 
in the empire was met in this way.
108
 Even in the disturbed conditions of the late 
republic, he argues that 50% of new slaves were born directly into slavery.
109
 It is 
nonetheless certain that, during the republic and perhaps even thereafter, a large number 
of slaves were acquired externally, whether enslaved by a victorious Roman army, or 
simply trafficked into areas under Roman control. The latter may have been a 
particularly prominent source of slaves in the east. A significant portion of this trade 
likely passed through Delos prior to its sack in 69, and through Ephesus thereafter, 
though various other cities may have played a role.
110
 Enslavement through conquest, 
however, will be considered first. 
Upon defeating an opposing army in the field, or upon capturing a town, it was 
the standard practice of Roman armies to enslave large numbers of their defeated 
adversaries.
 111
 While some could be killed outright, and a fortunate few might be 
ransomed, references to the mass enslavement of a population are frequent. This pattern 
is visible in all regions of the western Mediterranean. In Sicily in 218, 2000 from the 
surrendered Carthaginian garrison of Malta were sold at Lilybaeum.
112
 During his 
consulship in Sardinia in 163, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus is said to have killed or 
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 Given the almost permanent presence of legions in Spain, it is likely 
that enslaved Iberians were sold on a regular basis. One might think of the 9,500 
supporters of Viriathus sold by Fabius Maximus Servilianus in 140,
114
 or of the sale of 
the survivors of Numantia by Scipio Aemilianus seven years later.
115
 After the capture 
of Capsa during the Jugurthine War, Marius killed the young men, and had the rest of 
the population sold.
116
 Caesar, among a number of other mass enslavements in Gaul, 
claimed to have sold 53,000 of the Aduatuci at the end of 57.
117
 Many other instances 
could be described, but it is clear that the enslavement of substantial numbers of the 
defeated was a regular occurrence throughout the period, wherever Roman armies 
campaigned. From 297 to 167, our sources report the enslavement of 700,000 people, 
with the rate of enslavement increasing over the period.
118
 Given the numbers involved, 
and the likelihood that many instances of the enslavement of smaller groups went 
unreported, it is probable that enslavement after military defeat was a major, if erratic, 
source of slaves in the period.
119
 
How did an army undertake the sale of those it had enslaved? Under most 
circumstances, it appears to have been undertaken relatively quickly.
120
 Cicero describes 
how, having captured Pindenissus and distributed booty to his soldiers, he arranged for 
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the sale in tribunali of the population.
121
 In other words, the sale was carried out in the 
camp, in mid-December, before the troops were even led back to winter quarters. This 
should come as little surprise. A commander was unlikely to divert soldiers to guarding 
captives for a lengthy period, whose presence in large numbers would present a security 
risk, and whose need for food would place an additional strain on resources. There are 
exceptions to this pattern, such as Scipio Aemilianus’ decision to retain fifty captives 
for his triumph after Numantia.
122
 This is, however, only a small number of the total 
captured. Furthermore, Caesar states that he distributed one captive to each of his 
soldiers following the surrender of Vercingetorix.
123
 No doubt this was intended as a 
mark of his generosity, as well as an indication of the numbers of those captured. For 
practical reasons, it seems likely that Caesar’s soldiers quickly sold their captives, 
presumably to the same individuals who would otherwise have purchased them. 
Roman armies were conventionally accompanied by a range of camp followers, 
among them lixae and mercatores.
124
 Though lixae appear to have been lower in status 
than mercatores, both groups were probably involved in the sale of goods to soldiers. 
Mercatores, meanwhile, are known to have purchased booty from soldiers at times.
125
 
The traders best positioned to purchase the newly enslaved shortly after capture belong 
precisely to these two groups.
126
 Indeed, it has been suggested that this was the primary 
function of lixae.
127
 Given that Rome was by far the largest market for slaves in the 
west, an informal system must have existed to convey slaves from the armies to Italy. 
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Presumably, lixae and mercatores would have undertaken part of this process, but it 




Military activity was a major source of slaves, though a large number may also 
have been acquired independently, beyond the margins of areas under Roman control. 
One would expect an inverse relationship between successful Roman campaigns against 
foreign peoples, and the profitability of this independent slave trade. Indeed, one 
wonders if some of the lixae and mercatores who accompanied Roman armies would, in 
the absence of a military campaign, have traded in slaves in the same regions anyway. 
Whatever system existed for the transfer of those enslaved by Roman armies, it could 
have continued to operate under more peaceful conditions. Unfortunately, there is little 
indication of a permanent infrastructure supporting the slave trade in west, comparable 
to that found in the east. Once established in 166, Delos became a notorious entrepôt, 
where merchants from Italy trafficked in slaves, many of whom were victims of 
kidnapping by Cilician pirates.
129
 On a smaller scale, but also significant, is a republican 
inscription from Acmoneia, some 250 km inland in Asia Minor, which commemorates 
the construction of a slave market and altar by one C. Sornatius.
130
 No equivalents to 
these facilities are definitely known in the west, although this may result partly from the 
lack of epigraphic evidence and the difficulties involved in identifying purpose built 
structures archaeologically. If permanent slave markets were limited to the east, this is 
perhaps because the east was able to supply slaves more consistently, which could be 
the case if enslavement by the army played a greater role in the west. Rome itself could 
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have served as a centre for the redistribution of slaves in the manner of Delos, given that 
Italy was the final destination for the majority of slaves from the west. 
Nonetheless, there are hints of an ongoing, independent trade in the west. 
Cicero, for example, mentions that one L. Publicius was bringing slaves from Gaul, 
intending to pass them on to Quinctius’ adversary Naevius.131 While it is not explicitly 
stated that either Publicius or Naevius themselves are slave traders,
132
 they are clearly 
participants in that trade. Based on this passage, another from Diodorus,
133
 and the 
abundance of Gallic slaves in Italy, Tchernia suggested that slaves constituted a major 
export from Gaul in exchange for wine during the last century of the republic. Likewise, 
though not pertaining to the west, it has been suggested that coin hoards along the lower 
Danube, dated to the 60’s, 40’s, and 30’s BC, reflect a contemporary purchase of 
slaves.
134
 For the imperial period, Harris was able to list four individuals explicitly 
named in inscriptions as slave traders, as well as a fifth whose commemoration includes 
a depiction of a slave being sold.
135
 While much of this evidence is admittedly 
circumstantial, it does point to the existence of an independent trade in slaves, at least 
for Gaul. 
Despite the challenges inherent in identifying individual slave traders, the 
number of slaves required in Italy, and the number of those enslaved and sold after 
military defeat, indicate that a significant number of individuals were involved in the 
slave trade. To the extent that the slave trade depended on the sale of the captured, it 
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was somewhat sporadic, yet there is also evidence for a persistent trade in slaves 
independent of the army. This suggests that some individuals in the provinces 
commonly included slaves among their trading interests. These people would no doubt 
have profited greatly whenever a victory in the region placed an abundance of human 
beings in their hands. 
 
4.5 – Social Conditions of Trade 
 
 In the previous chapter, I outlined the general organisation of economic activity 
in the later republic, and applied that outline in considering the grain trade undertaken in 
the various regions of the western Mediterranean. So far in this chapter, I have extended 
that discussion to consider the trade in other commodities, particularly those for which 
relatively abundant evidence is available, such as wine, oil, fish products, and slaves. In 
these discussions, the locations and patterns of movement of the traders themselves 
have been considered only in passing, and it is to them that I now turn. 
 The geographical distribution of the Italian trade diaspora (or, to be precise, the 
segment of the Italian diaspora which was employed in trade) can be envisioned in 
terms of a network, comprised of nodes and connecting lines. The nodes are 
geographical points where traders are present on a permanent or semi-permanent basis, 
while the lines represent the journeys of those who actually convey goods between 
nodes, and this system is interconnected with non-Italian trade networks.
136
 Within such 
a model, a great deal of variation both in the relationship between nodes and in the 
identity of those shipping goods is possible. Rome itself is clearly the most significant 
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node in the system, for political reasons, for the exchange and transhipment of goods, 
and as a destination for goods to be consumed. Other nodes frequently occur at transit-
markets, where environmental conditions encourage the transfer of goods between 
different groups of shippers. This is most obviously going to be the case where transport 
by sea or river gives way to transport by land, e.g. Syracuse, Utica, Gades, Narbo. Such 
nodes can also exist inland, with locations dictated by a combination of trade routes and 
political geography, e.g. Toulouse, Cirta, Magdalensberg. Where goods of Italian origin 
were transported between nodes in the Italian trade network, they are likely to have 
been transported by Italians. This is indicated by the organisation of trade through 
agents, as well as by the legal requirement that legally enforceable contracts could be 
made only between Roman citizens or those possessing ius commercium. By contrast, at 
terminal nodes a different situation may have prevailed. Local inhabitants could have 
acquired Italian goods at these locations, and local traders may have acquired goods for 
distribution within their own trade networks. Alternatively, Italian traders may have 
conveyed goods to indigenous communities, and it is probable that the balance between 
these alternatives varied among regions. 
 The geography of trade is, of course, subject to change over time. Thus, while 
Rome’s importance throughout the period is clear, its dominance could only have 
increased. The destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146 eliminated the major 
commercial centres of two trade networks. While Italian traders were present in 
Carthage prior to 146,
137
 and while the destruction of the city must have been disruptive 
in the short term, many of those traders may have benefitted in the longer term as the 
trade formerly centered on the city came into their hands. Less violent, but no less 
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effective in bringing more trade under Roman control, was the establishment of Delos 
as a free port in 166, in deliberate and punitive competition with Rome’s erstwhile ally, 
Rhodes.
138
 As suggested earlier, the foundation of Narbo in 118 may have had a 
negative impact on Massiliote wine exports, though Rome’s favourable treatment of 
Marseille prior to 49 suggests that the effect was unintentional.
139
 The overall pattern 
involves an increasing amount of trade in the hands of Italian traders. This can be 
correlated with the growth in Roman military strength, and the ability to apply that 
strength coercively over ever increasing areas. Italian traders were gradually more able 
to appeal to governors and generals for assistance, as well having privileged access to 
new markets created by the presence of soldiers, miners, and other Italians overseas. 
Cicero, for example, describes how he was asked to supply the creditors of Salamis with 
cavalry in order that they might threaten the city to obtain payment.
140
 No doubt many 
governors would have acceded to such a request, but direct coercion need not have been 
the only way in which Italian traders were supported. The simple proximity of the 
military could sometimes have secured more favourable conditions for Italian traders, or 
at the very least have reduced the likelihood that traders would encounter interference. 
In general, the Italian trade diaspora would thus have operated at an increasing 
advantage over the course of the late republic. 
Among various possible comparisons, one is reminded of the experience of both 
the Dutch and British East India companies. Both companies were chartered at the 
beginning of the 17
th
 century, and sought (with at best sporadic success) to monopolise 
parts of the already extensive Indian Ocean trade. For more than a century, these 
companies and their traders were simply one economic actor among many in the 
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 By the mid-18
th
 century, advances in military tactics increasingly allowed the 
companies to coerce local authorities, and they began to gain a degree of territorial 
control over Java and Bengal, respectively. The Dutch and British governments 
responded by gradually assuming political responsibilities from their respective 
companies. The ultimate result was that the economy of these regions became largely, 
though not exclusively, “western-style” and “western-run”.142 The analogy is 
necessarily imperfect: Roman traders were not organised in a comparable fashion, they 
did not possess military forces of their own, and it is far from clear that their interests 
played a role in determining Roman imperial policy. The key similarity, however, is a 
parallel development from being one group of traders among many, to occupying 
increasingly advantageous positions as coercive power and then territorial control were 
extended. 
 One of the distinctions in the types of communities that comprised the Italian 
trade diaspora lies in whether they operated in an urbanised or a non-urbanised 
environment. In Cicero’s Verrines, one can observe the presence of these communities 
in a variety of locations in Sicily. Undoubtedly, it is to Cicero’s advantage to emphasise 
Verres’ abuses of Roman citizens in Sicily in order to sway the court, but it is 
nonetheless clear that the major towns of Sicily hosted communities of Roman traders 
who were resident there for extended periods, but whose business interests could 
involve them moving around the island. Cicero asserts that, although some traders 
simply visited the island, others remained there to engage in agriculture or other 
business, and even claims that the number of Romans on Sicily was great enough to 
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constitute a benefit to the republic.
143
 Later, he draws particular attention to evidence 
drawn from a large number of Roman citizens from Sicily, in order to counteract the 
possible claim that those Romans who do business in Sicily supported Verres.
144
 In 
describing the judicial arrangements of the lex Rupilia, Cicero mentions that the regular 
procedure was for judges to be selected from the conventus of Roman citizens in a given 
region.
145
 The conventus at Syracuse is frequently mentioned by Cicero, and even 
described as an ornament to the entire island.
146
 Though the prominence of the 







 In the last instance, we are provided 
with evidence that a businessman from Panhormus was present in Lilybaeum, 
demonstrating a degree of mobility within the island. Elsewhere, we are informed of the 
beheading of L. Herennius, described as a banker of Leptis, in Syracuse.
150
 After more 
than a century of Roman control, it is apparent that the major centres of Sicily were host 
to significant communities of resident Roman traders, whose business interests extended 
across the island, and perhaps beyond. This pattern was not restricted to Sicily, but 
clearly extended to Africa as well. Leptis has been mentioned, but Utica was host to a 
large community of Romans involved in trade, navigation and money-lending.
151
 Given 
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that Caesar specifically describes this population as a conventus, by analogy with the 
situation in Sicily, it is likely that many were present there on a permanent basis. 
Similarly, we might guess that some of the traders killed in Cirta at the start of the 
Jugurthine War were resident there, just as we are informed by Sallust that the 
Numidian town of Vaga contained Italians who engaged in trade and lived there.
152
 
Particularly in coastal cities, the diaspora of businessmen may have been accompanied 
and supported by resident bankers. Rathbone has suggested that, apart from the 
financial services these provided, a network of bankers would have propagated Roman 
commercial practices, and given rise to a more integrated commercial system.
153
 
Effectively, the existing urban centres of the Western Mediterranean quickly became 
nodes of an Italian trade diaspora, in some instances even in advance of the military. 
 What situation prevailed in non-urbanised regions? One model is provided by 
the Magdalensberg, in modern Carinthia, Austria, where numerous inscriptions provide 
an indication of how trade between Italy and Noricum was undertaken prior to Rome’s 
takeover of the formerly independent kingdom in 15 BC. Traders of Italian origin, 
mainly from the north (i.e., Aquileia, Bononia, Vetulonia) but with representatives from 
Rome and other locations (Verulae, Anxur, Bantia), established themselves in an 
enclave of the indigenous Celtic settlement there.
154
 The inscriptions (comprised of 
notes scratched on walls) even provide evidence of financial dealings between Roman 
traders and the local population, involving credit, loans, and payments in gold. Located 
on the main route across the Alps between Italy, Pannonia, and points further north, this 
was an optimal site for Roman traders to acquire goods produced with Norican iron, a 
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variety of which are also mentioned in the inscriptions.
155
 It has even been suggested 
that the traders in Magdalensberg remained resident throughout the year. If so, then the 
distinction between trade in this non-urbanised area, and the urbanised regions 
previously considered, may be somewhat blurred. 
 One can compare the image of Gaul presented by Cicero. On the one hand, he 
presents Transalpine Gaul as an area filled with Roman traders,
156
 yet at the same time 
the area is filled with hostile Gauls. Cicero implies that Narbo and Massilia are the only 
places that can really be considered civilised, an extreme contrast which serves his 
rhetorical aims.
157
 Narbo was clearly an important centre, and it was populated by 
enough Romans of sufficient wealth to carry out land auctions there.
158
 Furthermore, a 
significant portion of the wine trade passed through Narbo as it travelled inland to the 
region of Toulouse. Fonteius, after all, was accused of illegally imposing duties on wine 
that travelled on this route. In Cicero’s rendering of his adversaries’ claims, one Titurius 
exacted fourteen denarii per amphora at Tolosa, Portius and Numius three victorati at 
Crodunum, and Serveus two victoriati at Vulchalo.
159
 Despite textual difficulties in this 
passage, it appears that Fonteius had given certain individuals responsibility for 
collecting duties in communities with indigenous names along a specific trade route.
160
 
Thus, as was the case for the Magdalensburg, we are presented with an established trade 
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route, along which a valuable commodity was being moved. We should expect that 
Tolosa, and probably the indigenous communities along that route where customs fees 
were collected, also hosted communities of Roman traders. Considering the quantities 
of wine amphorae concentrated north-east of the Massif Central, we might expect that 
indigenous communities in that region, and along the route from Massilia, could also 
have hosted Roman traders. 
At what point were goods passed from Italian to indigenous traders? The 
Magdalensberg may be useful for comparison, but some caution is required in relying 
on it – our knowledge of the site belongs to a later period, in the years just before 15 
BC, and involves a trading enclave established in the administrative centre of a friendly, 
but still formally independent kingdom. The possibility thus exists that the nature of the 
trading community in the Magdalensberg was determined, at least in part, by the 
preferences of indigenous peoples. In effect, it was a transit-market. Its location was 
determined by political, as opposed to environmental, circumstance, and it was at this 
point that goods left Italian hands. Tolosa, and those points in central Gaul which were 
the destination for large quantities of wine, may have operated in a similar way, acting 
as the terminal nodes of the Italian trade network. While it is conceivable that Italian 
traders sometimes conveyed goods further inland, the evidence available does not 
suggest that this was the case. In Gaul and in the Magdalensberg, we are presented with 
a middle ground, in which Roman military strength lay on the horizon, but was still far 
enough away that trade required mutual accommodation. Under these circumstances, 





4.6 – Conclusion 
 
 In the case of both wine and slaves, a network of individual traders extending 
some distance inland from the Mediterranean coast has been suggested. In both 
instances, however, there is a degree of exceptionality. The wine trade between Italy 
and Gaul was particularly intense, and operated against a background of smaller scale 
trade elsewhere in the western Mediterranean. Similarly, the slave trade probably 
operated on a fairly consistent level, except when Roman victories resulted in the 
enslavement of a noteworthy number of individuals. The regular trade in wine and 
slaves likely operated in much the same way as the trade in the other commodities 
described in the introduction. That is to say, it probably involved traders in the 
provinces, who need not have been highly specialised, while the goods involved would 
often have been shipped as part of mixed cargoes. This is a commerce more elaborate 
than cabotage, yet not so focused as the wine trade with Gaul. 
 At the same time, and in various communities around the Mediterranean, we 
know that traders from Italy were present. In North Africa, Sallust notes that Vaga was 
frequented by Italian merchants.
161
 Moreover, the intervention of the Italian community 
at Cirta on behalf of Adherbal, and their subsequent massacre, helped to provoke the 
Jugurthine War.
162
 In the Verrines, Cicero often refers to negotiatores or cives Romani 
qui negotiabantur on Sicily,
163
 while giving little indication of what their negotia 
actually involved. The presence of these traders is not just a feature of more urbanised 
regions, as Caesar makes clear on several occasions that he used traders as a source of 
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 Sall., Jug. 47.1. Vaga, forum rerum venalium totius regni maxume celebratum, ubi et incolere et 
mercari consueverant Italici generis multi mortales. 
162
 Sall., Jug. 21.3. Adherbal cum paucis equitibus Cirtam profugit et ni multitudo togatorum fuisset, quae 
Numidas insequentis moenibus prohibuit, uno die inter duos reges coeptum atque patratum bellum foret. 
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 While it is difficult to connect these groups of traders with the 
specific (and probably diverse) objects of their trade, there can be little doubt that they 
dealt in at least some of the goods discussed here.  
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Chapter Five – Mining 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 
 Another major category of economic activity which involved the overseas 
migration of a substantial number of people from Italy was mining. The previous two 
chapters have been concerned primarily with the involvement of Italians in commerce in 
various goods. With respect to mines, however, a large number of migrant Italians 
appear to have been involved in extractive/productive activity overseas. Thus, Diodorus 
describes the large number of Italians who were attracted to Iberia after the Second 
Punic War by the wealth to be gained in the mines there,
1
 while Polybius claims that 
40,000 people were employed in the mines in the vicinity of New Carthage alone.
2
 The 
importance of these statements will be considered in further detail later in this chapter, 
but for now, they serve to indicate the potential scale of migration to these mines. 
Although Italians were certainly involved in the trade in metals, it is their role in the 
operation of the mines themselves that will be examined in detail here. 
 Certainly the most important source of metals (especially gold, silver, lead, and 
copper) in the western Mediterranean during the last two centuries BC was Iberia.
3
 The 
extension of Roman control over the mines of Iberia is correlated with a dramatic 
                                                 
1
 Diodorus, V.36.3. u(/steron de\ tw~n  (Rwmai/wn krathsa/ntwn th=j  )Ibhri/aj, plh=qoj  )Italw~n 
e)pepo/lase toi=j meta/lloij, kai\ mega/louj a)pefe/ronto plou/touj dia\ th\n filokerdi/an. 
2
 Polybius, XXXIV.9.8-9; quoted by Strabo, III.2.10.  ... tw~n peri\ Karxhdo/na Ne/an a)rgurei/wn ... 
o(/pou te/ttaraj muria/daj a)nqrw/pwn me/nein tw~n e)rgazome/nwn, a)nafe/rontaj to/te tw|~ dh/mw| tw~n  
(Rwmai/wn kaq’ e(ka/sthn h(me/ran dismuri/aj kai\ pentakisxili/aj draxma/j. Walbank (1979) made no 
comment on the date of this observation, implying that it pertains to the period of Polybius’ visits to 
Spain in 151 and 146. On the latter, see Walbank (1957), p. 4-5. 
3
 Craddock (2008), p. 94. 
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increase in anthropogenic lead emissions found in Greenland ice cores,
4
 which provides 
indirect testimony to the scale of silver and lead mining there. At the same time, it has 
been estimated that from the mid-2
nd
 century onwards the Roman supply of silver, in 
terms of the number of denarii in circulation, grew steadily.
5
 Correspondingly, some of 
the most important literary evidence relevant to mining during the republic pertains to 
Iberia. Another important source of evidence is stamped lead ingots, mostly dating from 
the republic, but with examples from the first century of the principate.
6
 Further 
epigraphic evidence is furnished by the Vipasca tablets which, though they date to the 
reign of Hadrian, have been used to inform scholarly discussions of mining outside their 
immediate context.
7
 Of necessity, scholarship on Roman mining has tended to invoke 
evidence from this region, a reliance which is particularly acute for the late republic.
8
 
Much of this chapter will thus be concerned with mining in the Iberian peninsula, but it 
should be emphasised that mining was undertaken in other areas. For example, copper 
and lead/silver mines are known to have been present in south-western Sardinia, near 
Iglesiente and Sulcis.
9
 Moreover, the Carthaginians exploited Sardinia’s mineral wealth, 
making it likely that the Romans did the same during the republic, probably beginning 
soon after their seizure of the island. Unfortunately, few details of Roman mining in 
Sardinia during this period are known.
10
 A similar situation prevails in Gaul. Copper 
                                                 
4
 Callataÿ (2005), p. 364. 
5
 Crawford (1985), p. 177. 
6
 Andreau (1989), p. 91-93; Domergue (1990), p. 265-266; Hirt (2010), p. 274-275. 
7
 The date of the tablets is indicated by explicit reference to Hadrian in the second paragraph of the lex 
metallis dicta. On their broader applicability see, e.g., Domergue (1983), p. 175-177; Hirt (2010), p. 269-
271. 
8
 So, for example, Ørsted (1985), p. 213, applies evidence for the organisation of mining attested by the 
Vipasca tablets in his study of iron mining in Noricum. A somewhat broader range of sources is available 
for the empire, e.g., inscriptions referring to conductores in Noricum, wooden tablets from Roşia 
Montană in Dacia (Hirt (2010), p. 270), inscribed lead ingots from Britain (Hirt (2010), p. 101, 279). 
Furthermore, archaeological evidence can be drawn upon for a variety of mining areas 
9
 Craddock (2008), p. 94; Webster and Teglund (1992), p. 465. 
10
 Rowlands, (2001), p. 106. Van Dommelen (1998), p. 126, points out that archaeological evidence for 
Punic mining in Sardinia is itself quite limited. 
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and silver were mined in Provence and the Cévennes, and gold in the Massif Central, 
but little can be said about these undertakings during the republic.
11
 Peninsular Italy 
itself lacks gold and silver mines, apart from in the Val d’Aosta; while copper and iron 
mines had been exploited in earlier periods, with the exception of iron mines on Elba, 
these were mostly inactive by the late republic.
12
 Although this chapter will concentrate 
on Iberia, evidence from other regions will be drawn upon for comparative purposes. 
Furthermore, evidence dating from later periods – most notably the Vipasca tablets – 
will be used where it may illuminate the situation during the republic. 
 This chapter will seek to examine two questions. Firstly, section 5.2 will be 
concerned with the administration of the mines. While this is a subject that merits 
interest in its own right, and one to which scholarly attention has been given, the 
objective is not to undertake an analysis for its own sake. Instead, the issue will be 
examined in so far as the way, or ways, in which mines were run has implications for 
the types of personnel that are likely to have been present. Section 5.3 will proceed from 
that point, in order to describe the groups of individuals involved in operating the 
mines, as well as in supporting those undertakings. 
 
5.2 – Administration of Mines 
 
One possible model for the history of Roman mining holds that three distinct 
administrative models were employed in succession, with societates publicanorum 
being responsible for the operation of mines during the republic, small scale lessees 
assuming that role in the Augustan period, and later, direct exploitation of mines by the 
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 Craddock (2008), p. 94; Healy (1978), p. 49, 59. 
12





 This concept of a linear replacement of administrative models can be critiqued in 
various respects. For example, different models appear to have co-existed,
 14
 not only 
between disparate regions, but even within a region such as Iberia. There, varying 
geological conditions demanded different methods of mining, corresponding with 
different levels of investment, and different administrative regimes.
15
 More important 
for the purposes of this chapter, however, is the hypothesis that the mines were operated 
by publicani, in the sense that the right to operate mines was leased to large societates 
by the censors (censoria locatio) in Rome itself. It certainly appears that some mines 
were operated in this way. Thus, Pliny alludes to a republican lex censoria, applying to 
gold mines in the territory of Vercellae, specifying that the publicani who operated 
those mines could employ no more than 5,000 men, a workforce whose size suggests a 
large societas.
16
 Elsewhere, Strabo notes that mines in the vicinity of Pompeiopolis had 
been worked by publicani.
17
 More famous, however, are Livy’s comments on the 
decision of the senate not to lease out the mines of Macedonia following Rome’s 
conquest of that country in 167.
18
 Livy’s interpretation of this as an effort to exclude 
publicani in the interest of either the public good or that of the Macedonians themselves 
could be an anachronistic reflection of later abuse. Livy clearly has large societates in 
mind, given the potential abuses he describes, but such organisations may belong to a 
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 Andreau (1989), p. 91, describing the model of Hirschfeld (1905), in Die kaiserlichen 




 Andreau (1989), p. 91. 
15
 Domergue (1983), p. 176. 
16
 Pliny, NH XXX.21.78. extat lex censoria Victumularum aurifodinae in Vercellensi agro, qua 
cavebatur, ne plus quinque milia hominum in opere publicani haberent. 
17
 Strabo, XII.3.40. ei0rga/zonto de\ dhmosiw~nai metalleutai=j... Strabo’s use of the imperfect suggests 
publicani operated the mines at an earlier date, while both Hirt (2010), p. 91, and Harris (2007), p. 520, 
treat this as a description of the situation in the republic. 
18
 Livy, XLV.18.3-4. metalli quoque Macedonici, quod ingens vectigal erat, locationes praediorumque 
rusticorum tolli placebat; nam neque sine publicano exerceri posse et, ubi publicanus esset, ibi aut ius 
publicum vanum aut libertatem sociis nullam esse. 
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period later than 167.
19
 Societates of the size which, after 133, undertook the collection 
of direct taxes in Asia, correspond well to the enterprises which Livy seems to have in 
mind. Nonetheless, he presents operation of mines by publicani as the only viable 
option, apart from simply leaving them closed. Perhaps the best explanation for this 
apparent contradiction is that the mines were indeed contracted out, and were operated 
by publicani, but that these individuals were not part of large societates. 
How well does a model of operation by large societates apply in Spain? The 
earliest evidence for any Roman efforts to administer the mines there comes from 
Livy’s assertion that Cato “arranged for the collection of large revenues from the iron 
and silver mines” in 195.20 Although Livy used Cato as one of his sources, he made no 
indication of the specific location of these mines. This situation is complicated by a lack 
of archaeological evidence for the production of iron in Spain.
21
 Gellius, however, 
preserved a fragment of Cato’s Origines in which he praises the quality of iron and 
silver mines north of the Ebro.
22
 The details of Cato’s innovation in this area are not 
indicated, but it is clear that mines – or at least silver mines – were now a source of 
revenue for the province. Significantly, there is no indication that large societates 





 century BC, a significant number of Italians migrated to the 
mining areas of Iberia. Diodorus, relying on Posidonius,
24
 states that once the Romans 
                                                 
19
 Andreau (1989), p. 94-95. 
20
 Livy, XXXIV.21.7. pacata provincia vectigalia magna instituit ex ferrariis argentariisque quibus tum 
institutis locupletior in dies provincia fuit. This is the only specific administrative measure known to have 
been undertaken by Cato in Spain. 
21
 Domergue (1990), p. 192-193. As Domergue’s table (p. 190-191) makes clear, Spanish mines during 
the republic almost all produced silver and lead, with a substantial number producing copper. 
22
 Gellius, NA II.22.29. Nam cum de Hispanis scriberet, qui citra Hiberum colunt, verba haec posuit: 
“Set in his regionibus ferrareae, argentifodinae pulcherrimae...” See also Knapp (1977), p. 171-172. 
23
 Richardson (1976), p. 141; Richardson (1986), p. 91. 
24
 Kidd (1988), p. 832-836, in his commentary on Posidonius, describes Diodorus V.35-38 as a “parallel” 
to Strabo III.2.9, a passage which explicitly recounts Posidonius’ discussion of mines in Iberia. As Kidd 
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had extended their authority over Iberia, a large number of Italians came to the mines of 
Iberia, and derived great wealth from them.
25
 It is implied that the Iberians, who had 
previously worked these mines themselves, were supplanted by these incoming 
Italians.
26
 The situation in different regions of Iberia need not, however, have been 
consistent. Mines in the vicinity of Carthago Nova had been operated by the 
Carthaginians, though the details of their administration, and any possible influences on 
subsequent Roman practices, are unknown.
27
 Regardless, after the conquest these mines 
became part of Roman public property, and were exploited relatively quickly.
28
 The 
other major republican mining area in Iberia, the Sierra Morena, only shows evidence of 
Roman exploitation after the death of Viriathus in 138.
29
 Here, however, earlier 
exploitation (usually of superficial copper deposits) had been undertaken by the Iberians 
themselves, with subsequent Roman works pursuing deeper deposits of silver and 
lead.
30
 In contrast with the mines near Carthago Nova, production in the Sierra Morena 
took decades to develop, perhaps because the latter area was less secure, or perhaps 
because of a need for a greater investment to profitably mine there. A similar pattern 
can be observed at Rio Tinto, where mining is known to have been undertaken by 
indigenous peoples,
31





                                                                                                                                               
notes, the passages of Diodorus and Strabo have a variety of details in common, indicating the reliance of 
both on Posidonius. Accordingly, Strasburger (1965) uses Diodorus’ account of the exploitative nature of 
Roman (and Carthaginian) mining in Iberia as evidence for Posidonius’ political philosophy. See also 
Richardson (1976), p. 141-2. 
25
 Diodorus, V.36.3. Quoted above, note 1. 
26
 Diodorus, V.38.2. 
27
 Domergue (1990), p. 241, 249. 
28
 Ibid., p. 225. 
29
 Ibid., p. 184-185. 
30
 Ibid., p. 194. 
31
 Jones (1980), p. 152 
32
 Ibid., p. 157-158. 
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In short, mining by Romans and Italians was extended further into Iberia over decades, 
and against the backdrop of a variety of pre-existing undertakings.
33
 
As Diodorus subsequently describes, the Italians used slaves, under the 
supervision of overseers, in order to carry out work in the mines. Despite debate among 
modern scholars as to the overall scale of migration from Italy to Iberia, Diodorus’ 
reference to a large influx of Italians involved in mining in Iberia has not been seriously 
challenged.
34
 Even Brunt, who took a very minimalist approach to the numbers of 
migrants from Italy, stated only parenthetically that “one might well doubt the 
assertion”,35 though without further elaboration. Brunt’s doubts were a consequence of a 
model for immigration in which he acknowledged the presence of only a minimal 
number of Italians directly involved in mining activity. Conversely, however, he noted 
that there is a lack of explicit evidence concerning business activity in Spain, a shortage 
which is particularly acute for the second century. In fact, the only evidence cited by 
him to demonstrate the presence of resident Italian businessmen in the 2
nd
 century does 
not concern mines at all, but contractors for military supplies.
36
 Specifically, while 
describing Cato’s consulship of Hispania Ulterior in 195, Livy stated that the consul 
forbade redemptores from purchasing grain, and dismissed them to Rome.
37
 With 
respect to the Spanish mines, it is on the basis of analogy with other regions (e.g., 
Cisalpine Gaul, Asia Minor, and Macedonia), and the assumption that an operation 
                                                 
33
 This could range from the simple replacement of local miners, to the application of new techniques to 
work new or underutilised deposits. This process extends beyond the republic, as mines were established 
in the north-west only in the decades after Augustus’ conquest of the region. Excavation of alluvial 
deposits in some areas, and tunneling in others, required even more significant investment here, and there 
is little evidence of indigenous mining. 
34
 See, for example: Knapp (1977), p. 152-3; Richardson (1986), p. 163. 
35
 Brunt (1971), p. 210. 
36
 Ibid, p. 211. 
37
 Livy, XXXIV.9.12. ...itaque redemptoribus vetitis frumentum parare ac Romam dimissis “bellum” 
inquit “se ipsum alet.” The text does not make clear if these individuals were resident. Nonetheless, the 
involvement of groups of businessmen, societates, in military supply contracts for Spain is known from 
as early as 215 (Livy, XXIII.48.6). 
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involving 40,000 workers could not have been arranged in any other way, that both 
Brunt and Badian concluded that they were operated directly by large societates 
publicanorum.
38
 Unfortunately, there is little direct evidence for the direct involvement 
of large societates in the mines of Iberia. 
An alternate model for the administration of mines in Iberia during the republic 
is thus called for. Given the situation in other regions, one might hypothesise that 
mining was undertaken by publicani outside large societates. One version of this has 
been described by Richardson.
39
 With the two caveats that the state of the evidence 
makes analysis difficult, and that different systems may have co-existed at any given 
time, he proposed that the mines (or at least those in the vicinity of Carthago Nova) 
were allocated to “small-scale contractors,” and that the relevant contracts were made in 
the province by the governor or his representatives. Domergue subsequently suggested 
that small-scale lessees could still have been subject to a censoria locatio.
40
 Indeed, it 
would not have been necessary for small scale contracts, whose value could be 
guaranteed by an individual, to be contracted to large societates.
41
 Furthermore, a 
parallel for the letting of public contracts by magistrates in the provinces exists in early 
1
st
 century Sicily. Cicero informs us that, before his own day, quaestors in Sicily were 
accustomed to auction the collection of certain agricultural tithes in the province.
42
 If 
such local auctions had been customary in one province, it is at least possible that they 
were also undertaken elsewhere. Given the early date at which the mines near Carthago 
Nova were first exploited, the administration of public contracts for Sicily would have 
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 Badian (1972), p. 31-32. Richardson (1976), p. 139. Brunt (1990), p. 362. 
39
 Richardson (1976), p. 144-147. 
40
 Domergue (1990), p. 247. 
41
 Brunt (1990), p. 373. The relatively small amounts of capital required to exploit these mines profitably 
– compared, for example, with those later established in north-western Iberia – are also a relevant. 
42
 Cic., Verr. II.III.7.18. L. Octavio et C. Cottae consulibus senatus permisit ut vini et olei decumas et 
frugum minutarum, quas ante quaestores in Sicilia vendere consuessent, Romae venderent... 
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been the major precedent for similar measures in Iberia. However mines were assigned, 
the suggestion that smaller scale producers were involved finds some support from both 
literary and archaeological evidence. 
Considering the literary evidence first, Richardson interpreted Polybius’ report 
that the mines provided the Roman people with a return of 25,000 drachmas per day
43
 
as a figure that was more likely to have been calculated in the provinces, rather than 
being derived from the value of contracts let through a censoria locatio in Rome.
44
 
Given that daily output would have been variable, however, it is best not to take 
Polybius too literally by assuming that miners collectively remitted that precise sum 
every day. The figure of 25,000 was necessarily an aggregate figure for the mines in the 
area, and must have represented an average over some period of time, whether 
calculated by a representative of the governor or of a societas. The other piece of 
literary evidence invoked by Richardson is from Posidonius, as quoted by Strabo, where 
it was claimed that certain private silver-miners could extract a Euboean talent in three 
days.
45
 Clearly, a category of relatively small-scale miners is indicated, which would be 
incompatible with direct exploitation of mineral resources by the societates of Rome. 
Archaeologically, Richardson first cited the comparatively small size of 
individual mines as an indication that they need not have been operated by the 
extremely wealthy. He then proceeded to consider an alternate source of evidence, 
specifically the inscriptions found on lead ingots that would have been produced from 
the same ore as the silver,
46
 a useful list of which was compiled by Boulakia.
47
 Of the 
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 See above, n. 77. 
44
 Richardson (1976), p. 142, 145. 
45
 Strabo, III.2.9. ...tw~n d’ a)rgureuo/ntwn tisi\n i)diwtw~n e)n trisi\n h(me/raij Eu)boi+ko\n ta/lanton 
e)cai/rousi. See Richardon (1976), p. 141. 
46
 Richardson (1976), p. 146. 
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twenty-four examples cited, twenty involve the names of various individuals, while two 
bear the name of a societas,
48
 and another two the abbreviation IMP.
49
 At least 
seventeen different individuals were named, as two people were identified in different 
ways in the inscriptions.
50
 With only one exception, P. Turuilius Arcon, these names 
were Italian in origin. Domergue’s more recent compilation of these inscriptions 
includes fifty-four which can be dated to the republic, but the conclusions are generally 
similar.
51
 Thirty-eight of the stamps from Domergue’s list carry the name of a single 
individual, while another seven bear the name of two individuals, presumably in 
partnership. A further seven refer to societates (SOC or SOCIET), three of which are 
qualified by the names of individuals, while four indicate the location of the relevant 
mines. None of the inscriptions referring to societates can be connected with Carthago 
Nova, a fact which is particularly significant given that the majority of the ingots 
originated there. 
Even more recent work has tended to corroborate these findings. Most of the 
known inscribed ingots originated in the vicinity of Carthago Nova, with individuals 
and small societates being represented.
52
 Indeed, the number of different names known 
from these ingots suggests something about the pattern of mining operations. If these 
represent the names of those who smelted the metal, then a correspondingly large 
number of separate smelters is indicated. Given that only a fraction of the overall metal 
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 Boulakia (1972), p. 142. See also Richardson (1976), p. 146, who noted that these ingots were dated to 
the republic or early empire based on the lettering. 
48
 SOCIET.ARGENT FOD.MONT.ILUCR GALENA (CIL XV.7916); SOCIET MONT ARGENT 
ILUCRO (Musée du Louvre). 
49
 CIL XV.7916; CIL II.6247. 
50
 This assumes that LAETILI.FERM (EphEp. VIII.254) and L.AETILI.FIERM (EphEp. IX.181) are the 
same individual, and that P.TVRVILI.M.F.MAI (EphEp IX.428), P TVRVILII ARCON (Museum of 
Madrid) and P.TVRLLI LABEONI (EphEp VIII.254) are identical. The last name mentioned may belong 
to an entirely different individual, thus raising the total of those known to eighteen. 
51
 Domergue (1990), p. 254-257. 
52
 Hirt (2010), p. 274. 
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production is represented by the known ingots, and given that many individual mine 
operators could have relied on others to smelt ore, a substantial number of separate mine 
operators seems likely. While it is possible that these individuals acted on behalf of 
large societates in Rome, the way in which societates were named on the tablets 
mitigates against this conclusion.
 
These societates are mentioned alongside the names of 
the individuals involved, or, where a geographical reference is used as in the case of 
Ilucro, were clearly relatively small undertakings.
53
 Of course, by analogy with the 
organisation of trade discussed in previous chapters, it is entirely possible that 
individual miners were acting entirely or in part as the agents of wealthier individuals in 
Rome. By the early principate, moreover, it is clear that some individuals resident in 
Spain had accrued enormous wealth through their involvement in mining. Thus, the P. 
Turuilius named on at least two lead ingots is known from coins to have served as a 
local magistrate (duumvir quinquennalis) during the early empire. Q. Torius Culleo, a 
resident of Castulo in the first century AD, is known to have made donations to his 
home town totalling some 20,000,000 sesterces, and was probably a mining 
contractor.
54
 Finally, there is the example of Sextus Marius, the richest man in Spain, 
whom Tacitus claimed was unjustly convicted of incest and executed in AD 33, on the 
grounds that Tiberius wished to place Sextus’ gold and copper mines under state 
control, for his own benefit.
55
 
From a somewhat later period, during the reign of Hadrian, one can also cite an 
inscription on bronze tablets, found near Vipasca in the western Sierra Morena. One of 
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 Richardson (1976), p. 146. Domergue’s list also describes a SOC. ARGENT. and a SOC. VESC., 
which likely refer to named mines, but their location and details of operation are unknown. 
54
 Keay (1998), p. 64. See CIL II.3278. 
55
 Tac. Ann. VI.19. Post quos Sex. Marius Hispaniarum ditissimus defertur incestasse filiam et saxo 
Tarpeio deicitur. Ac ne dubium haberetur magnitudinem pecuniae malo vertisse, aerarias aurariasque 
eius, quamquam publicarentur, sibimet Tiberius seposuit. 
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these bears a letter from a procurator of mines, and describes the legal procedures under 
which mining contracts were then let, as well as details of the management of mines.
56
 
The mines in this area were established in the late 1
st
 century BC, and thus at a later date 
than those in the eastern Sierra Morena and near Carthago Nova.
57
 Given the later 
foundation date of these mines, and the even later date of the tablets, continuity in 
administrative arrangements between Vipasca and republican mines is hardly likely. 
Nonetheless, their evidence is invoked here in order to demonstrate the feasibility of a 
pattern of leasing to small contractors, and the existence of a legal framework allowing 
for such leases, at least in the later period. Thus, clause two states that ownership of the 
50% share belonging to the imperial treasury can be purchased for 4,000 sesterces.
58
 Of 
course, this does not rule out the possibility that wealthy individuals or groups could 
undertake multiple such contracts. Indeed, ownership of multiple pits was specifically 
accounted for, as clause three requires a mine owner who strikes ore in one-fifth of his 
pits to continue work in the remainder. Clause six, however, makes it clear that an 
individual was permitted to occupy a mine in partnership with others, thus the 
possibility existed for individual citizens with less than 4,000 sesterces on hand to 
participate in these contracts.
59
 
The legal framework of a somewhat later period clearly allowed for the 
participation of a relatively broad range of individuals, but is this evidence applicable to 
Spain during the republic? The applicability of the administrative model at Vipasca to 
other locations has been questioned on the grounds that its provisions are specific to the 
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geology of the site. Thus, Domergue points out that certain regulations presume that 
silver and copper were being mined, rendering them unsuited even to another region of 
Iberia such as the Sierra Morena, where silver and lead were produced.
60
 Domergue is, 
however, quite specific that the Vipasca tablets have a more general applicability to 
other aspects of mining, among them the possible forms of ownership of mines, and the 
means by which the right to work them could be acquired.
61
 A series of tablets from 
mid-second century AD Dacia has been interpreted as indicating that mines there were 
operated by a similar range of small and medium scale producers, even though the 
details of their administration have little in common.
62
 The Vipasca model need not 
have been universally applicable, but it was one available administrative method among 
several. 
One possible solution is to acknowledge the possibility that multiple methods of 
administration for specific mines could have been in effect in a region such as Iberia at 
any one time. So, while it seems likely that the mines near Carthago Nova were 
exploited by a relatively large group of small producers, evidence from lead ingots from 
the Sierra Morena suggests that societates were more commonly involved there. As has 
been discussed, this difference may be connected with the later date at which Roman 
operation of mines in the Sierra Morena began, or it may be a function of differing 
geological conditions. As the effort required to access, extract and process ore grows, 
the investment required in order to profitably exploit a mine likewise increases. These 
higher expenditures could have been undertaken more easily by societates. Indeed, an 
even greater diversity of regimes is possible. In Noricum, from perhaps the mid-1
st
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century AD, conductores received contracts to collect vectigalia on iron exported from 
a region encompassing the mines of that province. 
 
5.3 – Mines and Personnel 
 
 In a given mining area, who should we expect to have been present? Polybius’ 
figure of 40,000 people working in the vicinity of Carthago Nova has been mentioned 
several times already, but not all of these individuals were necessarily employed in 
mining. Instead, it is entirely possible that the figure includes individuals otherwise 
occupied in tasks that supported mining operations, and provided necessary services to 
the miners themselves.
63
 The following discussion will thus consider those actively 
involved in mining first, before proceeding to those attracted to the mining areas but not 
actively employed in mines. 
 For the period of the republic, at least, it is likely that slaves undertook most of 
the physical labour in the mines. Alternatives existed, such as the use of paid labour, or 
the employment of indigenous people under compulsion. These, however, seem to have 
been more prominent in a later period,
64
 and in any case paid labour could not have 
been an option prior to the development of a monetized economy in Iberia. Given the 
regularity of Roman military campaigns in Iberia, it seems likely that this slave 
population was substantially drawn from the indigenous population of Iberia. In what 
capacity, then, were the Italian immigrants mentioned by Diodorus likely to have been 
employed? Some Italians may have been employed in managerial or technical roles, and 
while there is little direct evidence available concerning the personnel involved in these 
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tasks, a large slave workforce would have required supervision. Archaeological 
evidence can illuminate the situation to some extent. The housing known from the 
vicinity of Cartagena was simple, built to similar plans, and organised in small groups 
proximal to the mines.
65
 Housing in the vicinity of mines in the Sierra Morena shows a 
similar pattern, though there, graffiti demonstrate the presence of Iberians among the 
miners.
66
 The pattern is repeated at Rio Tinto, but at least in this instance the presence 
of somewhat wealthier individuals can be shown. The tombstone of one Lucius Iulius 
Rabirius, whose initials appear on locally produced lamps, points to the presence of an 
Italian population there. Under the circumstances, it is primarily the evidence of lead 
ingots that will further discussion, even though they are only likely to apply to the 
wealthiest section of the migrant population. 
 Based on lead ingots, it has already been established that the mines near 
Carthago Nova were operated primarily by individuals, with some instances of 
partnership, while explicit reference to societates was restricted to the Sierra Morena. 
But who were these individuals? Most of the names in question are Italian, and 
particularly from southern Italy, the only exception being one CN. ATELLI CN. L. 
BULIO, whose name is Iberian in origin.
67
 In a few instances, freedmen are named on 
these ingots, for example L. AURUNC L. C[.]TA, T IUVENT. T. L. DVSO, and M. 
LAETILI M. L. Moreover, the last named individual is identified as a partner in a 
societas with the freeman L. GARGILI T. F. In each of these three instances, it is 
entirely possible that the individuals named were operating as agents on behalf of others 
who provided the funds necessary to undertake mining operations. Nonetheless, these 
freedmen are a minority of those named. Several of the other names, however, are 
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shared by members of the Roman nobility, often novi homines of the period.
68
 Again, 
the likeliest explanation for the presence of these names in Iberia is that they belonged 
to the freedmen or clients of wealthier Romans, and that they operated mines wholly or 
partly on behalf of those wealthy individuals. Another group of names, meanwhile, 
reappears in the epigraphy of the municipal elite of Augustan Carthago Nova.
69
 As the 
descendants of mine operators, the presence of these people among the municipal elite 
suggests that their forerunners had accrued personal wealth also. In short, the pecuniary 
benefits of mining were likely shared between wealthy backers in Italy, and Italian mine 
operators in Iberia. 
 Alongside those individuals directly involved in mining must have been another 
group which was present in a supporting role. The lamp producer, Rabirius, from Rio 
Tinto falls into this category, but unfortunately this group is not otherwise well attested. 
Hirt has usefully speculated on the range of tasks that would almost certainly have had 
to be undertaken, including provision of food, water, and shelter, fabrication and repair 
of tools, maintenance of draught animals, acquisition of timber for supports, security for 
the mining area, and so on.
70
 No doubt much of the physical labour involved in these 
activities was, like mining itself, undertaken by slaves. More technical tasks such as 
surveying (surely important where multiple mines existed in a limited area) may have 
fallen to Italian migrants. Moreover, the presence of the mines created demand for a 
wide range of ancillary activities, and it’s entirely likely that some of them were 
undertaken by Italians also. The Vipasca tablets, meanwhile, explicitly refer to the 
auction of concessions for baths, shoemakers, barbers, fullers, schoolmasters, and even 
individuals to work the waste (scoria) of the mines. Obviously, it cannot be shown that 
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magistrates in republican Spain were dealing with auctions for such activities. What the 
tablets point to, however, is the possible range of economic activities to be found in 
association with mining areas. 
 
5.4 – Conclusion 
 
 It has been thought that the large mining areas of the republic were necessarily 
operated by large societates publicanorum. As I have shown, however, it is entirely 
feasible that mines were operated on a smaller scale. Strictly speaking, those who 
operated the mines did so under contracts, and were thus still publicani, and 
occasionally these operators were organised into societates. The key difference, 
however, is one of scale. While mining operations certainly required investment, they 
required neither the degree of financial security that large societates could provide, nor 
the semi-permanent legal identity of those societates. The general pattern of mining in 
2
nd
 century Iberia seems to have involved a large number of smaller operators, but the 
evidence suggests that at least some of them had the financial backing of wealthier 
individuals in Rome. That is to say, some of the Italians who migrated to Iberia to 
exploit the mines there did so as the agents of others. This is a significant result, given 
that it means that these mines were organised in a way that is compatible with the more 
general model of the Roman economy that was described and discussed in the preceding 
two chapters. Over the longer term, there are indications that some of these mine 
operators acquired a reasonable amount of wealth in their own right, enough to elevate 
them to the municipal elite, and perhaps further. 
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 Mining in Iberia clearly does show some variation over time. The mines near 
Carthago Nova were perhaps the first mines overseas which Rome found itself in a 
position to exploit, and this seems to have been done by means of small contractors. The 
Sierra Morena began to be exploited from the mid-2
nd
 century, and in that area there is 
evidence for the existence of small societates. It should be emphasised, however, that all 
of this activity was ultimately to Rome’s benefit. The growth in Rome’s silver coinage 
from the mid-2
nd
 century on clearly demonstrates this. It is only starting around 154/153 
that silver coins began to be minted in Iberia itself. While this silver may have 
originated in the mines near Carthago Nova and been sold by mine operators on an open 
market,
71
 its production was probably connected with Roman taxation, and used to pay 
the military in Iberia.
72
 Silver coins actually minted in Italy are unknown in Iberia prior 
to ca. 125, despite the number of coin hoards found there.
73
 This points, unsurprisingly, 
to the very unidirectional flow of wealth during the first seven decades of Rome’s 
operation of mines in Iberia. What, then, is the significance of the appearance of 
coinage from Italy? Crawford suggests that that it reflects migration of Italians to 
Iberia.
74
 Even apart from the mining areas, however, Italian settlement in Iberia had 
been underway for decades before 125, beginning with the foundation of Italica in 206. 
While it may be that a critical mass of Italians was present in Iberia after 125, I would 
suggest that the amount of wealth actually held by those Italians is more important. Not 
only did the seventy years before 125 see an increasing population of Italians in Iberia, 
but at least a segment of that immigrant population was becoming increasingly wealthy. 
The increasing wealth of this resident population is obvious by the principate, when 
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individuals such as P. Turuilius, Q. Torius Culleo and Sextus Marius who derived their 
wealth from mining are known to us. In short, the elite of early imperial Iberia owed its 
position in part to wealth accrued from mines over the preceding two centuries.
75
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Chapter Six – Demography of the Diaspora 
 
6.1 – Introduction 
 
 Over the preceding five chapters, I have analysed the Italian diaspora in the 
western Mediterranean in terms of its constituent groups. These groups are unlikely to 
have been entirely discrete, since individual migrants could easily have undertaken a 
variety of roles. Traders could have had a range of economic interests that shifted over 
time, while former soldiers who remained in the provinces may subsequently have been 
employed in the various categories of economic activity that have been examined. 
Nonetheless, organising the available evidence on migrants according to the roles which 
they undertook in the provinces has provided an analytically expedient foundation for 
my inquiries to this point. There are, however, characteristics of the diaspora which 
have not been adequately addressed in the course of examining subdivisions of that 
population. 
The goal of both this chapter and the next is thus to examine the diaspora in a 
holistic rather than a constitutive manner. In other words, they will seek to establish the 
group characteristics of the diaspora. Chapter seven will address the social conditions of 
the diaspora, in terms of interactions within the migrant community, and of 
relationships between that community and Rome and its magistrates. Chapter six has the 
more limited objective of describing the demography of the diaspora, including the 
overall scale of migration, its evolution over time, and its geographical scope. It is thus 
a necessary preliminary to chapter seven, in so far as the social conditions of migrant 
communities are affected by the size of their population. Obviously, a migrant group 
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numbering only a few tens of people, or one whose population is distributed over a 
large area, is going to have different characteristics from a community of hundreds, 
concentrated in a single location, and perhaps comprising a substantial fraction of the 
total population. 
Section 6.2 will discuss the quantitative approach to the demography of the 
diaspora. As will be seen, it is particularly challenging to determine absolute figures for 
the population of the diaspora. This is simply a consequence of the state of the available 
evidence, and corresponds with a limited consideration of the subject in modern 
scholarship. Given this situation, section 6.3 will treat the demographic question in a 
deliberately more qualitative way, intended to establish probable patterns of migration. 
 
6.2 – Quantifying the Diaspora 
 
 The earliest work of modern scholarship to include detailed deliberations on the 
number of Italian migrants throughout the Mediterranean was Brunt’s Italian 
Manpower of 1971. Brunt was not the first scholar to give attention to these migrants, 
having long been preceded by Hatzfeld’s Les trafiquants italiens dans l’Orient 
hellénique of 1919, and in fact explicitly responding on certain matters to Wilson’s 
Emigration from Italy in the Republican age of Rome of 1966.
1
 The key difference 
between Italian Manpower and the earlier works is that Brunt was specifically 
interested in quantifying population. Brunt’s work is thus the starting point for all 
modern studies of late republican demography. Although it should be recognised that 
Brunt’s interest in the Italian diaspora itself was incidental to his focus on the 
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population of mainland Italy, the influence of Italian Manpower on later scholarship 
necessitates some discussion. 
 The goal of Brunt’s work was to describe demographic changes in the number of 
Roman citizens during the last two centuries of the republic. He was particularly 
concerned with resolving a difference of opinion between Beloch and Frank over the 
possible growth of the citizen population between the census of 70/69 (at which the 
bulk of the free Italian population was first enrolled), and that of 28.
2
 Given that this 
debate is concerned primarily with the population of Italy, its details need not be 
discussed here, except to note that Brunt generally took the view that there was no 
significant growth of the citizen population over this time span, thus following Beloch 
rather than Frank. With respect to migration, Frank had claimed a demographically 
significant level of migration from Italy, which helped to inflate his assessment of the 
overall number of Roman citizens. Brunt, however, took a highly sceptical view of this, 
and thus tended to proceed from the assumption that the actual number of migrants was 
not significant. But what constitutes significance in this context? Brunt’s claim was 
effectively that the number of migrants was small in comparison with the degree of 
uncertainty in estimates of the population of Italy. For the purposes of Italian 
demography, he could then treat migration as an interesting but ultimately 
inconsequential phenomenon. Nonetheless, Brunt conceded that Italians overseas were 
culturally, socially, economically, and politically important.
3
 In terms of their impact 
overseas too, there is no doubt that migrants were significant. 
 Brunt’s initial attitude towards the demographic significance of Italian migration 
translates into scepticism towards what may be inferred on the basis of the limited 
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quantitative evidence available. This pattern of thought can be illuminated by the way in 
which he responded to Wilson’s more credulous approach. For purposes of comparison, 
both scholars were willing to invoke 19
th
 century patterns of migration, particularly 
from Europe to North America. Wilson used this comparison in order to demonstrate 
the possibility that conditions in a given region, e.g. Italy, could be so disturbed as to 
encourage those of modest means to seek refuge elsewhere, or to encourage the wealthy 
to invest overseas.
4
 Brunt, however, emphasised the difficulties involved in such 
migration, the tendency of migrants from Europe to gravitate to urban areas in North 
America, and on the need for state involvement and support to assist migrants, a support 
which was generally lacking in the Roman republic.
5
 The basic validity of this 
comparison can be called into question. The indigenous peoples of North America were 
increasingly disregarded through the period, and this corresponded with a settlement 
pattern involving their wholesale replacement by an immigrant population. As I 
concluded in Chapter Two, this is not the sort of cultural contact that likely prevailed in 
the late republic. By focusing on specific conditions relevant to the act of migration, 
both scholars ignored the social conditions that existed in areas where migrants settled. 
Brunt sought to dispose of the idea of a mass ‘peasant migration’, which Wilson had 
argued was at least possible. The rejection of a migration of this type, however, says 
little about the actual number of migrants, even though it has implications for the 
economic basis and general characteristics of diaspora communities. A migrant 
settlement reliant on peasant agriculture is unlikely to resemble one comprised of 
traders residing within a foreign community. 
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There are two important pieces of quantitative evidence which both Brunt and 
Wilson used in order to support their respective positions. The first piece of evidence, 
and one that is frequently cited, is the claim that 80,000 Italians were killed by 
Mithridates in 88 in Asia Minor and Delos. If accurate, this number would suggest a 
much larger migrant population around the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, Wilson 
conceded that the number was likely subject to exaggeration,
6
 while Brunt regarded the 
number as wholly untrustworthy.
7
 Clearly, it is difficult to consider something as 
politically charged as the numbers killed in a massacre as adequate testimony. The 
second piece of evidence involves an attempt by Wilson to estimate the population of 
migrants in Spain based on recruitment levels there during the civil wars of the 40s BC. 
Both he and Brunt concluded that approximately 10,000 were recruited into the 
Pompeian forces that were subsequently defeated at Ilerda.
8
 This figure necessarily 
involves some uncertainty. As Brunt himself noted in making his calculation, it is 
entirely possible that the citizenship of some recruits was doubtful, and that juridical 
niceties were ignored under difficult circumstances.
9
 Regardless, Wilson asserted that 
this figure was indicative of a significant migrant population, yet Brunt used the same 
figures to arrive at the opposite conclusion. Brunt went on to argue for the presence of 
50,000 provincial recruits from throughout the Mediterranean in the armies of the civil 
war, and extrapolated from this figure a total population of extra-Italian adult male 
citizens of 150,000.
10
 Even this figure is deemed by Brunt to be demographically 
insignificant. In the context of Brunt’s interest in the demographic history of Italy, and 
his attempt to decide between competing hypotheses involving a citizen population of 3 
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million or 10 million, it is easy to see why 150,000 migrants could be regarded as 
insignificant. Brunt’s criteria for significance were simply more stringent than Wilson’s. 
That said, Brunt did not explain how he arrived at a 3:1 ratio between total population 
and military recruits, and the 33% recruitment rate he postulated seems remarkably 
high. Under the circumstances, the figure of 150,000 adult male Romans overseas by 
the end of the republic is clearly a minimal estimate. 
What renders Brunt’s work most significant is the tendency for more recent 
scholarship to follow both his line of reasoning with respect to Italian demography, and 
his treatment of the population of migrants as a subordinate issue. For example, Harris 
discusses migrants, concentrating on negotiatores with political connections and 
influence in Rome but with some consideration of average citizens, while examining the 
possible economic motivations for Roman imperialism.
11
 Again in the context of 
economics, migrants appear in Nicolet’s description of the economy and society of 
Rome during the last 80 years of the republic.
12
 In this instance, Brunt’s discussions of 
population figures are even used explicitly,
13
 and Brunt’s concession that the diaspora 
collectively possessed much greater influence than their numbers alone would suggest is 
echoed. Thus, Delos is said to be inhabited by a “veritable aristocracy of bankers and 
merchants,” while the migrants as a group are termed a “powerful diaspora, the more so 
because it was a diaspora of the ruling race.”14 Despite the extent to which Brunt was 
followed by Nicolet, the latter allows the diaspora a somewhat greater numerical 
significance, by claiming that in Cisalpina, Narbonensis, and Spain, their numbers were 
sufficient to constitute an entirely new population. Nicolet is vague about the scale of 
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migration that would be required to give rise to such a ‘new population,’ but seems to 
have in mind the formation of communities in which Italians were numerically 
predominant. 
 Gabba, meanwhile, was even more willing to contradict Brunt than was Nicolet. 
Thus, in seeking the causes of a population decline in central and southern Italy after the 
Second Punic War, he assigned part of the blame to the emigration of individuals and 
families dispossessed by some combination of war and changes in land use patterns.
15
 
He argued that much of this population settled in Cisalpine Gaul, often in formally 
established colonies or on other lands granted to them, though he also suggested on 
several occasions that some portion of this population settled in Spain.
16
 Such a 
phenomenon is remarkably close to the sort of peasant migration which Brunt denied to 
have existed. Essentially, the picture of economic and social conditions in late 
republican Italy presented by Gabba, and to a lesser degree Nicolet, point toward a 
higher estimate of the population of Italians overseas than allowed for by Brunt’s low 
estimate. 
 Other scholars who have relied upon Brunt’s calculations of the Italian 
population for their own inquiries pertaining to the demographic history of Italy during 
the late republic have expressed doubts about his conclusions on migration. Hopkins, in 
describing this period as one in which peasant agriculture was replaced by large slave-
worked farms, relied on Brunt’s population figures. While Hopkins concentrates on the 
movement of those displaced to Rome, some attention is given to migration overseas, 
and the assertion made that Brunt’s estimates of the migrant population were notably 
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 Similarly, Parkin praises Brunt for his evaluation of the pertinent evidence, 
but also expresses doubt as to the veracity of a decline in the freeborn population of 
Italy in this period.
18
 Meanwhile, he expresses a further doubt that the available 
evidence can allow migration to be quantified with sufficient accuracy to be 
incorporated into demographic models.
19
 In effect, Parkin reaches the same conclusion 
as Brunt concerning the impact of migration on Italian demography, but by denying the 
possibility of quantifying migration within any reasonable margin of error. 
Brunt’s work only temporarily settled the very demographic debate which he 
originally endeavoured to resolve. Some more recent scholars, most notably Lo Cascio, 
have revived Frank’s notion of significant population growth in late republican Italy, as 
well as challenging the overall model of a depopulation of the Italian peasantry.
20
 It is 
likely that a much higher population count in Italy would correspond with emigration on 
a far greater scale than Brunt’s figures would suggest. While acknowledging his own 
bias toward the ‘low count’ position, Scheidel has provided a detailed discussion of the 
terms of this ongoing debate, and gone some way to addressing Morley’s earlier 
comments that the implications of the ‘high-count’ position require more thorough 
consideration.
21
 It might be challenging to bring a debate on Italian demography to bear 
on questions of migration, even though participants on both sides acknowledge the role 
of migration beyond Italy.
22
 Conversely, however, the demographic conditions 
prevailing in Italy necessarily impact on our understanding of the motivations for 
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migration, as the high count implies simple population pressure played a significant 
role, whereas the low count implies the active involvement of wealthy landowners. 
As Erdkamp has noted, there is a shortage of discussion of migration in 
antiquity,
23
 one which his 2008 contribution seeks to alleviate, at least for intra-Italian 
migration. A notable exception, however, is Scheidel’s 2004 paper which, although it is 
concerned with the overall changes in the free population of Italy as the republican 
empire developed, includes an assessment of the quantitative significance of extra-
Italian migration by individuals relative to that of migration involving “state-sponsored 
re-settlement programs”.24 Based on Brunt’s figures, he calculated a rate of individual 
emigration of 0.1% of the Italian population per annum over the period 200-50 BC. 
This figure was then compared with rates for state-sponsored emigration during the four 
periods 338-263 BC, 200-177 BC, 81-28 BC within Italy, and 48-14 BC to the western 
empire, with respective rates of 0.4-0.5%, 0.6-1.0%, 0.4%, and 0.7%. Particular stress is 
laid on an overall emigration rate of 0.65% for the period 81-14 BC. Scheidel thus 
concluded that private migration had a more limited demographic impact than publicly 
sponsored migrations. It should be stressed that Scheidel’s figure for the rate of 
individual migration must, for several reasons, represent a minimum. Firstly, as 
previously discussed, Brunt’s estimate of the population of extra-Italian adult male 
migrants in 49 BC, 150,000, was a cautious one. Secondly, assuming a figure of 
150,000 migrants in the provinces by 49 BC, a calculation over the period 200-50 BC 
also requires the inclusion of those migrants who could not have survived to the end of 
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that period. Indeed, Scheidel earlier notes the importance of the time-span of the 
relevant migration episodes being of a similar order of magnitude.
25
 Finally, it should be 
remembered that only the rate of migration to the western empire from 48-14 BC is, for 
my purposes, strictly relevant to the rate of individual migration to those areas. The 
other periods considered by Scheidel deal only with migration within Italy. While the 
colonisation efforts of the latter half of the 1
st
 century were likely to have been on a 
larger scale than earlier, private migrations, it seems an exaggeration to claim that they 
were of completely different orders of magnitude. 
 Surely more provocative in quantitative terms is Crawford’s suggestion, even if 
only as a thought-experiment, that half of Roman citizens may have been living 
“overseas” after 90 BC.26 Crawford’s argument here has much less to do with precise 
demography than with pointing out that “alternative states” governed by certain dynasts 
(e.g., Sertorius in Spain, Pompey in the east, Caesar in Gaul) relied on the presence of 
significant numbers of Roman citizens in those regions in order to function. Similarly, 
Purcell has considered the significance of the Italian diaspora during the rule of 
Augustus, particularly as a point of cultural contact between east and west.
27
 As might 
be expected, his work shows the influence of some of his predecessors. Thus, there is a 
focus on evidence from the east, and particularly on the inscriptions analysed previously 
by Hatzfeld and Wilson. Perhaps reflecting Brunt, there is a hesitancy to pursue specific 
figures for the number of migrants, although an estimate of several hundred thousand is 
mentioned.
28
 Finally, in a manner suggestive of Nicolet, Purcell draws attention to the 
power dynamic which underlay the importance of the diaspora, and to the privileged 
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position occupied by Roman migrants by virtue of their relationship with the dominant 
power in the Mediterranean. 
 In some respects, efforts to quantify the Italian diaspora have made only 
minimal progress since Brunt. His calculations continue to represent a minimum figure 
for the total number of adult male Romans overseas by the end of the republic. When 
the question has been approached from the context of the social, economic, and political 
conditions existing in the provinces, however, there seems to be greater discomfort with 
a population estimate as low as Brunt’s. Nonetheless, there has been little discussion of 
how much greater the migrant population might have been. In principle, migrants might 
have been several times more numerous. If so, they may still have been insignificant 
relative to the demography of Italy, and would still not have exceeded the rate of 
publically sponsored migration discussed by Scheidel. 
One might estimate a migrant population on the order of several hundred 
thousand by the end of the republic, but the margin of error in this figure remains high. 
That said, it seems doubtful that achieving greater accuracy in this estimate would be 
particularly useful in attempting to describe the conditions and experiences of the 
diaspora. More important in this regard than an aggregate population estimate is 
establishing when migration occurred and where migrants settled. An examination of 
these general patterns is the first step in describing the communities that comprised the 







6.3 – Patterns of Population Movement 
 
 While it is possible to make a very general estimate of the overall population of 
the diaspora at the end of the republic, such as the figure of several hundred thousand 
just discussed, it would be more informative for my purposes to characterise migration 
in terms of its variation over time and between regions. In this section, I shall endeavour 
to use the material of the previous chapters in order to hypothesise on the fluctuating 
patterns of migration throughout the western Mediterranean. An overall picture will be 
built up by examining the likely contribution to the diaspora of different categories of 
migrants. As a preliminary to this, however, it would be useful briefly to compare the 
scale of migration to the west with that to the east. 
The earliest major work to focus on migrants from Italy, and the one to which 
subsequent scholarship almost inevitably refers, is Hatzfeld’s Les trafiquants italiens 
dans l’Orient hellénique.29 His work was not entirely without precedent, as he cites the 
earlier efforts of Schulten, Kornemann
30
 and Parvan, though Hatzfeld found that their 
efforts were relatively narrow in scope, and did not adequately address the questions in 
which he was interested.
31
 Specifically, these questions concerned the origins and 
occupations of Italian migrants, and their relationships both with other Italians and with 
Greeks. Hatzfeld’s own study was intentionally limited, considering only les hommes 
d’affaires, and almost exclusively dealing with Greece and Asia Minor. In Hatzfeld’s 
view, the eastward movement of negotiatores was of an entirely different character to 
the westward, in part because the east was more attractive and hospitable to those 
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 Hatzfeld thus justified the geographical limits of his study, and 
implied a significant disparity in the scale of migration between east and west. No doubt 
this perspective was a consequence of Hatzfeld’s concentration on epigraphic evidence. 
Hatzfeld’s approach can be compared to that of Wilson. As the latter 
acknowledged, his geographical scope demanded a different approach in east and west, 
with scattered literary references providing evidence for the latter, and a relatively 
greater abundance of inscriptions supporting discussion of the east.
33
 Furthermore, 
Wilson was willing to use evidence from the east in order to better illuminate the 
situation in the west, at least with respect to the potential scale of migration.
34
 In fact, 
rather than regarding the west as relatively inhospitable, Wilson considered the figure of 
80,000 killed by Mithridates in 88 in Asia Minor and Delos as indicative of the scale of 
migration both there and throughout the Mediterranean. It is also worth noting that 
Brunt subsequently estimated the Italian population in Spain at the end of the republic at 
30,000.
35
 This alone represents one-fifth of his total estimate for the population of the 
diaspora, and should be sufficient to demonstrate that Brunt did not perceive a dramatic 
disparity in the scale of eastward versus westward migration. 
Having established that a substantial number of Italians were migrating to 
locations in the western Mediterranean, it remains to be discussed when and where they 
went.  The fact that the diaspora has usually been approached from the perspective of 
Italian demography has corresponded with a tendency for scholars to show little interest 
in the specific destination of migrants. Instead, scholarly attention generally has 
concentrated on the causes of emigration and its consequences for Italy. We can start 
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from the assumption, however, that the different groups thus far considered are likely to 
demonstrate different patterns of migration, and may thus commence with military 
migrants. 
At the most simplistic level, the number of military migrants (including both 
former soldiers and those involved in military supply) should be a function of the 
number of troops present in a given region. The implication of this is that a region such 
as Iberia, where Roman armies frequently campaigned, should have contained a larger 
number of former soldiers than a region where campaigns were relatively rare, such as 
Sicily. This effect would be compounded by the duration of Rome’s involvement in 
Spain, with an almost permanent presence there from the Second Punic War. By 
comparison, migrants of this sort are unlikely to have been present in Africa prior to 
146, or in Transalpine Gaul until the 120s. Essentially, military migration should be 
dependent on the duration and intensity of Roman military activity in each region. 
This relatively simple model, however, conceals several complications. In 
particular, a variety of factors may have influenced the probability of military migrants 
choosing to remain in the regions where they had served. Firstly, a lengthy term of 
service might have encouraged soldiers to remain in a given location. This may have 
been a factor in the foundation of Italica in 206, from among soldiers who had been in 
Iberia for up to twelve years. Such lengthy service can be compared with the later 
tendency for six years of service to become normal in Spain.
36
 Secondly, one should 
consider the perceived hospitability of a given region. Iberia was host to soldier settlers 
from an early date, and second century foundations such as Corduba and Valentia may 
have been attractive to later migrants. If a community of former soldiers was already in 
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the province, it seems likely that their presence would have encouraged others to 
remain. The situation in Iberia can be contrasted with that in Sardinia. Although 
numerous campaigns were undertaken there, and while there are a few candidate sites 
for Italian settlement, the evidence of such settlement is comparatively limited.
37
 
Furthermore, the island had an unhealthy reputation, which can hardly have enticed 
potential migrants, even if it did not entirely exclude them. 
Even if the presence of Roman armies was not the only factor determining the 
likelihood of settlement by military migrants in a given region, it was a necessary 
precondition. The variation in the number of legions in a given province should be 
correlated with the rate of settlement by ex-soldiers. The average number of legions in 
service throughout the Mediterranean varied over time, from as few as four to as many 
as twelve in different periods of the second century.
38
 If one narrows the perspective to 
specific regions, then the tendency is unsurprisingly for large numbers of troops to be 
present only for campaigns. In at least some ‘frontier’ areas, it has been argued that such 
campaigns were broadly periodic, occurring every few decades.
39
 Given the duration of 
Roman involvement in Spain, such a pattern should be most pronounced there. At least 
for the second century, the foundation dates of settlements seem to be distributed 
accordingly, with Italica in 206, Gracchuris in 179 or 178, Corduba in 169 or 152, and 
Valentia in 138. If these foundations reflect the needs of military migrants, they might 
point to elevated migration at those times. In essence, military migration should be 
characterised by bursts of activity reflecting periodic campaigns in particular regions. 
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Migrants motivated by their involvement in economic activities, such as trading 
in grain or wine, or mining, might be expected to have exhibited a somewhat different 
pattern of migration. Some types of trade were closely connected with the army, 
whether they involved military supply or the sizeable number of those enslaved after 
defeat. This component of economic activity should be correlated with the scale and 
success of campaigns. There was likely also a background level of small-scale trade, but 
beyond that the pattern of migration would be determined by the prevalence of 
particular economic activities in certain regions. As has been discussed, a grain trade 
existed throughout the western Mediterranean, and it is likely that some number of 
individuals participated in it in all regions. That said, the grain trade to Rome was on a 
far more significant scale, meaning that regions able to supply the city were far more 
likely to attract grain traders. Given the importance of Sicily to the urban grain supply, 
it would come as no surprise if migrants there were far more likely to be involved in 
that trade. 
A generally similar pattern might be visible in the wine trade. The evidence of 
amphorae demonstrates that there was a Mediterranean-wide trade in wine, and there 
can be little doubt that wine traders would have been present at numerous points along 
the coast. Nonetheless, as has been discussed, the wine trade from Italy to Gaul between 
125 and 25 BC was particularly intense. In that case, we should expect there to have 
been a correspondingly larger number of individuals in that region participating in the 
wine trade. Moreover, it is likely that Italian traders were responsible conveying for 
wine further inland than previously. If so, rather than being concentrated along the 
coast, an Italian trade diaspora may have been present deeper in Gaul. Part of this trade 
may have involved seasonal patterns of movement, connected with the transportation of 
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wine both from Italy to the Gallic coast and inland from the coast, and with the 
movement of traders to points further inland than locations where they overwintered. 
With respect to mining, this activity was almost exclusively present in Iberia, 
and even then only in certain parts of the peninsula. During the first decades of the 
second century, Carthago Nova was the only overseas mining district in Roman hands, 
and it is likely that the diaspora in the vicinity was drawn there for that reason. 
Gradually, mining began in other areas, for example in the Sierra Morena around the 
middle of the century. As discussed in chapter five, however, the mines there were 
organised somewhat differently, with evidence for the presence of small societates, 
perhaps reflecting the need for greater initial investment. Furthermore, as suggested at 
the end of chapter six, there may be evidence for an increasing wealth among Italian 
migrants in Spain during the seventy years preceding 125 BC. 
The commercial component of the diaspora is likely to have been determined by 
the specific business opportunities that were perceived to have been present in each 
region at any given time. Furthermore, it is likely that the opportunities for traders of 
various descriptions became more extensive over time, not least as Romans exerted 
power over greater areas. Presumably, the recognition of these economic opportunities 
would have been associated with bursts of migration from Italy. Apart from these 
events, however, it is difficult to perceive an overall trend in migration rate. It could be 
that the rate of migration was, over the last two centuries of the republic, fairly constant. 
The increasing extent of Roman power suggests, however, that a gradual increase in the 
rate of migration is also possible. Turning to their geographic distribution, it seems 
likely that these traders would have tended to be concentrated in coastal locations, 
though there were exceptional circumstances. The exploitation of mines would 
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obviously have driven migration further inland, while the particularly lucrative wine 
trade with Gaul likely encouraged individuals to trade further inland. 
 
6.4 – Chronology of the Diaspora 
 
 Given all the factors that have been mentioned thus far, a chronology of 
migration can be sketched. That at least some Romans were travelling overseas, perhaps 
as early as the beginning of the republic, is implied by Polybius’ account of Rome’s 
treaties with Carthage. The first of these treaties includes clauses stipulating Rome’s 
commercial privileges in Carthaginian territory, with more stringent rules applying to 
trade in Africa and Sardinia than in Sicily.
40
 While it is highly improbable that large 
numbers of Romans were undertaking overseas trade at such an early date,
41
 this treaty 
at least allowed for the possibility that some did so. The second treaty, likely belonging 
to 348, also restricted Roman trade, barring their involvement in Sardinia and Africa, 
but allowing them to trade in Sicily and at Carthage.
42
 The third treaty, of 279, then 
renewed the clauses of its predecessor.
43
 The situation prior to 279 thus appears to be 
one in which Romans were engaged in trade, but under restrictions that make a large-
scale, widespread diaspora in the west improbable. 
 This may be contrasted with the representation in subsequent Roman 
historiography, that Rome before the Second Punic War was a militaristic state, lacking 
any significant commercial or maritime interests. Purcell contests this self-description, 
arguing that the development of historiography in Rome itself demonstrates that the city 
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had been involved in and influenced by the intellectual discourses of the wider 
Mediterranean world throughout the fourth and third centuries.
44
 In a similar vein, 
Leigh argues that the First Punic War was subsequently dramatized as the moment of 
Rome’s entry in the Greek world.45 While he acknowledges that the war brought about 
Rome’s first “meaningful” naval presence, he points out several instances of Roman 
concern with naval affairs in the late fourth and early third centuries.
46
 Essentially, 
Rome was not an isolated entity in this period. Combined with the evidence of the 
Polybian treaties, it is likely that at least some Romans had commercial interests 
overseas before the Punic Wars, even if their numbers were as yet limited. 
Under the circumstances, the migration of a significant number of Romans is 
only likely to have occurred once Rome was beginning to exert authority overseas. In 
that case, the seizure of Sicily in 241, as well as that of Sardinia and Corsica in 238, 
would be the earliest period in which such migration is likely. Unfortunately, the 
evidence is inadequate to evaluate the possibility of an immediate surge in migration. 
There is no indication of military settlement in Sicily, and what exists for Sardinia 
belongs to a later period. Even with respect to grain, a resource that one might expect 
the Romans to have exploited quickly, the earliest evidence for it being shipped to 
Rome is from the last decade of the third century. It is possible that significant 
migration to these islands took place prior to the Second Punic War. This would have 
been facilitated by the transition of most of their area to Roman control, and perhaps 
encouraged by whatever commercial links existed before the outbreak of war in 264. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the scale of this migration, as it is not visible in the 
available sources. 
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A rather different picture emerges toward the end of the Second Punic War. The 
foundation of Italica in 206 provides the first evidence for the settlement of former 
soldiers overseas. Furthermore, the mines in the vicinity of Carthago Nova were 
relatively quickly brought back into production after the ejection of the Carthaginians 
from Spain. In Sicily, meanwhile, the lex Hieronica, regulating the taxation of grain, 
was extended across the whole island at some time between 210 and 205. The 
reorganisation of the tax regime in Sicily could have presented Romans with further 
economic opportunities there. In short, the end of the Hannibalic War was associated 
with the first visible major movement of Romans overseas. 
What pattern of migration then prevailed in the century and a half following the 
end of that war? Three separate components can be identified. The first is associated 
with military activity, the second with the exploitation of specific temporarily 
favourable economic circumstances, and the third with a background level of migration. 
These components contributed in different ways and to different degrees in each 
location. While I shall attempt to put numbers to these components, and to each region, 
it must be remembered that these figures represent best guesses and can only be 
regarded as accurate within a very broad degree of error. Furthermore, the numbers 
proposed refer in all cases to the population of adult male citizens.
47
 
In Spain, the more or less permanent presence of at least two legions,
48
 along 
with allied troops prior to the Social War, meant that ex-soldiers likely comprised a 
significant portion of the diaspora there. Assuming a garrison of 20,000 men and a term 
of service of six years,
49
 a minimum of 3,300 reinforcements would have been needed 
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annually, even ignoring fatalities. If only a few percent of these men chose to remain in 
province, the result would have been the annual settlement of 100-200 ex-soldiers. This 
figure does not take into account the involvement of additional legions in the frequent 
campaigns in Spain, nor does it consider those involved in supplying the armies. In the 
period from 205-44 BC, the settlement of some 15,000 individuals connected with the 
military would be a relatively conservative estimate, with double that figure being more 
probable. Military settlement would in turn have attracted Italian traders, and there 
would have been a simultaneous migration connected with mining. An initial surge 
when the mines near Carthago Nova were reopened is likely, followed by another, 
similar burst in the mid-2
nd
 century when mines in the Sierra Morena were brought into 
operation. Polybius’ figure of 40,000 employed in the mines near Carthago Nova was 
discussed in Chapter Five. While slaves no doubt performed a great deal of physical 
labour in the mines, supervisory, technical, and other, ancillary activities were more 
likely to fall to Italians. While any estimate of this Italian population is highly 
speculative, a figure on the order of thousands seems reasonable, perhaps as many as 
10,000 across the two mining districts. 
Taken together, the military and mining alone might account for 40,000 
migrants to Spain. In addition to these, there must also have been a background level of 
migration, attracted by economic opportunities in the region that were not directly 
contingent upon military activity or economic booms. This more mundane element is 
harder to quantify, precisely because it is less likely to have attracted comment in our 
sources. Nonetheless, the growth of Italian communities in the peninsula, and the 
extension of Roman control over ever greater areas there, must have been associated 
with a growth in economic opportunities for Italian migrants. An assessment of the 
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contribution of this element to the diaspora will necessarily be subjective. For now, 
however, I would suggest that this component of migration was as significant in Spain 




Is such a figure reasonable? Crawford, in considering his “alternative states”, 
would presumably think so. His suggestion, that as many as half of Roman citizens 
were overseas by the end of the republic, relies in part on the way in which Spain was 
governed under Sertorius. As he points out, Sertorius established a government with its 
own senate and magistrates, despite not being accompanied by a large number of 
individuals from Italy.
50
  The only alternative is that the personnel of his parallel 
government were drawn from the existing Italian population in Iberia. In effect, this 
probably means that many of the wealthiest Italians in Iberia were co-opted into his 
government, and indeed it was argued in Chapter Five that a segment of this population 
had been growing increasingly wealthy during the century before Sertorius. This 
wealthy tranche of the population was presumably the affluent pinnacle of a broader 
migrant community in the province. It is debatable whether this supports Crawford’s 
provocative suggestion that as many as half of Roman citizens were outside Italy by the 
end of the republic. Even without pushing the figures so far as Crawford, however, they 
do not contradict the figure of multiple tens of thousands suggested here. Indeed, they 
rule out any dramatically lower population count. 
The situation in other regions of the western Mediterranean can be compared 
with that in Spain. In Africa after 146, the components of the diaspora made 
proportionately different contributions to those in Spain, with the result that the diaspora 
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there is likely to have been characteristically different. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
scale of Roman military involvement in Africa was more limited than in Spain. The 
campaigns of the Punic Wars, and particularly the Jugurthine War, probably resulted in 
some settlement by former soldiers. Without large standing garrisons, however, the 
military contribution to the diaspora there is likely to have been much more limited. 
Rather than the tens of thousands suggested for Spain, a few thousand in Africa seems 
reasonable. A larger impact was made by those involved in agriculture and in trade. The 
former was considered in Chapter Three, where it was noted that the Gracchan colony at 
Junonia probably drew several thousand individuals to Africa. Despite the failure of that 
colony, it is clear from the lex agraria of 111 that Italians held land in Africa, though 
the proportion of absentee landlords to resident farmers is open to debate. It is also clear 
that the larger towns of the region played host to an Italian trade diaspora. It is clear that 
this was present during the Jugurthine War, as Sallust informs us of the massacre of 




 in the interior. Furthermore, he comments in a 
negative and moralising way on Marius’ efforts to gain support among the Italian 
merchant class in Utica.
53
 Later, during Caesar’s African War, merchant communities in 
the cities of Africa again appear, in Thysdra, Hadrumetum, and (again) in Utica. Indeed, 
in the latter, Caesar’s opponents were able to form a “senate” of 300 wealthy resident 
Romans,
54
 which may have been representative of a larger population of Italian origin. 
It is obviously difficult to use simple evidence for the presence of diaspora communities 
to quantify the diaspora. Nonetheless, the claim that Caesar’s opponents were able to 
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raise 12,000 troops from the Roman population of Africa is clearly suggestive.
55
 Using 
this figure to estimate the adult male population necessarily involves speculation on the 
recruitment rate, but a figure of perhaps 35,000 might correspond well. As for the 
chronology of this diaspora, no doubt there were surges in settlement associated with 
the Jugurthine War and the settlement at Junonia. Nonetheless, the prominence of 
traders in Africa suggests that the background component of migration, encouraged by 
general economic opportunities, played a dominant role. 
Transalpine Gaul became a venue for Roman military action at a later date than 
either Spain or Africa. Despite this, there is at least some evidence for the existence of 
settlements founded in connection with military activity. Aquae Sextiae was founded 
after campaigns in the late 120s, while Lugdunum Convenarum was established in the 
wake of the Sertorian War. In this regard there is a similarity with Spain, and of course 
the Sertorian War involved a campaign from south-western Gaul into Spain. It has been 
suggested that this period, specifically Fonteius’ efforts as governor to secure the region 
and use it to support Pompey’s campaign in Spain, marked a watershed in the 
organisation of the Gallic province.
56
 Moreover, Ebel suggested the province was 
administered as part of Hispania Citerior until alternate arrangements were made under 
the supervision of Pompey.
57
 Despite the similarities with Spain, however, the shorter 
period of Roman military involvement in Gaul, and the smaller number of campaigns, 
should both correspond to a smaller level of military settlement. As in Africa, several 
thousand military settlers seem likely. Also as in Africa, it is clear that traders made a 
substantial contribution to the diaspora in Gaul. Cicero, in the pro Fonteio, represents 
Gaul as the residence of so great a number of Roman traders that practically all business 
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transactions in the region involved them.
58
 Even allowing for some exaggeration, such a 
representation would have been ineffective if it lacked at least an element of truth.
59
 As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the years after 125 saw the shipment of wine from Italy to 
Gaul on a scale that dwarfed the wine trade with other regions. No doubt this involved a 
surge in migration in the last quarter of the 2
nd
 century, one that perhaps blazed a trail 
for a range of other traders, and which may go some way to justifying Cicero’s 
presentation of the province.
60
 Unfortunately, the available evidence means that only a 
guess can be made as to the population of this diaspora. A figure comparable to that 
suggested for Africa (35,000) is perhaps reasonable. This population could have been 
reached in a relatively shorter time, as a consequence of a population surge after 125. 
The larger Mediterranean islands can, to some extent, be understood by 
comparison with the regions already considered. With regard to Sicily, I described in 
Chapter One how little evidence exists for military settlement on the island. The 
evidence for a permanent garrison there is limited, while the only occasion on which 
Roman troops clearly campaigned there is during the Second Slave War. Conversely, 
however, Sicily was exploited as a source of grain from an early date, certainly in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second Punic War, if not before. By the period of the 
Verrines, Cicero could appeal rhetorically to a number of communities of Roman 
traders on Sicily as witnesses to Verres’ activities. Cicero mentions no less than 42 
individual Roman citizens in the course of the Verrines, and notes that the island had 
attracted many citizens.
61
 Nonetheless, as was the case for Gaul, it is challenging to 
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estimate the migrant population on the basis of this evidence. A figure of 20,000 would 
be smaller than that proposed for Gaul and Africa, though still of a similar order of 
magnitude. Sardinia and Corsica seem to have attracted only limited settlement by 
former soldiers, and to have been comparatively uninviting on economic grounds. 
Under these circumstances, a migrant population significantly in excess of a few 
thousand seems unlikely. 
 
6.5 – Conclusion 
 
 Taking together the population figures that I have proposed yields a total 
population for the Italian diaspora in the western Mediterranean of slightly more than 
170,000 adult male citizens by the end of the republic. We might suppose an initial 
overseas population on the order of 5000 at the end of the Punic War. Gradual growth 
over the subsequent decades, along with migration to the mines near Carthago Nova 
may have produced a population of 25,000 by the mid-2
nd
 century. The second half of 
that century saw the extension of Roman control into Africa and Transalpine Gaul, and 
various circumstances would have contributed to population growth in this period. 
These would have included the development of mines in the Sierra Morena around 150, 
the dramatic expansion of the wine trade with Gaul after 125, the foundation of Junonia 
in 122 and that of Narbo in 118, as well as the settlement of former soldiers following 
the Jugurthine War. All together, we might expect a population of 80,000 by the end of 
the 2
nd
 century. A continued growth thereafter would have led to an overseas population 
of 170,000 by the end of the republic. The overall pattern thus involves a gradually 
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increasing rate of growth over the period, coupled with a series of watershed events that 
contributed to the overseas population in the last half of the 2
nd
 century.  
The population numbers which contribute to this estimate are themselves 
educated guesses, ones which exceed those produced by Brunt’s minimalist approach, 
but fall short of Crawford’s proposal that half the Roman citizen population was 
overseas by this time. Perhaps more important than an estimate of the absolute 
population is the pattern of population growth, both in terms of the identity of migrants, 
and the chronology of their movements. Essentially, the end of the Hannibalic War is 
associated with the earliest significant growth in the population of Italians overseas, 
particularly in Spain and Sicily. In several instances, bursts in the overall rate of 
migration can be identified. Even in a region such as Africa, however, where such 
bursts are harder to identify, it is clear that a significant migrant population was present 
by the end of the republic. Here and elsewhere, a background level of migration, 
independent of periods of unusual growth, was contributing to the population of the 
diaspora. This background migration rate perhaps grew modestly over the century and a 
half after the Hannibalic War, but this was punctuated by instances of unusual growth. 
Geographically, most migration is likely to have been to coastal areas, with traders 
attracted particularly to existing urban centres. Exceptions would have existed, such as 
migration to inland mining areas, and in connection with the Gallic wine trade. Having 
characterised the growth in the population of the diaspora, it remains to examine the 






Chapter Seven – Social Conditions of the Diaspora at the 
end of the Republic 
 
7.1 – Introduction 
 
 In chapter six, I undertook a demographic inquiry which sought to characterise 
migration from Italy in terms of its scale and geographical scope, while also indicating 
how these evolved. In chapter seven I shall examine the end result of these 
developments, by describing the state of the diaspora during the thirty years prior to 44 
BC. The chapter relies heavily on outside descriptions of diaspora communities by 
members of the Roman elite who were directly involved with them. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the elite, urban context in which the available literary evidence was 
produced. Section 7.2 is concerned with relationships among migrants. Specifically, it 
deals with the organisation of diaspora communities, at least as far as external sources 
describe them. Section 7.3 then considers the relationship of the overseas communities 
with Rome and its magistrates. This is achieved by examining the economic and 
political networks which connected diaspora communities both with Rome and with 
each other. 
 Prior to these considerations, however, it will be useful to summarise some 
general characteristics of the diaspora which had developed by this time. In chapter six, 
a peak aggregate population figure of 170,000 was suggested for the diaspora in the 
west. The rate of migration was not uniform over time, but was characterised by bursts 
of migration to specific regions. Temporarily high rates of migration could be induced 
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by particular economic circumstances (e.g., the wine trade with Gaul after 125) or 
military activity (e.g., in Iberia after the ejection of the Carthaginians in 206). 
Consequently, the phasing of migration to particular regions varied. Furthermore, the 
involvement of a significant number of migrants in trade implies that a large segment of 
the diaspora was concentrated in existing coastal communities. There were, of course, 
exceptions to this geographical distribution. Communities of former soldiers could be 
located inland, such as at Italica and Gracchuris in Iberia. Moreover, traders could be 
found inland, such as those massacred at Cirta in 113, or those involved in mining in the 
Sierra Morena. Nonetheless, these should be viewed as exceptional cases; as will be 
seen in section 7.2, most of the organised diaspora communities were located in coastal 
centres. Apart from these demographic developments, it is also likely that the diaspora 
collectively disposed of an increasing amount of wealth. As suggested at the end of 
chapter five, one possible explanation for the appearance of Italian-minted silver coins 
in Iberia in the last quarter of the second century may be the increasing wealth of the 
diaspora there. Although some migrant communities may have been unsuccessful, those 
that persisted and grew might be expected to have followed a similar trajectory, if 
differently timed, in terms of affluence. 
 One aspect of the diaspora that has not thus far been considered in detail is the 
juridical status of its members. Prior to the Social War, and the enfranchisement of the 
Italians under the terms of the lex Julia, migration from Italy would have involved both 
those with Roman citizenship and those without it. This is not to suggest that the 
diaspora necessarily had the same proportion of citizens to non-citizens as existed in 
Italy. Rather, individuals in the diaspora were citizens either of Rome or of Rome’s 
Italian allies, and accordingly possessed different rights in Roman law. Under most 
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circumstances, the distinction between Roman citizens and allies probably had little 
practical significance to individuals outside Italy. While it is difficult in most instances 
to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, the situation in Delos may be 
illustrative. Onomastic evidence from the island, pertaining to the decades prior to the 
Social War, suggests that the migrant population there was comprised of both Romans 
and individuals from southern Italy.
1
 When referred to in inscriptions, these people may 
be named as  (Rwmai=oj or  )Italikoi/ / Italici. As Adams has shown, Romanus never 
appears in Latin texts from the island, with Italici being used exclusively.
2
 
Furthermore,  )Italikoi/ / Italici is only ever used in the plural, which Adams interprets 
as an indication that the “clearest collective identity” on the island was an Italian one.3 
On this interpretation, despite the differing citizenship of members of the community, 
this cleavage was not so important as to be emphasised in its self-description. Even 
when addressing itself to a Latin-speaking audience, the community chose to describe 
itself as Italian. A comparable usage, though not contemporary, may be observed in 
Sallust, who on several occasions applies the term Italici to the negotiatores present in 
the African cities of Cirta and Vaga.
4
 Indeed, Sallust also uses the term in a way that is 
clearly inclusive of Roman citizens, describing the sole survivor of the garrison of 
Vaga, the prefect T. Turpilius Silanus, as unus ex omnibus Italicis.
5
 In other words, he 
uses Italici in a way that elides distinctions in citizen status. Taken together, these 
pieces of evidence suggest that migrant communities could use their Italian origin as a 
unifying characteristic, and that this collective identity could be recognised externally. 
                                                 
1
 Solin (1982), p. 117. Solin explicitly contrasts his emphasis on the Roman population of Delos with 
Hatzfeld’s (1919) view that the diaspora there originated almost exclusively from southern Italy. 
2
 Adams (2003), p. 652. 
3
 Ibid, p. 653. 
4
 Sall., Jug. 26.1; 47.1. See Adams (2003), p. 657. 
5
 Sall., Jug. 67.3. 
216 
 
Citizenship status must, however, have been divisive in at least one respect, 
specifically in the relationship of individuals with representatives of the state, and in 
their ability to access the Roman legal system. It appears, for example, that the first law 
to provide a legal remedy against extortion by magistrates, the lex Calpurnia of 149, 
was intended for the use of Roman citizens alone.
6
 Given that similar protections were 
only extended to non-citizens in 123, for a generation Italian emigrants were in an 
inferior legal position when dealing with provincial magistrates. The situation was 
likewise complicated for Italians engaging in business with Romans overseas. Lacking 
ius commercium, Italians were unable to form contracts with Roman citizens that could 
be enforced in Roman courts, potentially placing them at another disadvantage. 
Furthermore, the absence of this right debarred Italians from bidding on Roman public 
contracts, and thus from direct participation in lucrative activities such as military 
supply and tax collection. Clearly, Italians were engaging in commerce overseas, 
suggesting that any legal disadvantages could have had only limited effect on their 
activities.
7
 Indeed, it is clear that Romans and Italians were cooperating in financial 
matters at least as early as 193. Livy describes how, in that year, the senate addressed 
the practice of certain Romans, who transferred the accounts of debtors to Italians in 
order to evade laws against usury that applied only to citizens.
8
 It seems unlikely that 
those engaging in financial transactions designed to evade Roman law would have been 
particularly concerned whether the relevant contracts were legally enforceable. 
                                                 
6
 Richardson (1987), p. 11. 
7
 Mouritsen (1998), p. 92. See, however, Gabba (1989), p. 224-225, suggesting that Italian economic 
interests, and their desire for greater influence on Roman decisions affecting trade overseas, were 
contributory causes of the Social War. Mouritsen takes a contrary view, that the Italians were primarily 
concerned with escaping Roman domination. In his view, citizenship would have held few commercial 
advantages for the Italians, hence economic concerns are unlikely to have been relevant to the outbreak of 
war. 
8




Conversely, however, this example does suggest that less dubious forms of commerce 
did exist between Romans and Italians, whatever the legal disabilities of the latter. Such 
distinctions were, of course, eliminated in the wake of the Social War, but must have 
been operative in diaspora communities. The presence of a large number of Italian 
traders overseas suggests, however, that formal legal disabilities had relatively little 
impact on their commercial activities. 
 
7.2 – Community Formation and the Roman conventus 
 
By the last decades of the republic, communities of Roman citizens existed in 
various regions of the Mediterranean, and particularly in locations which were 
advantageous for business purposes.
9
 By this period, moreover, enough of these 
communities had organised, or been organised, into conventus civium Romanorum, that 
the latter bodies were common throughout the Roman world.
10
 Much of the relevant 
evidence for these communities, however, describes their presence in the eastern 
provinces, or pertains to the period of the Principate.
11
 While the conventus of the east 
and the persistence of conventus long after the end of the Republic are each interesting 
subjects in their own right, they lie beyond the scope of my inquiry. Complicating 
matters further, the term conventus is also used in connection with the administration of 
justice. In this context, it can refer to the provincial cities in which a governor was 
obliged to hold assizes, as well as to the judicial districts surrounding each of those 
cities. In this judicial sense, the Latin conventus came to be equivalent to the Greek 
                                                 
9
 Purcell (2005), p. 93. 
10
 RE: conventus. 
11
 This pattern may be a result of the paucity of epigraphic evidence in the west; most of the evidence for 
conventus there is literary. 
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dioi/khsij. The first objective of this section will be to consider the evidence pertaining 
to the citizen conventus of the western provinces during the Republic. A second goal 
will then be to examine the relationship between the conventus as a citizen group and 
the judicial conventus. 
 
Conventus civium Romanorum 
 
The most extensive evidence for the existence of an organised community of 
Romans concerns the city of Utica. Initially a Punic city, Utica was on the Roman side 
during the Third Punic War, was rewarded with territory during the post-war 
reorganisation of the region, and subsequently became the administrative centre for the 
province of Africa.
12
 The community of Roman citizens in Utica first comes to 
prominence in 83/82 BC, at which time they are said to have had the governor of the 
province, Hadrianus, burned alive in his own house.
13
 Cicero is explicit in stating that 
this action was not punished by the authorities, and in fact Valerius Maximus employs it 
as an exemplum for appropriate vengeance. However appropriate these actions may 
have been, it is remarkable that no punitive action was taken, and may be an indication 
of the influence of the community. Conversely, it is possible that Hadrianus was an 
opponent of the then ascendant Sulla, and that his death was at least partly politically 
motivated.
14
 Whatever the political significance of the Roman community at Utica, and 
whatever the degree of organisation possessed by that community, our sources clearly 
treat it as collectively responsible for its actions. 
                                                 
12
 Lintott (1994), p. 27. Whittaker (1996), p. 586. 
13
 Cicero, Ver. I.70.“quod eius avaritiam cives Romani ferre non potuerant, Uticae domi suae vivus 
exustus est”. Val. Max.,  IX.10. cum enim Hadrianus cives Romanos, qui Uticae consistebant, sordido 
imperio vexasset idcircoque ab iis vivus esset exustus. 
14
 Seager (1994), p. 191. 
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The Roman citizens of Utica would again become prominent in the latter stages 
of the civil wars of 49-45 BC, at which time it became a centre for the senatorial 
opposition to Caesar, under the leadership of Cato the Younger. The inhabitants of the 
town were not, however, united in their opposition to Caesar, as he himself makes clear. 
He describes the population as “a multitude of people unaccustomed to war,” with the 
native Uticenses “most friendly to Caesar on account of certain benefits he had 
conferred upon them,” alongside a Roman conventus which is described as ex variis 
generibus.
15
 This last phrase has been interpreted as indicating that the loyalties of the 
Roman inhabitants were divided, though the existence of a Caesarian faction among 
them is not otherwise indicated.
16
 As will become clear, however, it is more likely that 




The events that transpired in Utica subsequent to Caesar’s victory at Thapsus are 
described in de Bello Africo, where the term conventus is again used to describe the 
community.
18
 A similar version of events is provided by Plutarch in his Life of Cato the 
Younger. These sources agree that Cato worked in conjunction with a group of 300 
Roman inhabitants of Utica, which acted as a “senate”. This group consisted of 
businessmen, in particular merchants and money-lenders,
19
 and was also active in 
                                                 
15
 Caes., B.Civ. II.36. Erat in oppido multitudo insolens belli diuturnitate otii, Uticenses pro quibusdam 
Caesaris in se beneficiis illi amicissimi, conventus is, qui ex variis generibus constaret, terror ex 
superioribus proeliis magnus. Carter (1991, p. 235) suggests that the multitude refers to the surrounding 
rural population, who had presumably taken refuge in the city. The specific benefit that Caesar conferred 
on the Uticenses is unclear, though a law of 59 BC has been suggested. Perhaps an element of the lex 
Julia de pecuniis repetundis? 
16
 Carter (1991), p. 235. 
17
 OLD, definition 6: “A. changeable in behaviour, mood allegiance, etc., wavering, fickle, or sim.; (also 
of thoughts or attitudes). B. untrustworthy, insincere, two-faced.” 
18
 [Caesar], B.Afr., 68. 
19
 Plutarch, Cat. Mi. LIX.2. oi[j e)xrh=to boulh|=, R(wmai/ouj me\n o)/ntaj, e)n de\ Libu/h| 
pragmateuome/nouj a)po\ e)mpori/aj kai\ daneismw=n. 
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maritime trade and the slave-trade.
20
 More importantly for their subsequent fate, this 
group is said to have donated money to the “senatorial” cause.21 Despite Cato’s efforts 
to rally them, in the aftermath of Caesar’s victory, it was clear that they would not 
support continued resistance, and they thus sent a delegation to Caesar.
22
 Upon his entry 
into the city, Caesar thanked the native inhabitants for their loyalty, and then upbraided 
“the Roman citizens who were engaged in trade and those members of the Three 
Hundred who had contributed sums of money to Varus and Scipio”.23 Accordingly, 
Caesar stipulated the fine that he intended to levy against these individuals, a 
punishment which they are said to have accepted without complaint. The group is then 
said to have responded as follows: petieruntque a Caesare ut universis CCC uno 
nomine pecuniam imperaret.
24
 The phrase uno nomine indicates that they sought to pay 
a single debt,
25
 with that debt being assigned to them as a collective. What conclusions 
can be drawn about the Roman community in Utica based on these events? Firstly, it 
had an independent decision-making capacity, allowing it to take collective action as it 
did when it sought to make an arrangement with Caesar. Secondly, it actively sought to 
be treated as a collective body for the purposes of assigning a fine. Furthermore, the 
collective identity of the group was recognised by Caesar, even as he was dispensing a 
punishment to them (though, of course, the passage is designed to demonstrate Caesar’s 
                                                 
20
 Plutarch, Cat. Mi. LXI.1. tw~n de\ triakosi/wn, a(/te dh\ plwtikw~n kai\ daneistikw~n a)nqrw/pwn kai\ 
to\ plei=ston e)n toi=j oi)ke/taij th=j ou)si/aj e)xo/ntwn. 
21
 [Caesar], B.Afr. 88. CCC, qui  pecuniam Scipioni ad bellum faciendum contulerant. 
22
 [Caesar], B.Afr. 88. Plutarch, Cat. Mi. LX-LXI. Plutarch’s account gives Cato the opportunity to make 
a speech which convinces the three-hundred, though only temporarily. Their subsequent defection is 
attributed partly to a desire not to manumit and arm their slaves for the defence of the city. In any case, 
this behaviour may explain Caesar’s description of them as ex variis generibus. 
23
 [Caesar], B.Afr. 90 civis autem Romanos negotiatores et eos qui inter CCC pecunias contulerant Varo 
et Scipioni multis verbis accusat. This passage creates some difficulty, as it may indicate that some 
among the 300 did not actually donate funds. The collective nature of the punishment for the three-
hundred, however, does not support such a distinction, nor does the description of these funds at B.Afr. 
88. 
24
 [Caesar]. B.Afr. 90. 
25
 Schneider (1962), p. 126. Schneider describes this debt as “als Gesamtschuld”, a description that 
corresponds with OLD definition 22. 
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clemency to his adversaries). Moreover, a similar process can be seen in the brief 
references to the indemnities which were assigned to two other African communities, 
Hadrumetum and Thapsus.
26
 The actions of the conventus at Utica, and the assignment 
of collective responsibility to it and other conventus, indicate that these were organised 
entities. 
The position of the Roman community in Corduba, Spain, merits discussion in 
this context. Founded either in 169/8 or 152 BC by M. Claudius Marcellus, the town 
appears to have been comprised of both Romans and Iberians, and received formal 
colonial status only under Caesar or Augustus.
27
 Certainly, the Roman community there 
is described as a conventus by Caesar himself as, for example, when it excluded the 
Pompeian Varro, and detained two cohorts of troops for the defence of the town.
28
 
Subsequently, this same group revolted against the corrupt governance of Caesar’s 
lieutenant, Q. Cassius Longinus,
29
 although it is also indicated that they refused “to act 
contrary to Caesar’s interests”.30 In this instance then, a community of Romans 
described as a conventus is clearly competent to organise the defence of its town. 
Furthermore, in a situation reminiscent of Utica, the conventus here has sufficient 
freedom of action to determine whom it will support in the course of the civil war. 
Rather than being assembled and empowered solely in the presence of a Roman 
magistrate, the conventus of Corduba was an organised and independent decision 
making body. 
                                                 
26
 [Caesar]. B.Afr. 97. ibi bonis venditis eorum qui sub Iuba Petreioque ordines duxerant, Thapsitanis HS 
XX, conventui eorum HX XXX, itemque Hadrumetinis HS XXX, conventui eorum HS L multae nomine 
imponit. 
27
 Richardson (1986), p. 119. 
28
 Caes., B.Civ. II.19.3. simul ipse Cordubae conventus per se portas Varroni clausit, custodias 
vigiliasque in turribus muroque disposuit, cohortes duas, quae colonicae apellabantur, cum eo casu 
venissent, tuendi oppidi causa apud se retinuit. 
29
 [Caesar], B.Alex. 57. paucis ei diebus affertur conventum Cordubensem ab eo deficisse. 
30




This section has thus far been concerned mainly with the role of conventus 
during time of war. Clearly, the members of these bodies were wealthy enough to attract 
the interest of the antagonists of the civil war, and bore collective responsibility for their 
actions. Cicero, however, refers on numerous occasions to the conventus of Syracuse in 
the course of the Verrines. So, for example, we are told that members of the conventus 
could be called upon to serve as judges in “other matters”.31 Given that Cicero has just 
described the permutations of possible disputes involving Sicilians, these other matters 
presumably concern Romans alone. While the conventus mentioned in this particular 
context does not appear to have any judicial functions per se, its individual members 
were clearly competent to act as judges. This procedure for the selection of judges can 
be compared with that indicated in the first Cyrene Edict of 7-6 BC (reproduced in 
Anderson (1927)). In that instance, jurors are drawn from among those Romans in the 
province with a census rating of at least 2,500 denarii (e)c w {n ei0sin oi9 kritai/).32 Given 
Cicero’s subsequent emphasis on the high standing of the members of the conventus at 
Syracuse, it is possible that membership in that body required at least a modest degree 
of wealth. 
Cicero then points out that Verres preferred to appoint judges from among his 
own associates, rather than from the conventus, or even from among the negotiatores.
33
 
Quite apart from Verres’ impropriety in contradicting pre-existing law and custom, it is 
interesting to note that Cicero seems to imply a separation between negotiatores and the 
conventus. This distinction may be connected with the temporary presence of the 
former, in comparison with the permanent presence of the latter, or it may imply a class 
                                                 
31
 Cic., Verr. II.2.13.32. …ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum proponi 
solent. 
32
 See Anderson (1927) for the original text. 
33
 Cic., Verr. II.2.13.34 Selecti ex conventu aut propositi ex negotiatoribus iudices nulli… 
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difference. Given the composition of the conventus at Utica, i.e., individuals involved in 
a range of commerce, it hardly seems likely that the conventus at Syracuse was devoid 
of members engaged in commerce.
34
 Nonetheless, Cicero may have sought in this way 
to augment the standing of the conventus at Syracuse by emphasising the permanence 
and stature of its membership. Cicero repeats this pattern later when he argues that 
judges should have been appointed from the conventus, in order to inquire into the 
relationship between Apronius and Verres.
35
 Notably, in this instance, he emphasises 




Elsewhere, Cicero’s reasons for invoking the conventus revolve around using 
them as surrogate, citizen witnesses of Verres’ misdeeds. So, Cicero claims that any of 
its members could act as witnesses of Verres’ disposal of illegally seized silver.37 
Shortly thereafter, Cicero describes a highly emotive appeal by the Syrian king 
Antiochus to the assembled Roman citizens of Syracuse, following Verres’ 
misappropriation of a highly ornate candelabrum which the king had intended to 
dedicate in Rome.
38
 While there is an emphasis on the idea of religious impropriety at 
the theft of the object, it is again the conventus which is called upon to act as witness of 
an act approaching sacrilege. The image which Cicero maintains of the conventus in 
                                                 
34
 As discussed in chapter 3.2, it is probable that many senators involved themselves in trade, but only on 
an indirect basis to avoid the social stigma attached to it. Cicero may have implied a separation between 
negotiatores and conventus in order to mirror the social biases of the senatorial jury, thus encouraging 
sympathy with the conventus. 
35
 Cic., Verr. II.3.59.136. praeterea conventus honestus Syracusis, multi equites Romani, viri primarii, ex 
qua copia recuperatores reici oporteret… 
36
 Cicero’s emphasis on the presence of equites in Syracuse also reflects the contemporary political 
contest over the composition of juries for the quaestio de repetundis. Cicero claims that, if the senatorial 
jury fails to convict Verres, then legislation placing the juries is equestrian hands is likely to be passed. 
See Seager (1994), p. 225-226. 
37
 Cic., Verr. II.4.25.55. Quem voles e conventu Syracusano virum bonum nominato; producam; nemo 
erit quin hoc se audisse aut vidisse dicat. 
38
 Cic., Verr. II.4.29.67. tamen tum se in illo conventu civium Romanorum dare donare dicare consecrare 
Iovi Optimo Maximo, testemque ipsum Iovem suae voluntatis ac religionis adhibere. 
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Syracuse is that of an exceptional body of individuals, which acts as a stand-in in the 
context of his prosecution for the court itself. Although it suits Cicero’s purposes to 
exaggerate the standing of the community at Syracuse, there must have been some 
element of truth in his attitude toward it. The experiences of the conventus must have 
been sufficiently important to warrant consideration by the court, otherwise Cicero 




Given the frequency with which Cicero describes the involvement of conventus 
in judicial matters in the provinces, it is necessary to consider what connection existed 
between the citizen conventus and the administration of justice. It is clear in both Caesar 
and Cicero that the administration of justice in specific provincial locations was among 
the responsibilities of a governor.
39
 At the end of several of his campaign seasons in 
Gaul, Caesar explicitly notes that he returned to Cisalpine Gaul for this purpose, using 
the phrase ad conventus agendos or similar.
40
 A variant of this same expression is also 
used by Cicero to describe the customary administration of justice by governors in 
particular towns in Sicily.
41
 Given this evidence, there is nothing particularly 
                                                 
39
 To be clear, the governor did not deal personally with all legal matters in his province; matters 
involving citizens of the same city were dealt with by local courts under local law (Cic., Verr. II.2.13.32). 
As outlined by Cicero, the governor was only called upon to deal with disputes involving more than one 
community, or those involving Roman citizens. 
40
 Caes., B.Gal. 1.54.3. …ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos profectus est. See also 5.1.5, 
5.2.1, 6.44, 7.1.1.  
41
 Cic., Verr. II.5.11.28. …ex iis oppidis in quibus consistere praetores et conventum agere soleant… 
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controversial about the notion that the term conventus was used to describe the courts 
operated by governors during the republic.
42
 
It is interesting to observe, however, that modern scholarship on conventus 
sometimes concentrates exclusively on the judicial meaning of the term. Consider, for 
example, the papers by Habicht on the judicial districts of Asia,
43
 and Burton on the 
assize tours of proconsular governors, which likewise draws heavily on evidence from 
Asia.
44
 The focus of both is on early imperial administration. Although they each draw 
on evidence from the republic, they are entirely concerned with conventus in the judicial 
sense. Of course, given that these papers are focussed on relatively specific 
administrative issues pertaining to a later period, this exclusion is hardly surprising. 
Conversely, van Andringa’s work on the conventus of imperial Gaul shows little interest 
in the judicial dimension of the term. He concentrates instead on the role of these 
entities in asserting citizen identity, and the relationship between them and their host 
cities.
45
 The New Pauly’s entry on conventus applies the term only to court districts, 
their principal cities, and the court assemblies themselves.
46
 This omission of alternate 
meanings is remarkable, given that the much more extensive article in the original 




Modern scholarship has thus tended to be bifurcated between the two different 
definitions of conventus, treating them in isolation. This is partly a reflection of the 
                                                 
42
 These were not, however, permanent standing courts, but were established on an ad hoc basis by the 
governor. They may have been held in certain locations on a semi-regular basis, but this likely reflects 
precedent and the presence of a citizen population in those places. 
43
 Habicht (1975). 
44
 Burton (1975). See p. 92 regarding Burton’s focus on Asia. 
45
 Van Andringa (1998). 
46
 Strothmann (1996). 
47
 Kornemann (1900). Furthermore, both the Oxford Latin Dictionary and the Oxford Classical 
Dictionary, 3
rd
 ed. describe the communal and judicial meanings of conventus. 
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subjects and periods on which individual scholars have concentrated, but also of the 
similar meanings of dioi/khsij and conventus when the latter refers to assize districts. I 
would suggest, however, that conventus had not yet taken on this particular, technical 
meaning by the end of the republic. Consequently, the administrative model employed 
for early imperial Asia (i.e., division into dioikh/seij) would not be applicable to the 
late republican west. Both literary and epigraphic evidence pertaining to dioikh/seij 
suggest that the term was distinguished from conventus during the Republican period. 
So, for example, Cicero describes how he travelled from Laodicea to Iconium, in order 
to meet the magistrates and legates of the dioceses.
48
 Elsewhere, he writes to the 
propraetor of Asia on behalf of L. Genucilius Curvus, asking that if the latter should be 
involved in a legal dispute with a Hellespontian, his case should be referred to the 
dioi/khsij of Parium.49 Cicero also mentions that three dioikh/seij were attached to his 
province of Cilicia.
50
 Whether transliterated or left in Greek, Cicero makes a deliberate 
decision not to equate dioi/khsij with conventus. Relevant to this discussion is an 
inscription from Priene, which reproduces a letter from a Roman magistrate to the 
people of Miletus, probably dating to 51-50 BC.
51
 While the precise matter which the 
letter sought to address has been lost, the extant portion orders a copy to be erected in 
the smaller centres of each of several Asian dioikh/seij.52 Furthermore, the author later 
states explicitly that he wrote in Greek, rather than Latin, in order to ensure that the 
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 Cic., ad Fam. 3.8.4. quid enim erat, quod me persequerentur in castra Taurumve transirent, cum ego 
Laudicea usque ad Iconium iter ita fecerim, ut me omnium illarum dioecesium, quae eis Taurum sunt, 
omniumque earum civitatum magistratus legationesque convenirent? 
49
 Cic., ad Fam. 13.53.2. …si quid habebit cum aliquo Hellespontio controversiae, ut in illam dioi/khsin 
reicias. 
50
 Cic., ad Fam. 13.67.1. ex provincia mea Ciliciensi, cui scis trei=j dioikh/seij Asiaticas adtributas 
fuisse… 
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 Sherk, RDGE 52. This date is based on the appearance of Cicero’s name in the document, coupled with 
his governorship of Cilicia in that year. A date of 29-28 BC is also possible, see Habicht (1975), p. 69. 
52
 Lines 46-50. …i(/na te u(mei=j pro\j ta\j e0n th=I dioikh/sei th=I i0di/ai po/leij diapostei/lhsqe e)/n te tw~I 




contents of his letter were interpreted correctly. Obviously, this does not prove that he 
was concerned specifically by a potential for confusion between dioi/khsij and 
conventus. It is, however, clear that this magistrate was aware that linguistic differences 
had to be accounted for in administrative matters. In addition to these pieces of 
evidence, it should be noted that the term conventus was not applied to judicial districts 
until the Augustan period.
53
 Under these circumstances, it is not clear that conventus 
and dioi/khsij synonymously referred to judicial districts in the republic. 
What bearing does the linguistic history of conventus have on the development 
of those bodies in the west? I would suggest that the initial origin of the conventus was 
as a self-organised group of Roman citizens overseas. These entities persisted well into 
the imperial period, and even beyond the extension of citizenship to virtually all 
inhabitants of the empire.
54
 Cicero in particular makes it clear that, at least in Sicily in 
the 70s, judges were drawn from the conventus. Likewise, it is also clear that governors 
there were expected to administer justice in multiple locations. Under this model, the 
conventus developed locally, and their membership was subsequently drawn upon for 
judicial purposes. Once the term conventus was being applied to courts, whose judges 
were members of conventus, it is easy to see how the technical, judicial sense of the 
word could have evolved and become synonymous with dioi/khsij. 
This model is, however, only one among several for the evolution of the 
conventus, a subject which has long been debated. Mommsen, for example, believed 
that the phrase conventus civium Romanorum was simply a descriptive term for the 
citizens who inhabited judicial districts.
55
 This would suggest that judicial districts 
existed prior to citizen conventus. Mommsen’s views were, however, thoroughly 
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critiqued by Kornemann and Schulten, who made it clear that citizen conventus must 
have existed before the term was ever applied to judicial districts.
56
 This leaves open the 
question of whether the impetus for the formation of conventus came from citizen 
groups themselves, or from magistrates. Recent scholarship has tended to treat 
conventus as basically informal organisations, without formal legal status.
57
 A more 
nuanced position is taken by Purcell, who suggests that patronage by Roman 
magistrates led to the recognition of some of these groups as “formal collectivities 
under Roman law”.58 Certainly, the attitude of magistrates toward conventus suggests 
recognition of their usefulness for judicial and military purposes, though whether this 
has any implications for their formal status is unclear.
 59
 Usage of the term conventus by 
Caesar and Cicero does not seem to imply that these bodies were necessarily constituted 
by any external authority. Indeed, conventum appears in the Caesarian lex Ursonensis 
alongside coetum and coniurationem as a class of banned gatherings.
60
 Conventus was 
thus being used in legal documents of the late republic in a non-technical sense. While 
the state of the evidence does not necessarily permit firm conclusions to be drawn about 
how citizen conventus were formed, I believe that the role of the citizens themselves 
was primary. 
A number of other unanswered questions remain about the republican conventus. 
The nature and degree of their organisation, and their range of activities, are both 
unclear. They may have selected curatores in the same manner as later conventus.
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While it is likely that these organisations had officers of some description, no evidence 
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demonstrates that this was the case. Likewise, they may have been loci for cult practices 
specific to citizens,
62
 yet evidence for such differences does not appear until the 
Augustan period.
63
 Given the involvement of some of their members in commerce, it is 
possible that they functioned as a trade association for citizens, but they need not have 
been limited to this role. Our knowledge of republican conventus is a function of the 
interactions between them and Roman magistrates. For the latter, conventus were 
important in the administration of justice, and as potential sources of support in 
wartime. The conventus was a means by which diaspora communities could articulate 
their identity, and the available evidence establishes the reaction of magistrates to them. 
 
7.3 – Social Relations with Rome and Across the Diaspora 
 
 By the end of the republic, many individual communities within the diaspora 
possessed distinct and recognisable identities as conventus civium Romanorum. While it 
is difficult to ascertain whether the stimulus for this organisation was internal or 
external, and while the possibility of some formal, legal recognition cannot be excluded, 
these communities were becoming increasingly prominent in accounts of the actions of 
magistrates overseas. Details of this rise to prominence are sadly lacking, not least 
because of the paucity of literary evidence contemporary with the last third of the 
second century. While the republican empire described in Livy and Polybius did not 
exclude Romans overseas, the role of these communities in their narratives is limited. 
This can be compared with the prominent roles ascribed by Caesar to the conventus of 
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Corduba and Utica during the civil wars, or Cicero’s repeated emphasis on the 
importance of the Roman citizens in Syracuse. Sallust too hints at the importance of 
citizen bodies in Africa during the Jugurthine War.
64
  No doubt the size of the citizen 
community at Cirta was exaggerated to heighten the impact of the massacre there, but 
there can be no doubt about its presence, or that their deaths helped to justify Rome’s 
military action. Furthermore, the fact that Marius directed complaints about Metellus to 
citizens in Utica – despite the impropriety involved – implies that the community there 
had at least some political importance.
65
 Despite the difficulties involved in tracing their 
development, it appears that the communities of the diaspora were playing a significant 
role in the republican empire, perhaps as early as the Jugurthine War, and certainly by 
the 70’s. Given the apparent importance of the diaspora communities, it will be useful 
to characterise the relationships between them and Rome, as well as the relationships 
among those in the diaspora itself. 
 The relationship between Rome and the communities of the diaspora can be 
considered from both an economic and a political perspective. Economically, the 
diaspora was connected to Rome in several ways. Most obviously, as the largest 
population centre in the western Mediterranean, Rome must have been the destination 
for the largest fraction of the goods in which members of the diaspora traded. Consider, 
for example, the trade in grain. Some in the diaspora would have held public contracts 
for the transportation of grain from the provinces (especially Sicily) to Rome, as well as 
to the armies in certain instances. The holders of these contracts, as well as their agents, 
had a clear connection with the state. Even in the case of privately traded grain, 
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however, Rome was the most likely profitable market. Moreover, after the destruction 
of Carthage in 146, the size of Rome relative to any other centre meant that it could act 
as a centre for redistribution. The development and increasing elaboration of the 
harbour and warehouse infrastructure at Rome, Ostia, and Puteoli, are a testament to the 
centrality of Rome in western economic networks.
66
 If goods were already being 
brought to Rome, they could also be shipped from there, as and when needs for those 
goods existed elsewhere. Rome’s position in the hierarchy of urban centres with access 
to the sea was not the only thing that tied the diaspora to the city. The economic model 
described in Chapter Three itself required close connections between individuals in Italy 
and in the provinces. Simply put, this model suggests that wealthy Romans avoided the 
stigma of direct involvement in trade, by using agents in order to undertake commercial 
activities on their behalf. At least some individuals in the diaspora thus relied, in whole 
or in part, on the finances of individuals in Rome in order to engage in trade. The size of 
Rome relative to any other centre, combined with the financial resources available to its 
wealthiest citizens in the wake of its conquests, meant that traders in the diaspora were 
likely to be closely connected to it. 
 Diaspora communities were also connected to Rome politically and militarily. 
This is not to suggest that the relationship between those communities and Rome had 
necessarily been given a legal foundation. Granted, there were a few overseas 
communities whose establishment was sanctioned by the senate, such as Carteia or 
Narbo Martius. Likewise, there are instances of magistrates founding settlements 
without prior sanction from Rome, from Italica to Lugdunum Convenarum. There is no 
evidence to suggest, however, that republican magistrates concerned themselves with 
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establishing a legal foundation for most of the various communities of the diaspora. 
Nonetheless, members of the diaspora could look to magistrates for protection, and for 
patronage and favours. While Cicero was governor of Cilicia, he was approached by 
one M. Scaptius who, acting on behalf of Brutus, sought assistance in settling a debt 
owed by the Cyprian city of Salamis.
67
 Scaptius’ initial request for military assistance 
was declined by Cicero, though we are told that Cicero’s predecessor, Appius, had 
acquiesced to a similar petition. Even Cicero, despite his scruples about placing troops 
under Scaptius’ command, was willing to threaten the Salaminians with compulsion.68 
Ultimately, Cicero agreed to leave the matter unresolved at Scaptius’ behest, despite 
explicitly calling the request impudens, and despite the heavier financial burden this 
would impose on Salamis. While the issue at stake for Cicero was his friendship with 
Brutus, this example highlights some of the benefits that a magistrate could confer on an 
individual in the provinces. Little wonder, then, that Roman patrons commended their 
clients to provincial magistrates. Cicero’s letter on behalf of L. Genucilius Curvus, 
seeking a favourable venue for the latter in the event of a legal dispute, is just one 
example of the practice.
69
 
 The dynamics of patronage did not always involve citizens overseas entreating 
magistrates for favours. By the end of the republic, there are instances of magistrates 
themselves seeking to gain material support from the diaspora. This was particularly 
true in the period of the civil wars, as demonstrated by Cato’s formation of a ‘senate’ in 
Utica and by the recruitment of soldiers from among citizens in Iberia. Even in 
peacetime, though, the diaspora communities could be politically useful. Thus, Cicero 
frequently refers to the Roman citizens of Sicily, no doubt in part because the jury was 
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inclined to treat Verres’ alleged misdeeds against citizens more seriously. 
Simultaneously, however, Cicero’s prosecution of Verres was an act of patronage on 
behalf of those citizens. Roman citizens in the provinces were embedded participants in 
a complex patronage network centered on Rome. In this capacity, they acted in ways 
that were neither wholly private nor public,
70
 playing an integral role in the republican 
empire. 
 The recognition of some close political and economic connections between 
Rome and the diaspora does not imply that this relationship was the only one of 
importance to communities overseas. The available literary evidence, after all, reflects 
the concerns of an elite centered in Rome; that evidence refers to citizens overseas 
primarily when that elite had occasion to deal with them. It is thus potentially 
misleading to concentrate entirely on the relationship between Rome and the diaspora, 
as if relationships between diaspora communities were inconsequential. Though the 
relationship with Rome may have been particularly important, republican imperialism 
was not characterised by a total concentration of commerce and politics in the city. 
Though difficult to trace, there must have been relationships between the diaspora 
communities of individual provinces and regions, as well as between adjacent regions. 
Thus, while the economic model proposed in Chapter Three acknowledges the 
commercial centrality of Rome, it also takes into account the persistence of independent 
coastal trade. Instead of a system defined only by a series of individual relationships 
with Rome, like so many spokes connecting to a single hub, the communities of the 
diaspora would also have had a network of bilateral relationships with each other.
71
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Doubtless the connections with Rome were the strongest, given the unique economic 
and political situation of the city, but these were not exclusive. 
 
7.4 – Conclusion 
 
 An alternate method for evaluating the role of overseas migrants in the 
republican empire is to speculate about the properties that empire might have had if the 
diaspora were absent, or much reduced in population. Under such conditions, a much 
greater fraction of private trade in the Mediterranean would necessarily have been 
undertaken by non-Romans, perhaps Greeks. This would diminish the indirect
72
 
economic benefits that accrued to individuals as a result of Rome’s increasing political 
dominance, but is not a wholly implausible scenario. By contrast, the situation with 
respect to public contracts would have been more complicated. Given that such 
contracts had to be held by citizens, the absence of citizens overseas would pose an 
obvious problem. Public contracts might have covered a much more limited range of 
activities, in which case an alternate administrative model would be required. One 
option would be to employ a much larger bureaucracy, though it is difficult to see how 
this would have developed in the republic. Another option would be to give indigenous 
people a much more prominent role in the administration of public affairs in the 
provinces. Mines, for instance, could have been operated by indigenous peoples, 
remitting a portion of their production to the state. Tax collection could have been 
undertaken by individual indigenous communities, or some such communities could 
have been given a privileged position and collected taxes from others. The inherent 
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difficulty in this scenario lies in the even more prominent role it gives to individuals 
overseas whose connection with Rome was purely one of self-interest. The absence of a 
diaspora corresponds not only with the loss of agents overseas, but a lack of individuals 
who were tied into networks of patronage centered on Rome. An informal but vital 
complement to the minimalist formal administration of the provinces would be lost, 
weakening Roman political control.
73
 The counter-historical republican empire 
imagined here is more loosely integrated with Rome, and perhaps less politically stable. 
Even if the diaspora was not quite a sine qua non of the republican empire, its presence 
was of tremendous importance in defining how that empire functioned. 
 By the end of the republic communities of Romans overseas, united by their 
common citizenship and by their role in economic and political networks centered on 
Rome, were ubiquitous. They often possessed a degree of organisation as conventus, 
even if the precise way in which those bodies emerged is unclear. They co-operated 
with Roman magistrates in the administration of legal matters pertaining to citizens. By 
the period of the civil wars, the diaspora and its resources were sufficient to attract the 
attention of the antagonists. Not only were they prominent and organised, they were an 
integral factor affecting the evolutionary path which the republican empire followed.  
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 In this work, I have characterised the Roman republican diaspora in the west on 
a thematic basis, subdividing my discussion of it according to the activities which 
prompted migration. I was motivated to undertake this discussion on the grounds that 
the diaspora in the west has received relatively little attention in modern scholarship. 
Even when the diaspora has been considered, it has been in the context of debates on 
other subjects, most obviously those on Italian demography. Though there are some 
exceptions to this pattern (e.g., Purcell (2005)), the fact remains that a monograph 
length account which focuses on these overseas communities does not yet exist. In my 
view, the absence of such an account is particularly striking, given that the diaspora was 
the major point of contact between Romans and indigenous peoples, and thus an 
important feature of how Roman imperialism operated on an everyday basis. 
 Traditional perspectives on Roman imperialism have often concentrated on the 
role of the senate, magistrates, and armies, as the defining features of Roman activity 
outside Italy. So, for example, Harris examined how the conduct of politics in Rome 
encouraged military activity overseas, while Richardson discussed in detail the military 
and administrative actions of Roman magistrates in Spain. Conversely, studies 
concentrating on trade have exploited archaeological evidence and focussed on the 
conditions of consumption of goods from Italy by indigenous peoples. No doubt this has 
been conditioned by the increasing availability of suitable evidence, and by a post-
colonial approach which sought to emphasise the agency of local populations. Italian 
migrants fall into a gap between these approaches, on the one hand being much less 
visible than magistrates and armies, yet still closely associated with the imperial power. 
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To be fair, studies of migration from Italy to the east have had a long history in 
scholarship, going back at least as far as Hatzfeld nearly a century ago. For the most 
part, however, these studies have tended to rely on the relatively abundant epigraphic 
evidence available from that region, most obviously at Delos. The situation in the west 
has not received similar attention. Furthermore, as I have suggested previously, it is 
only urbanised areas of the west such as Sicily that are likely to have been comparable 
to those areas of the regions of the east that have been examined. 
I have sought to demonstrate that it is possible to characterise the diaspora in the 
west on the basis of the available evidence. A major step in this process was to assess 
the size of the migrant population, and its geographical distribution. As discussed at 
several points, Brunt’s low assessment of the diaspora’s population contributed to a 
disregard for the subject in subsequent scholarship. In chapter six, I determined, within 
a broad degree of tolerance, a population figure for the diaspora in the west of 170,000 
adult male citizens by the end of the republic. By comparison, Brunt’s figure for the 
entire Mediterranean basin was 150,000. Assuming the overall scales of eastward and 
westward migration were comparable, my estimate is roughly double Brunt’s. 
Nonetheless, this is a much lower migrant population than would be implied by 
Crawford’s suggestion that half of Roman citizens were overseas by as early as 90 BC. 
Despite proposing a migrant population twice that calculated by Brunt, my estimate 
remains closer to his than to Crawford’s. My work has thus sought to correct the 
consequences of Brunt’s minimal estimate, while not taking the opportunity to radically 
inflate the figure which he calculated. 
What are the implications of this revised estimate of the migrant population? 
The most obvious impact is going to be on our impression of the migrant communities 
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themselves. The figures I have proposed suggest that the diaspora was numerically 
significant in the coastal centres where they were likely concentrated, as well as in 
certain inland locations such as the mining districts of Spain. It admits the possibility of 
some Italian migration to rural areas, but implies that the scale of such migration could 
not have been very great. This is simply the logical outcome of my approach, which 
looked at the probable population of migrants in a given context, as opposed to Brunt’s, 
which insisted on direct evidence for their presence. Cleaving closer to Brunt’s figure 
than Crawford’s, however, has interesting ramifications for discussions of Italian 
demography. A high migrant population would imply a high rate of reproduction in 
Italy, and could thus indirectly support the high-population count advocated by Lo 
Cascio. My more limited estimate removes such support. Indeed, my argument has 
some parallels with the modified low-count of Italian population supported by, for 
instance, de Ligt: both involve a moderate upward estimate of conventional population 
figures, but fall well short of accepting radically higher suggestions. High estimates of 
the migrant population would necessarily impact our interpretation of events during the 
civil wars, and into the Principate. If a very high proportion of Roman citizens were 
overseas during the civil wars, the antagonists would presumably have had access to 
much larger resources than has been assumed. Furthermore, one would have to consider 
the subsequent settlement of veterans in the provinces a relatively minor phenomenon in 
quantitative terms. The impact of Augustus’ reorganisation of provincial administration 
might also need to be reconsidered, if his efforts affected a much large number of 
citizens. My comparatively moderate population estimate renders these issues moot, but 




The reappraisal of estimates for the scale of migration from republican Italy is, 
however, only one component of what I sought to achieve. Beyond the demography of 
the diaspora, I have established some characteristics of its distribution, activities, and 
organisation. Involvement with the military, whether as soldiers or among the various 
categories of individuals who accompanied the armies, was one of the drivers of 
migration. As I have shown, even if only a small percentage of all the soldiers who 
served overseas remained there, their numbers would have been a significant 
contribution to the population of the diaspora. Furthermore, I have highlighted the 
activities of generals overseas, who founded and reorganised multiple settlements, 
without apparent reference to Rome. Some of these places definitely contained 
populations of former soldiers, and the presence of such individuals in other 
communities can be surmised. The involvement of generals in provincial settlement by 
former soldiers was, of course, a common feature during the civil wars, and into the 
Principate. The role of earlier magistrates in founding settlements such as Italica and 
Gracchuris are examples, though on a more limited scale, of the same behaviour. 
The other major driver of migration was economic activity. A significant 
fraction of the migrant population consisted of a merchant diaspora located in major 
coastal centres. Not only did this component occupy an advantageous position in 
relation to the biggest market in the Mediterranean, but many of its individuals are 
likely to have had financial connections with wealthy and/or politically active 
individuals in Italy. Indeed, I employed a general model for trade in the late republic 
which emphasised the role of agents, acting in whole or in part on behalf of wealthy 
backers. This implies that a section of the diaspora, far from being negligible, was 
closely bound to the interests of the political class in Rome. My subsequent examination 
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of specific economic activities allowed conclusions to be drawn about the migrants who 
participated in them. Thus, consideration of the grain trade highlighted the intersection 
between its private and public components. The redirection of public grain to Rome, 
combined with the elimination of major alternate centres of trade, facilitated the private 
trade through the city. I traced the trade in wine, giving particular attention to the 
intense traffic between Italy and Gaul in the last quarter of the second century. While 
the diaspora was likely concentrated in coastal centres, the scale of the wine trade to 
inland locations (e.g., along the Aude and Rhone) suggests the presence, at least on a 
transitory basis, of migrants in these places. I examined the organisation of provincial 
mines, most notably those in Iberia. A diversity of administrative arrangements is likely 
to have existed, reflecting both local geological conditions and the period in which 
mines were first organised. Rather than being operated by a small number of societates, 
I suggested that contracts to operate mines in a given area could have been held by 
numerous individuals or small partnerships. Furthermore, based on comparison with the 
operation of mines in a later period, the mining districts are likely to have attracted a 
large number of individuals who took on a variety of supporting roles in those areas. 
The mining districts may thus have attracted a larger number of migrants than would be 
suggested by a traditional model, which emphasised the exploitation of vast numbers of 
slaves by a limited number of monolithic business interests. 
Having examined the diaspora in terms of the activities which its members 
undertook, I turned my attention to the social conditions of the diaspora. Firstly, I 
investigated the development of conventus civium Romanorum in the last decades of the 
republic, both as an indication of organisation in the diaspora, and in connection with 
the administration of justice. Although the details of their early development are 
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obscure, I suggested that the initiative for the development of conventus lay with 
migrants themselves. Given the presence of these organisations, provincial magistrates 
naturally used them and their members in the administration of justice. Indeed, Cicero’s 
presentation of events in the Verrines shows how a failure to collaborate with the 
conventus on judicial matters was a sign of a bad governor. Conversely, the successful 
prosecutor presents the coventus as a surrogate audience and witness of Verres’ 
misdeeds. Following from this, I considered the nature of the political and economic 
networks which bound the diaspora together and to Rome. I proposed that there was a 
particularly strong relationship between diaspora communities and Rome, but that this 
was not exclusive, and that there was also a network of bilateral relationships among 
those communities. 
Such scholarly attention as the Italian republican diaspora has received has 
tended to be in the context of other research questions, with the result that few 
comprehensive conclusions have been drawn about the characteristics of the diaspora. 
Frequently, the diaspora is ambiguously portrayed as an ill-defined collection of traders 
and businessmen who happened to be located overseas. Cicero’s presentation of the 
diaspora in his forensic speeches has been particularly influential in this regard. Thus, in 
the Verrines, it is the negotiatores of the conventus of Syracuse who are frequently 
called upon as the witnesses of Verres’ activities. In this context, however, Cicero has a 
particular interest in evoking the sympathies of a senatorial jury. Thus, he focuses on 
the very group of migrants with whom senators in Rome are most likely to have had 
dealings, and presents those migrants in the most positive possible light. Cicero’s 
concentration on this class of individuals is reflected in modern scholarship, but as I 
have shown in my examination of their activities, the diaspora encompassed a much 
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broader range of individuals. On the military side, former soldiers were among those in 
the diaspora, while the armies attracted a variety of other individuals ranging from camp 
followers to military suppliers. Whether they settled in existing indigenous 
communities, or in centres reorganised by the generals themselves, these individuals 
usually fall beneath the notice of our sources. Likewise, the categories of economic 
activity which I examined suggest the involvement of a larger group of individuals than 
just a handful of comparatively wealthy negotiatores. The Ciceronian portrayal of 
migrant communities thus represents only the affluent apex of the diaspora. 
There is a clear diversity within the diaspora in terms of material prosperity, but 
there must also have been a corresponding diversity of social circumstances.  This 
ranged from ex-soldiers living in indigenous communities or in mixed settlements 
established by their generals, to small groups of traders operating in peregrine towns at 
the limits of Roman trade networks, all the way to the large, organised, and prominent 
migrant communities which existed in many coastal towns. Obviously, the experience 
of individuals in rural Spain or Gaul would have been radically different to that of the 
members of large diaspora communities embedded in pre-existing Greek or Punic cities. 
Whatever their particular circumstances, the members of the diaspora were united by 
their common origin, and by the maintenance of their privileged connection with Italy. 
As agents of wealthy individuals in Rome, some members of the diaspora had direct 
connections to members of the political elite. These members of the diaspora would in 
turn have had personal and/or business links with other, less well connected migrants. In 
short, the diaspora did not consist simply of a handful of individual businessmen in the 
provinces. It was a diverse and complex network of individuals which was a unifying 
feature of the various regions of the western Mediterranean. The story of republican 
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imperialism in the west is not simply one of extending political control through military 
action. Alongside the actions of generals and armies, the Italian diaspora created a 
network of personal connections which determined how the republican empire itself 
operated on an everyday basis. 
This work has examined the Roman diaspora in the republican west in detail, 
and from this basis multiple avenues for future research are possible. While the diaspora 
in the diaspora in the eastern Mediterranean has been given more consideration than that 
in the west, much of that attention has concentrated on epigraphically visible 
communities such as that on Delos. A broader examination of the activities of the 
diaspora in the east could allow for meaningful comparison between it and the migrant 
communities of the west. I have suggested that the diaspora had different characteristics 
depending on the degree of urbanisation in a given region. In that case, the diaspora in 
the east might have shown greater similarity with that in, for instance, North Africa than 
that in Iberia or Gaul. One could also examine the role of the diaspora during the 
Augustan period and beyond. The settlement of veterans overseas changed the 
composition of the diaspora, while developments in provincial administration entailed a 
reorganisation of the overseas population and its relationships with Rome. The first 
evidence for diaspora communities as loci for collective cult activities is also 
contemporary with Augustus. Given the prominence of the diaspora by the late republic, 
we might expect that it was not a passive party to these changes, but an active 
participant. Relationships between the diaspora and indigenous populations likewise 
deserve consideration. These interactions would have been a major determinant of the 
living conditions experienced by the diaspora. More important, however, are the 
cumulative effects of these relationships, the cultural changes and accommodations 
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which they occasioned for each party, and the provincial societies that developed as a 
consequence. 
 To some extent, this thesis has sought to describe people whose social status 
normally rendered them below the notice of our sources. Discussions of former soldiers 
(and even deserters), camp followers, and small-scale traders, fall into this category. 
Even when discussion has turned to individuals of a somewhat higher status, such as 
agents acting behalf of individuals in Rome, they remain relatively obscure. 
Nonetheless, by the end of the republic a large number of Roman citizens were dwelling 
in the provinces. This was a diaspora that Rome’s magistrates did not disregard, and 
perhaps could not afford to. Indeed, members of the diaspora were active participants in 
events during the civil wars. This fact alone suggests an importance which extended 
beyond mere numbers, something which is only to be expected given that citizens in the 
diaspora had a unique connection with the dominant power in the Mediterranean. Given 
the diversity in the diaspora which I have highlighted, there must have been 
corresponding regional variations. Traders would have been attracted in greater 
numbers to existing coastal centres. No doubt Iberia had a relatively greater population 
of former soldiers and their descendants, given the scale of Roman military activity 
there. Whatever the differences, the diaspora was united not only by a common 
citizenship, but by a common advantage conferred by that citizenship. The people of the 
diaspora were, to a significant extent, one face of Roman republican imperialism, and 
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